Safeguards assessment of gamma-ray detection for process monitoring at natural uranium conversion facilities by Dewji, Shaheen Azim
SAFEGUARDS ASSESSMENT OF GAMMA-RAY DETECTION 




























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in the 
School of Mechanical Engineering 
















SAFEGUARDS ASSESSMENT OF GAMMA-RAY 
DETECTION FOR PROCESS MONITORING AT NATURAL 


























Approved by:   
   
Dr. Nolan Hertel, Advisor 
School of Mechanical Engineering, Nuclear and 
Radiological Engineering Program 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Adam Stulberg 
School of International Affairs 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. Glenn Sjoden 
School of Mechanical Engineering, Nuclear and 
Radiological Engineering Program 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Alan Icenhour 
Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology 
Division 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
   
Dr. Bernd Kahn 
School of Mechanical Engineering, Nuclear and 
Radiological Engineering Program 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Robert McElroy 
Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology 
Division 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
   






I must first start by thanking God – everyday I am ever thankful for the opportunities I 
have been granted.  
 
I would like to extend my deep gratitude to Dr. Nolan Hertel, who has been a 
phenomenal adviser. I feel it was providencial that I ended up with such an amazing 
adviser who unwaveringly encouraged my intellectual pursuits. He has instilled 
confidence in my abilities as an engineer, and I look forward to working with and 
continuing to learn from him in the future for many years to come. I would also like to 
thank Dr. Adam Stulberg, who has been instrumental in fostering my technology-
policy interests and provided me with an invaluable skill set for approaching real-
world challenges through the lens of a political scientist armed with the toolbox of an 
engineer. 
 
I would also like to thank my committee – both from Georgia Tech (Dr.Sjoden and Dr. 
Kahn) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Dr. Icenhour and Dr. McElroy), for their 
guidance throughout the duration of my academic and research endeavors in graduate 
school.  
 
None of this research would be possible without the strong support of my colleagues 
at ORNL. First and foremost, I would like to thank Bernie Kirk for her unwavering 
support. Bernie has been a truly phenomenal mentor without whom any of my 
doctoral work would have not been possible. Second, I would like to thank Dawn 
Eipeldauer for developing my initial interest in safeguards work at ORNL. I would 
also like to thank Jeff Chapman for his confidence, enthusiasm and perpetual 
iv 
optimism, Chris Pickett for his investment in my early career development in nuclear 
safeguards, and Dr. Denise Lee, who has supported me though all my work at 
UNCLE. I would like to extend special gratitude to Dr. Stephen Croft, who spent 
many long hours with my dissertation and was truly instrumental in guiding the 
development of my work. Further thanks are due in spades to Steve Cleveland, Linda 
Paschal, and Cheryl Brown, who were always willing to extend a helping hand with a 
smile! I would finally like to thank Michael Whitaker, Joe Birdwell, Tyler Guzzardo 
also from ORNL, and Ram Venkataraman from Canberra, for their support in my 
dissertation research activities. 
 
Further appreciation is extended to NA-241 for funding the UNCLE project and most 
notably to Marc Humphrey, Kevin Veal, Dunbar Lockwood and Melissa Scholz for 
being steadfast supporters of my work along the years. I owe a special debt of 
gratitude to Melissa, as I would not have been able to achieve my goals and am 
forever indebted to her for her support and kindness. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family, whose love, support, and prayers have been 
the motivation and the driving factor behind my accomplishments. I would like to 
thank Pasquale Fulvio, for being a source of strength and balance through the final 
trials of completing my dissertation, and for constantly reminding me that “there is no 
such thing as half a Ph.D!” I would especially like to thank my mother (Parin Ph.D.!) 
for instilling a desire for the lifelong pursuit of knowledge from a young age and my 
father for unconditionally supporting all my educational endeavors. Last but not least, 
I am forever thankful to my sister for always being there when I needed her and for 
always queuing a movie on the weekend despite my mountains of homework (this is 
the last schoolwork, I promise!). It was with her love, encouragement, and sacrifice 
that made all my successes possible.  
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...............................................................................................III 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ XI 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... XIV 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................XXIV 
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................XXVI 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1 
1.1 Project Significance ............................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Problem Statement and Objectives ........................................................................ 2 
1.3 Research Questions................................................................................................ 3 
1.4 Dissertation Overview ........................................................................................... 4 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................7 
2.1 Conversion Methods in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle .................................................... 8 
  2.1.1 Dry Hydrofluor Process ................................................................................ 11
  2.1.2 Wet Solvent Extraction Process .................................................................... 12
2.2 Potential Diversion Pathways in Conversion Facilities ....................................... 15 
2.3 Drivers for New Conversion Capacity Production .............................................. 17 
CHAPTER 3. POLICY CONTEXT: IAEA POLICY-DRIVEN TECHNOLOGIES .......18 
3.1 International Atomic Energy Agency Changes in Early Fuel Cycle Policy ........ 18 
3.2 Legal Context and State-Level Concepts ............................................................ 21 
  3.2.1 Case Study for States with Complementary Access: Canada ....................... 21
 3.2.2 Case Study for States without Complementary Access: Brazil and 
 Argentina ................................................................................................................... 22
3.3 Integrating Safeguards by Design ........................................................................ 24 
3.4 Safeguards System Requirements ....................................................................... 25 
CHAPTER 4. RELATED WORK ON SAFEGUARDING URANIUM 
CONVERSION FACILITIES ...........................................................................................26 
4.1 Previous Approaches to Safeguarding Conversion Facilities .............................. 26 
4.2 Previous Technology Development for Process Monitoring in Uranium 
Conversion Facilities ..................................................................................................... 28 
4.3 Proposed Monitoring Points ................................................................................ 29 
4.4 UNCLE Facility at ORNL ................................................................................... 34 
4.5 Challenges for Developing a Safeguards System ................................................ 35 
CHAPTER 5. INSTRUMENTATION AND METHODS ................................................38 
vi 
5.1 Source Term Analysis ......................................................................................... 40 
  5.1.1 Solution Preparation of Uranyl Nitrate in UNCLE ....................................... 41
  5.1.2 Radiation Signatures for Assaying Uranyl Nitrate ....................................... 42
  5.1.3 Age Effects of Decay Products in UN .......................................................... 44
5.2 Attenuation Analysis ........................................................................................... 45 
  5.2.1 Mass Attenuation Properties of Uranyl Nitrate ............................................ 46
5.3 Detection Efficiency ............................................................................................ 49 
  5.3.1 Self-Attenuation Correction Principles ......................................................... 51
5.4 Detection Instrumentation Selection ................................................................... 55 
  5.4.1 Detection Principles ...................................................................................... 56
  5.4.2 Gamma-Ray Instrumentation Selection ........................................................ 57
5.5 Dilution Measurements........................................................................................ 59 
  5.5.1 Dilution Measurement Setup ........................................................................ 60
  5.5.2 Densitometry Measurements ........................................................................ 62
5.6 UNCLE Measurements........................................................................................ 62 
  5.6.1 Monitoring of Fissile Flow ........................................................................... 63
  5.6.2 UNCLE Measurement Setup ........................................................................ 65
5.7 Validation Simulations ........................................................................................ 67 
  5.7.1 MCNPX Simulations .................................................................................... 68
  5.7.2 Gaussian Energy Broadening Calibration ..................................................... 69
  5.7.3 MCNPX Tallies ............................................................................................ 70
5.8 Algorithm Development for Peak Area Interpretation ........................................ 71 
5.9 Background, Uncertainty, and Sensitivity Analysis ............................................ 72 
  5.9.1 Statistical Uncertainty and Error Propagation .............................................. 73
  5.9.2 In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) .................................................... 74
  5.9.3 ISOCS Peak Efficiency Simulations ............................................................. 76
5.10 Discussion and Recommendations ................................................................... 77 
CHAPTER 6. THEORY: SOURCE PROPERTIES OF URANYL NITRATE ................79 
6.1 Correlating Uranyl Nitrate Concentration with Density ...................................... 79 
6.2 Gamma-Ray Signatures for Uranyl Nitrate Assay .............................................. 82 
6.3 Age Effects and Decay Products in UN .............................................................. 83 
6.4 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 85 
CHAPTER 7. THEORY: ATTENUATION FACTORS ..................................................87 
7.1 Attenuation Properties of UN-Bearing Pipe ........................................................ 87 
vii 
7.2 Attenuation Properties of Uranyl Nitrate ............................................................. 89 
7.3 Emission Intensities from Uranyl Nitrate-Filled Pipe ......................................... 92 
7.4 Properties of Transmission Sources for Densitometry Monitoring ..................... 93 
7.5 Self-Attenuation Correction Factor ................................................................... 101 
 7.5.1 Measurement and Calculation of Self-Attenuation Correction Factor for 
 UN in Pipe ............................................................................................................... 101
7.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 104 
CHAPTER 8. COMPUTATIONAL MODELS ..............................................................106 
8.1 Falcon BEGe Detector Model ........................................................................... 106 
  8.1.1 Simulation Geometry .................................................................................. 107
  8.1.2 Gaussian Energy Broadening Fit ................................................................ 110
8.2 Passive Dilution Simulations ............................................................................. 112 
  8.2.1 Passive Dilution Material Composition ...................................................... 112
  8.2.2 Passive Dilution Source Definition ............................................................. 113
8.3 Densitometry Transmission Simulations ........................................................... 115 
  8.3.1
137





Co Transmission Simulations .................................................. 116
8.4 Enrichment Simulations .................................................................................... 117 
8.5 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 117 
CHAPTER 9. RESULTS: DILUTION EXPERIMENTS ...............................................118 
9.1 Experiment Setup for Dilution Measurements .................................................. 118 
9.2 Energy Calibration ............................................................................................. 120 
9.3 Passive 
235
U Dilution Measurement Results ..................................................... 123 
9.4 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Results ......................................................... 134 
9.5 Dead Time ......................................................................................................... 142 
9.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 143 
CHAPTER 10. RESULTS: UNCLE FACILITY MEASUREMENTS ...........................145 
10.1 Experiment Setup for UNCLE Measurements ............................................... 145 
10.2 Energy Calibration ......................................................................................... 146 
10.3 Change in Flowrate Measurements ................................................................ 150 
10.4 UNCLE 
137
Cs Transmission Measurements .................................................. 160 
10.5 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 167 
CHAPTER 11. RESULTS: VALIDATION SIMULATION MODELS .........................169 
11.1 Passive Simulation Validation Results ........................................................... 169 
11.2 Transmission Simulations of Dilution Experiments ...................................... 176 
viii 




Co ................................................. 178 
11.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 182 
CHAPTER 12. STATISTICAL, UNCERTAINTY, AND SENSITIVITY 
CALCULATIONS ...........................................................................................................185 
12.1 Statistical Uncertainty and Error Propagation ................................................ 186 
  12.1.1 Dilution Background Measurements .......................................................... 186
  12.1.2 UNCLE Background Measurements .......................................................... 189
  12.1.3 Compton Continuum Effects ...................................................................... 193
12.2 Detection Efficiency ....................................................................................... 196 
12.3 MCNPX Analysis ........................................................................................... 199 
12.4 In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) Simulations .................................. 204 
  12.4.1 ISOCS Peak Efficiency Simulations ........................................................... 204
  12.4.2 ISOCS Mass and Activity Calculation of UN in Dilution Experiments ..... 209
  12.4.3 ISOCS Efficiency Models Due to Absorbers and Self-Shielding .............. 211
12.5 Self-Attenuation Correction Factor ................................................................ 214 
  12.5.1 Overall Peak Efficiency .............................................................................. 216
12.6 Sensitivity Analysis of Detection Efficiency ................................................. 217 
  12.6.1 Spatial – Offset ........................................................................................... 217
  12.6.2 Spatial – Source-Detector Distance ............................................................ 224
  12.6.3 Pipe Thickness ............................................................................................ 225
12.7 Enrichment Variables ..................................................................................... 228 
  12.7.1 MCNPX Enrichment Results at 90 g U/L................................................... 228
  12.7.2 MCNPX Enrichment Results at 75 g U/L................................................... 230
12.8 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 232 
CHAPTER 13. DISCUSSION: EVALUATING “SPOOFING”AND DIVERSION 
SCENARIOS ...................................................................................................................235 
13.1 NUCP Efficiency Considerations .................................................................. 235 
13.2 Diversion Stream Modeling ........................................................................... 237 
13.3 Statistical Certainty for Detecting 1 SQ ......................................................... 239 
  13.3.1 Background Optimization to Detect 1 SQ .................................................. 240
  13.3.2 Efficiency Effects on 1 SQ Detection ......................................................... 242
13.3.2.1 Changes in Pipe Thickness ................................................................... 244 
13.3.2.2 Changes in Concentration .................................................................... 245 
13.3.2.3 Changes in Enrichment ........................................................................ 247 
  13.3.3 Material Substitution ................................................................................... 251
ix 
  13.3.4 Peak Area Interpretation ............................................................................. 255
13.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 258 
CHAPTER 14. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK .............................................260 
14.1 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 260 
  14.1.1 Experiment Conclusions ............................................................................. 260
  14.1.2 Simulation Conclusions .............................................................................. 262
  14.1.3 Sensitivity Analysis Conclusions ................................................................ 263
  14.1.4 Overall Detector Performance .................................................................... 264
14.2 Conclusions Regarding IAEA Safeguards Requirements .............................. 265 
14.3 Future Work ................................................................................................... 267 
  14.3.1 Proposed Instrumentation Enhancements for NDA-Based Safeguards ...... 267
  14.3.2 Future Work – IAEA-Level Strategic Approaches ..................................... 269
14.3.2.1 Strategic and Technical Implementation Challenges of Advancing 
Front-End IAEA Safeguards under Policy Paper 21 ........................................... 270 
14.3.2.2 Development of a Statistical IAEA Safeguards Tool for Correlating 
Unique Front-End Process History Signatures Using Chemical Impurity and 
Isotopic Analysis .................................................................................................. 272 
APPENDIX A. GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVENTORY OF CONVERSION 
FACILITIES ....................................................................................................................276 
APPENDIX B. IAEA STANDING ADVISORY GROUP ON SAFEGUARDS 
IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS OF 34(C) IN THE FUEL CYCLE .........................280 
APPENDIX C: UNCLE FACILITY AT ORNL .............................................................282 
APPENDIX D: MASS ATTENUATION COEFFICIENT GRAPHS ............................285 
APPENDIX E: MCNP INPUT FILES ............................................................................289 
APPENDIX F: SIMULATION OUTPUT .......................................................................299 
F.1 Source Definition Comparison of Simulations ..................................................... 299 
F.2 Simulation Output for Passive and Transmission Simulations ............................. 300 
APPENDIX G: DILUTION MEASUREMENT FULL SPECTRA ................................306 
APPENDIX H: DILUTION MEASUREMENT FULL SPECTRA ................................313 
APPENDIX I: BACKGROUND MEASUREMENTS ...................................................316 
APPENDIX J: MCNPX EFFICIENCY MODELS .........................................................317 
APPENDIX K: ISOCS SIMULATIONS ........................................................................320 
K.1 ISOCS Models for Falcon and Osprey Detectors ................................................ 320 
K.2 ISOCS Efficiency Values at for Collimated/Shielded Detectors without Pipe 
Wall at Dilution Concentrations .................................................................................. 322 
x 
K.3 ISOCS Efficiency Values at for Uncollimated/Unshielded Detectors without 
Pipe Wall at Dilution Concentrations .......................................................................... 324 
K.4 ISOCS Efficiency Comparison for Falcon and Osprey without Pipe Wall ......... 326 
K.5 ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Results ................................................................. 329 
 K.5.1 Source-Detector Distance Variation .............................................................. 329
 K.5.2 Pipe Thickness Variation ............................................................................... 331
APPENDIX L: MATERIAL SUBSTITUTION ANALYSIS USING MCNPX .............332 
WORKS CITED ..............................................................................................................335 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 4-1. Monitoring Points Suggested from ORNL Studies. .........................................33 
Table 5-1. Uranyl Nitrate Composition in 1 L (1000 cm
3
) Volume of UNCLE 
Solution. .............................................................................................................................42 
Table 5-2. Properties of Selected Gamma-Ray Detectors for Validation Experiments. ...58 
Table 6-1. Solution Properties of Uranyl Nitrate in Pipe Segment (2.62 L). ....................79 
Table 6-2. Source/Progeny Decay Chains of Predominant Photon Emitters in UN 
Composition in UNCLE. ...................................................................................................84 
Table 6-3. Gamma-Ray Properties of Uranium Isotopes...................................................85 
Table 7-1. UNCLE Pipe Model Dimensions and Composition .........................................87 
Table 7-2. Attenuation Properties of 185.7 keV Gamma Ray through Inner Pipe 
Diameter at Dilution Concentrations of Uranyl Nitrate. ....................................................90 
Table 7-3. Linear Attenuation Coefficients of External Transmission Sources for 
Densitometry Measurements. ............................................................................................95 
Table 8-1. Detector Material Specifications. ...................................................................108 
Table 8-2. Pipe, Detector, and Shielding Configurations. ...............................................109 
Table 8-3. Material Composition of Uranyl Nitrate Solution in Pipe Segment (2.62 L).113 





U Activity for Fresh UN at Dilution Concentrations. ................................114 







U Activity at Various Enrichments for Fresh UN at 90 g U/L. ..................117 
Table 9-1. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries and Resolution Properties of 185.7 
keV 
235
U Peak in Passive Dilution Measurements. .........................................................129 
Table 9-2. Peak-to-Total Ratios of 185.7 keV Peak at 90 g U/L. ....................................131 
Table 9-3. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries and Resolution Properties of 661.7 
keV 
137
Cs Peak in Passive Dilution Measurements. ........................................................139 
Table 9-4. Peak-to-Total Ratios of 661.7 keV Peak at 90g U/L. .....................................142 
Table 10-1. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries and Efficiency Properties of 185.7 
keV 
235
U Peak in UNCLE Measurements. ......................................................................153 
xii 
Table 10-2. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries and Efficiency Properties of 661.7 
keV 
137
Cs Peak in UNCLE Measurements. .....................................................................161 
Table 11-1. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries for Gamma-Ray Emissions from 
Dilution and Transmission MCNPX Simulations of UN for the Falcon BEGe. .............174 
Table 12-1. Falcon BEGe Optimal Counting Time for Passive and Transmission 
Dilution Measurements for Predetermined Precision ......................................................187 
Table 12-2. Inspector 1000 LaBr3 Optimal Counting Time for Passive and 
Transmission Dilution Measurements for Predetermined Precision ...............................188 
Table 12-3. Osprey NaI(Tl) Optimal Counting Time for Passive and Transmission 
Dilution Measurements for Predetermined Precision ......................................................188 
Table 12-4. Optimal Counting Time for UNCLE 1070 RPM Flowrate Measurements 
for Predetermined Precision .............................................................................................193 
Table 12-5. ISOCS Mass and Activity of UN in Dilution Pipe from Falcon BEGe. ......211 
Table 12-6. ISOCS Mass and Activity of UN in UNCLE from Falcon BEGe. ..............211 
Table 12-7. ISOCS 185.7 keV Peak Efficiencies for Various Geometries. ....................213 
Table 12-8. Calculation of κ Based on Derived Values of CF(AT). ................................216 
Table 12-9. ISOCS Peak Efficiency Results for Falcon and Osprey Detectors at 
Measurement Offset Locations. .......................................................................................223 
Table 12-10. 
235
U Activity at Various Enrichments for Fresh UN at 75 g U/L. ..............231 
Table 13-1. Optimal Counting Time for Passive and Transmission Dilution 
Measurements for Predetermined Precision at 90 g U/L. ................................................241 
Table 13-2. Optimal Counting Time for Passive and Transmission Dilution 
Measurements for Predetermined Precision at UNCLE. .................................................241 
Table 13-3. 
235
U Mass (g) in Pipe Segment as a Function of 185.7 keV Net Peak Area.251 
Table 13-4. Annual 
235
U Throughput (MTU/yr.) in UNCLE for 1070 and 500 RPM 
Flowrates. .........................................................................................................................253 
Table 13-5. Comparison of ROI Peak Area (cpm) for (A) Dilution and (B) Pb 
Substituted Solution at Various Enrichments. .................................................................254 
Table 13-6. Capabilities of Installed Instrumentation for NUCP Safeguards 
Monitoring. ......................................................................................................................258 
Table A-1. Status, Classification and Design Capacity of World Uranium Conversion 
Facilities. ..........................................................................................................................276 
xiii 
Table D-1. Infinite Thickness Values for External Transmission Source Gamma -Ray 
Emissions at Dilution Concentrations of UN...................................................................285 
Table F-1. Peak Area and Continuum Comparison of MCNPX 185.7 keV Emission 
with and without 
238
U Source Definition. ........................................................................299 
Table H-1. Peak Area Statistics Comparing Static (Dilution) and Dynamic (UNCLE) 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................315 
Table L-1. Equivalent 90 g U/L UN Solution Mass Replacement for Pb(NO3)2. ...........332 
Table L-2. Mass Fraction of UN-Pb(NO3)2 Solution Employed in MCNPX 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2-1. Typical Processing Phases for Conversion (UO3). ...........................................9 
Figure 2-2. Uranium Conversion (A) Dry Hydrofluor (B) Wet Solvent Processes...........10 
Figure 2-3. Generic Conversion Wet Process (Central Axis) and Potential Diversion 
Paths (Periphery) for a Natural Uranium Conversion Facility. .........................................16 
Figure 2-4. Conversion supply and requirements (reference and high cases) forecast. ....17 
Figure 4-1. NUCP Process Diagram with Proposed Safeguards Instrumentation. ............31 
Figure 4-2. Recommended Material Balance Locations for Uranium Conversion 
Process. ..............................................................................................................................32 
Figure 4-3. UNCLE Facility with First-Generation TUrND Neutron Detector. ...............35 
Figure 5-1. (A) Actinium and (B) Uranium Radioactive Decay Series for Natural 
Uranium. ............................................................................................................................43 




U-Decay Chain. ......................................45 
Figure 5-3: Total Mass Attenuation without Coherent Scattering of Uranium (Z=92) 
Compared with Plutonium (Z=94), Californium (Z=98), and Lead (Z=82). .....................48 
Figure 5-4. Results of Depleted UN Measurements in Parker’s Calculation of CF(AT) 
Based on One-Dimensional Model. ...................................................................................55 
Figure 5-5. Gamma-Ray Detectors Employed in Measurement Experiments. .................58 
Figure 5-6. Dilution Measurement Experiment Configurations. .......................................62 
Figure 5-7. Mass Flowrate Averages for Varying Pump Speeds in UNCLE. ...................65 
Figure 5-8. Detector Setup in UNCLE Facility. ................................................................67 
Figure 5-9. ISOCS MCNP Voxel Validation Technique...................................................75 
Figure 5-10. Pipe Model of Falcon BEGe with Collimator Using ISOCS. .......................76 
Figure 5-11. Pipe Dilution Model of Osprey NaI(Tl) with Shielding Using ISOCS. .......77 
Figure 6-1. Relationship between Density and Uranium Concentration at Various 
Temperatures (NO3/U mole ratio = 1.56). .........................................................................81 
Figure 6-2. Comparison of Measured and Calculated Densities of Uranyl Nitrate as a 
Function of Uranium Concentration. .................................................................................82 
Figure 7-1: (A) Pipe segment employed in dilution measurements; (B) piping assayed 
in UNCLE measurements. .................................................................................................88 
xv 
Figure 7-2. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Stainless Steel at 185.7 keV from 
235
U. .89 
Figure 7-3: Total Mass Attenuation Coefficient at Dilution Concentrations of Uranyl 
Nitrate. ...............................................................................................................................91 
Figure 7-4. Transmission of 185.7 keV Gamma Ray through Various Concentrations 
of Uranyl Nitrate as a Function of Thickness. ...................................................................92 
Figure 7-5. Transmission of 185.7 keV Photon within UN-Filled Pipe Segment as a 
Function of UN Concentration for Narrow-Beam Geometry. ...........................................93 
Figure 7-6. Gamma Ray Transmission through Stainless Steel at Various 
Transmission Energies. ......................................................................................................96 
Figure 7-7. Transmission of 122.1 keV 
57
Co Photon through Various Concentrations 
of UN as a Function of Thickness. .....................................................................................97 
Figure 7-8. Transmission of 365 keV 
133
Ba Photon through Various Concentrations of 
UN as a Function of Thickness. .........................................................................................98 
Figure 7-9. Transmission of 661.7 keV 
137
Cs Photon through Various Concentrations 
of UN as a Function of Thickness. .....................................................................................99 
Figure 7-10. Transmission of 122.1 keV, 356 keV, and 661.7 keV Photons in UN-
Filled Pipe Segment as a Function of UN Concentration for Narrow-Beam Geometry. 100 
Figure 7-11. 
137
Cs Source Transmission as a Function of UN Solution Density for 
Calculation of CF(AT). ....................................................................................................102 
Figure 7-12. Calculation of CF(AT) for UN-Filled Pipe as a Function of Transmission 
through Dilution Concentrations for Various Values of κ. ..............................................103 
Figure 7-13. Calculation of CF(AT) for UN-Filled Pipe as a Function of Dilution 
Concentrations for Various Values of κ...........................................................................104 
Figure 8-1. VisEd Model of HPGe Detector and Collimator. .........................................108 
Figure 8-2. VisEd Represenation of Pipe, Detector, and Pb Brick Shielding 
Configuration Employed in Experimental Measurements. ..............................................109 
Figure 8-3. Falcon BEGe Detector Setup and Simulation Models. .................................110 
Figure 8-4. Detector Resolution Measured Using Calibration Sources for Falcon 
BEGe. ...............................................................................................................................111 
Figure 8-5. Gnuplot Fit of FWHM as a Function of Energy to Obtain the Gaussian 
Energy Broadening Parameters........................................................................................112 
Figure 8-6. External Transmission Source Simulation Models with Falcon BEGe. .......115 
xvi 
Figure 9-1. Laboratory Set-up for Dilution Measurements: (A) Falcon BEGe; (B) 
Inspector 1000 LaBr3; and (C) Osprey 2x2 NaI(Tl). .......................................................119 
Figure 9-2. Experiment Setup following Contamination Incident. .................................120 
Figure 9-3. Energy Calibration Curve of Falcon BEGe Detector for Dilution 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................121 
Figure 9-4. Energy Calibration Curve of Osprey 2×2 NaI(Tl) Detector for Dilution 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................122 
Figure 9-5. Energy Calibration Curve of Inspector 1000 LaBr3 Detector for Dilution 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................123 
Figure 9-6. 90 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors...............................124 
Figure 9-7. 85 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors...............................125 
Figure 9-8. 75 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors...............................126 
Figure 9-9. 50 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors...............................127 
Figure 9-10. 10 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors.............................128 
Figure 9-11. Net Peak Area for 
235
U 185.7 keV Emission as a Function of Dilution 
Concentration. ..................................................................................................................130 
Figure 9-12. Peak Area Values for 
235
U Emissions as a Function of Solution 
Concentration for Dilution Measurements for Falcon BEGe. .........................................132 
Figure 9-13. Peak Area Ratios of 
235
U Emissions (143.8 keV, 163.3 keV) to 185.7 keV 
for Dilution Measurement Data as a Function of Solution Concentration for Falcon 
BEGe. ...............................................................................................................................133 
Figure 9-14. 90 g U/L 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data for All Detectors. ..........134 
Figure 9-15. 85 g U/L 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data for All Detectors. ..........135 
Figure 9-16. 75 g U/L 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data for All Detectors. ..........136 
Figure 9-17. 50 g U/L 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data for All Detectors. ..........137 
Figure 9-18. 10 g U/L 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data for All Detectors. ..........138 
Figure 9-19. Peak Resolution of 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data at 90 g U/L. ...139 
Figure 9-20. Peak Area for 
137
Cs Transmission Measurements as Function of Solution 
Concentration for all Detectors. .......................................................................................141 
Figure 9-21. Dead Time for all Detectors as a Function of Dilution Concentration. ......143 
xvii 
Figure 10-1. Detector Setup in UNCLE Facility: (A) Falcon BEGe; (B) Osprey 2×2 
NaI(Tl); (C) Inspector 1000 LaBr3. .................................................................................146 
Figure 10-2. Energy Calibration Curve of Falcon BEGe Detector for UNCLE 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................147 
Figure 10-3. Energy Calibration Curve of Osprey 2×2 NaI(Tl) Detector for UNCLE 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................148 
Figure 10-4. Energy Calibration Curve of Inspector 1000 LaBr3 Detector for UNCLE 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................149 
Figure 10-5. Volumetric Flowrate Averages for Varying Pump Speeds in UNCLE. .....150 
Figure 10-6. Comparison  of 
235
U Spectra for Flowrate Measurements at 1070 RPM at 
UNCLE. ...........................................................................................................................151 
Figure 10-7. Comparison  of 
235
U Spectra for Flowrate Measurements at 500 RPM at 
UNCLE. ...........................................................................................................................152 
Figure 10-8. Comparison of UNCLE Peak Areas at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM. .............154 
Figure 10-9. Comparison of UNCLE Spectra at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM with 
Dilution Spectra for Falcon BEGe. ..................................................................................155 
Figure 10-10. Comparison of UNCLE Spectra at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM with 
Dilution Spectra for Falcon BEGe at 185.7 keV 
235
U Energy. ........................................156 
Figure 10-11. Comparison of UNCLE Spectra at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM with 
Dilution Spectra for Osprey NaI(Tl) at 185.7 keV 
235
U Energy. .....................................157 
Figure 10-12. Comparison of UNCLE Spectra at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM with 
Dilution Spectra for Inspector LaBr3 at 185.7 keV 
235
U Energy. ....................................158 
Figure 10-13. Comparison of 
235
U 185.7 keV UNCLE Flowrate Peak Areas at Dilution 
Peak Areas for All Detectors. ..........................................................................................159 
Figure 10-14. Comparison of UNCLE 
137
Cs Transmission Spectra at 1070 RPM for 
All Detectors. ...................................................................................................................160 
Figure 10-15. Comparison of UNCLE Transmission Peak Areas at 1070 RPM with 
Dilution 
137
Cs Transmission Peak Areas for All Detectors. ............................................162 
Figure 10-16. Comparison of UNCLE 
137
Cs Transmission Peak Ratios at 1070 RPM 
with Transmission Ratios at Dilution Concentrations for All Detectors. ........................163 
Figure 10-17. Comparison of UNCLE Transmission Spectra at 1070 RPM with 
Dilution Transmission Spectra for Falcon BEGe. ...........................................................164 
Figure 10-18. Comparison of UNCLE Transmission Spectra at 1070 RPM with 
Dilution Transmission Spectra for Osprey NaI(Tl). ........................................................165 
xviii 
Figure 10-19. Comparison of UNCLE Transmission Spectra at 1070 RPM with 
Dilution Transmission Spectra for Inspector LaBr3. ........................................................166 
Figure 11-1. 90 g U/L Comparison of Dilution Measurement Data with MCNPX 
Simulation. .......................................................................................................................169 
Figure 11-2. 85 g U/L Comparison of Dilution Measurement Data with MCNPX 
Simulation. .......................................................................................................................170 
Figure 11-3. 75 g U/L Comparison of Dilution Measurement Data with MCNPX 
Simulation. .......................................................................................................................171 
Figure 11-4. 50 g U/L Comparison of Dilution Measurement Data with MCNPX 
Simulation. .......................................................................................................................172 
Figure 11-5. 10 g U/L Comparison of Dilution Measurement Data with MCNPX 
Simulation. .......................................................................................................................173 
Figure 11-6. Net Peak Area for 
235
U 185.7 keV Emission as a Function of Dilution 
Concentration for MCNPX. .............................................................................................174 
Figure 11-7. Peak Area Ratios of High Intensity 
235
U Emission Photons to 185.7 keV 
for Dilution Measurement Data and MCNPX Simulation at 90 g U/L. ..........................175 
Figure 11-8. 90 g U/L Comparison of 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data with 
MCNPX Simulation. ........................................................................................................176 
Figure 11-9. Net Peak Area for 
137
Cs Transmission MCNPX Simulations at 661.7 keV 
as a Function of Dilution Concentration. .........................................................................177 
Figure 11-10. 
133




Co Transmission MCNPX Simulation Data Spectra at Dilution 
Concentrations. ................................................................................................................179 
Figure 11-12. Net Peak Area for 
133
Ba Transmission MCNPX Simulations as a 
Function of Dilution Concentration. ................................................................................180 
Figure 11-13. Net Peak Area for 
57
Co Transmission MCNPX Simulations as a 
Function of Dilution Concentration. ................................................................................181 
Figure 11-14. MCNPX Simulations Net Peak Area for All Transmission Sources as a 
Function of Dilution Concentration. ................................................................................182 
Figure 12-1. Laboratory Background for Dilution Measurements. .................................186 
Figure 12-2. Falcon Detector Setup in UNCLE (Setup 5: Shadowshield/Frontshield) 
Measuring Leakage into Collimator. ...............................................................................189 
xix 
Figure 12-3. Detector Comparison UNCLE - Setup 5: Shadowshield (Frontshield) 
Leakage into Collimator at 1070 RPM. ...........................................................................190 
Figure 12-4. Detector Comparison UNCLE - Setup 4: No Backshield 1070 RPM. .......191 
Figure 12-5. Full Energy Spectra of Counts Shielded by Backshield in UNCLE. ..........192 
Figure 12-6. 185.7 keV 
235
U Integral Counts in the Absence and Presence of 
137
Cs at 
85 g U/L Dilution. ............................................................................................................195 
Figure 12-7. 185.7 keV 
235




Figure 12-8. Peak Efficiency of 185.7 keV Emissions from 
235
U from Dilution 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................197 
Figure 12-9. Peak Efficiency of 661.7 keV Emissions from 
137
Cs from Transmission 
Measurements. .................................................................................................................198 
Figure 12-10. VisEd Model of MCNPX Simulation Source Particle Interactions. .........199 
Figure 12-11. 185.7 keV Peak Efficiency Values from MCNPX F1 Tallies. .................201 
Figure 12-12. 185.7 keV Peak Efficiency Values............................................................203 
Figure 12-13. ISOCS Calculated Peak Efficiencies for Collimated Falcon at Dilution 
Concentrations as a Function of Energy. .........................................................................205 
Figure 12-14. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations for Collimated Falcon Measurements as 
a Function of UN Solution Density. ................................................................................206 
Figure 12-15. ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for Shielded Osprey Dilution 
Measurements as a Function of Energy. ..........................................................................207 
Figure 12-16. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations for Shielded Osprey Dilution 
Measurements as a Function of UN Solution Density. ....................................................208 
Figure 12-17. Comparison of ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for Shielded/Collimated 
Falcon BEGe and Osprey NaI for 90 g U/L in Pipe. .......................................................209 
Figure 12-18. Comparison of ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of 90 g U/L UN for 
Falcon BEGe (i) with Pipe and Collimation; (ii) with Pipe Wall Without Collimation; 
(iii) with Pipe with Collimation; and (iv) without Pipe or Collimation. ..........................212 
Figure 12-19. Comparison of ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of 90 g U/L UN for 
Osprey NaI(Tl) (A) with Pipe and Collimation; (B) without Pipe with Collimation; 
and (C) Pipe or Collimation. ............................................................................................213 
Figure 12-20. Calculation of CF(AT) for Various Values of κ. .......................................215 
Figure 12-21. Spatial Offset Measurement Values for Falcon BEGe at 90 g U/L. .........218 
xx 
Figure 12-22. Spatial Offset Measurement Values for Osprey NaI(Tl) at 90 g U/L. ......219 
Figure 12-23. Spatial Offset Measurement Values for Inspector 1000 LaBr3 at 90 g 
U/L. ..................................................................................................................................220 
Figure 12-24. 185.7 keV Net Peak Area for Spatial Offset Measurements for All 
Detectors. .........................................................................................................................221 
Figure 12-25. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations for 
Falcon Detector at Various Distances from Source along Central Axis. .........................222 
Figure 12-26. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations for 
Osprey Detector Offset from Central Axis. .....................................................................223 
Figure 12-27. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations for 
Falcon Detector at Various Distances from Source along Central Axis for 185.7 keV 
Emissions. ........................................................................................................................224 
Figure 12-28. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations for 
Falcon Detector at Various Pipe Thickness Values .........................................................226 
Figure 12-29. Relative Efficiency for Falcon Detector at Various Pipe Thickness 
Values ..............................................................................................................................227 
Figure 12-30. MCNPX Spectral Comparison at Various 
235
U Enrichments for 90 g 
U/L. ..................................................................................................................................229 
Figure 12-31. MCNPX Peak Area Comparison at Various 
235
U Enrichments for 90 g 
U/L. ..................................................................................................................................230 
Figure 12-32. MCNPX Spectral Comparison at Various 
235
U Enrichments for 75 g 
U/L. ..................................................................................................................................231 
Figure 12-33. MCNPX Peak Area Comparison at Various 
235
U Enrichments for 75 g 
U/L. ..................................................................................................................................232 
Figure 13-1. Comparison of Mass, Self-Attenuation Correction, Density, and Linear 
Attenuation as Functions of UN Concentration. ..............................................................246 
Figure 13-2. MCNPX Net Peak Area for 
235
U 185.7 keV Emission as a Function of 
Dilution Concentration at 0.76% Enrichment (UNCLE). ................................................249 
Figure 13-3. 
235
U Mass in Pipe Segment as a Function of MCNPX Net Peak Area for 
185.7 keV Emissions for 75 g U/L and 90 g U/L Simulated Enrichments and Dilution 
Concentrations. ................................................................................................................250 




U 185.7 keV Peak Area, 
and Solution Concentration..............................................................................................256 





Figure B-1. SAGSI Assessment of Fuel Cycle Materials Meeting 34(C) Criteria. .........280 
Figure B-2. SAGSI Assessment of 34(c) Materials in the Conversion Process. .............281 
Figure C-1. UNCLE Facility Schematic at ORNL. .........................................................283 
Figure C-2. Two-Dimensional Image of UNCLE Facility. .............................................283 
Figure C-3. 3-D Image Taken with Overview of the Z+F Imager 5006i. .......................284 
Figure D-1. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 90 g U/L at 
Various Energies. .............................................................................................................285 
Figure D-2. Gamma Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 85 g U/L at 
Various Energies. .............................................................................................................286 
Figure D-3. Gamma Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 75 g U/L at 
Various Energies. .............................................................................................................286 
Figure D-4. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 50 g U/L at 
Various Energies. .............................................................................................................287 
Figure D-5. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 10 g U/L at 
Various Energies. .............................................................................................................287 
Figure D-6. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 0 g U/L 
(pure NO3 + H2O) at Various Energies. ...........................................................................288 
Figure F-1. Comparison of MCNPX Simulation for 
235
U Source Definition with and 
without 
238
U Source Definition. .......................................................................................299 
Figure F-2. 85 g U/L Comparison of 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data with 
MCNPX Simulation. ........................................................................................................300 
Figure F-3. 75 g U/L Comparison of 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data with 
MCNPX Simulation. ........................................................................................................301 
Figure F-4. 50 g U/L Comparison of 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data with 
MCNPX Simulation. ........................................................................................................302 
Figure F-5. 10 g U/L Comparison of 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data with 
MCNPX Simulation. ........................................................................................................303 
Figure F-6. MCNPX Simulation for Passive Dilution Measurements. ...........................304 
Figure F-7. 
137
Cs Transmission MCNPX Simulation Data Spectra at Dilution 
Concentrations. ................................................................................................................305 
Figure G-1. 90 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors. .............................306 
Figure G-2. 85 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors. .............................307 
xxii 
Figure G-3. 75 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors. .............................308 
Figure G-4. 50 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors. .............................309 
Figure G-5. 10 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors. .............................310 
Figure G-6. Peak Area Ratios of 
137
Cs Emissions of 661.7 keV to 185.7 keV for 
Transmission Measurement Data as a Function of Solution Concentration. ...................311 
Figure G-7. Peak Area Values as a Function of Solution Concentration for 
137
Cs 
Transmission Measurements for Falcon BEGe. ..............................................................312 
Figure H-1. Full Spectrum Detector Comparison of UNCLE Flowrate Measurements 
at 1070 RPM. ...................................................................................................................313 
Figure H-2. Full Spectrum Detector Comparison of Backshield at 500 RPM Flowrate 
at UNCLE. .......................................................................................................................314 
Figure I-1. Operational Background Taken from UNCLE at Standoff. ..........................316 
Figure K-1. ISOCS Software Interface and Input Parameters for (A) Falcon BEGE 
Detector and (B) Tungsten Collimator. ...........................................................................320 
Figure K-2. ISOCS Software Interface and Input Parameters for (A) Osprey 2x2-
NaI(Tl) Detector and (B) Pb Shielding. ...........................................................................321 
Figure K-3. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of UN for Collimated Falcon without Pipe 
Wall. .................................................................................................................................322 
Figure K-4. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of UN for Shielded Osprey without Pipe 
Wall. .................................................................................................................................323 
Figure K-5. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of UN for Uncollimated Falcon without 
Pipe Wall. .........................................................................................................................324 
Figure K-6. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of UN for Unshielded Osprey without 
Pipe Wall. .........................................................................................................................325 
Figure K-7. Comparison of ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for Shielded/Collimated 
Falcon BEGe and Osprey NaI for 90g U/L with Pipe Wall. ...........................................326 
Figure K-8. Comparison of ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for 
Unshielded/Uncollimated Falcon BEGe and Osprey NaI for 90 g U/L without Pipe 
Wall. .................................................................................................................................327 
Figure K-9. Comparison of ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for 
Unshielded/Uncollimated Falcon BEGe and Osprey NaI for 90 g U/L with Pipe Wall. 328 
Figure K-10. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations for 
Falcon Detector at Various Distances from Source Along Central Axis. ........................329 
xxiii 
Figure K-11. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations for 
Falcon Detector at Various Pipe Thickness Values. ........................................................331 
Figure L-1. Peak Area (cpm) in 185.7 keV ROI for 
235
U as a Function of 
235
U Mass in 
MCNPX Simulated Pipe Segment. ..................................................................................334 
 
xxiv 












































Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear 
Materials  
Ammonium diuranate 
[Model] Additional Protocol 
Ammonium uranyl carbonate 
Broad Energy Germanium 
Complementary Access 
CANada Deuterium Uranium 
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission 
Containment and Surveillance 
Destructive Analysis 
Design Information Verification 
U.S. Department of Energy 
full-width-at-half-maximum 
Gaseous Centrifuge Plant 
Gaseous Diffusion Plant 
Gaussian Energy Broadening 
High-Purity Germanium  
International Atomic Energy Agency 
Information Circular 
Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System 
In situ Object Counting System 
Key Measurement Points 
Lanthanum bromide 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Mass Attenuation Coefficient 
Material Balance Area 
Material Control & Accountability 
Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code eXtended 
Mean Free Path 
Metric Tonnes of Uranium 
Material Unaccounted For 
Sodium Iodide  
Nondestructive assay 
Non-Nuclear Weapons States 
Natural Uranium Conversion Plant 
Nuclear Weapons States 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Principal Component Analysis 




















IAEA Policy Paper 18 
Region of Interest 
Revolutions per Minute 
Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation 
Safeguards by Design 
Short Notice Random Inspection 
Significant Quantity  
Transverse Uranium Neutron Detector 
Uranium Conversion Facility 
Uranium tetrafluoride  
Uranium hexafluoride 
Uranyl nitrate 
Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment 
Uranium dioxide  
Uranium trioxide  
Uranium ore concentrate 
Uranous uranyl oxide  
United States  
xxvi 
SUMMARY 
Conversion, the process by which natural uranium ore (yellowcake) is purified and 
converted through a series of chemical processes into uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), 
has historically been excluded from the nuclear safeguards requirements of the 
235
U-based nuclear fuel cycle. With each step in the conversion process, from 
yellowcake to feedstock for UF6, intermediary uranium oxide and uranium fluoride 
compounds become progressively more attractive products for diversion toward 
activities noncompliant with international treaties. The diversion of this product 
material could potentially provide feedstock for a clandestine or undeclared 
enrichment for weapons development for state or non-state entities. With the 
realization of this potential, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has only 
recently reinterpreted its policies to emphasize safeguarding this feedstock in response 
to such diversion pathways. 
  
This project employs a combination of simulation models and experimental 
measurements to develop and validate concepts of nondestructive assay monitoring 
systems in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). In particular, uranyl nitrate 
(UN) solution exiting solvent extraction was identified as a key measurement point 
(KMP), where gamma-ray spectroscopy was selected as the process monitoring tool.  
The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility at Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory was employed to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a 
purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an 
NUCP. This work investigated gamma-ray signatures of UN circulating in the 
UNCLE facility and evaluated various gamma-ray detector (HPGe, LaBr3, and NaI) 
sensitivities to UN. Several predictive modeling techniques were explored where 
satisfactory agreement with experimental measurements was achieved. 
xxvii 
It may be concluded that transmission-corrected gamma-ray spectra provides a reliable 
way to monitor the 
235
U concentration of UN solution in transfer pipes in NUCPs. 
Furthermore, predictive and analysis methods are adequate to design and realize 
practical designs. The 
137
Cs transmission source employed in this work is viable but 
not optimal for 
235





Co as alternative densitometry sources. All gamma-ray 
detectors are viable for monitoring natural uranium feed; although high-purity 
germanium (HPGe) is easiest to interpret, it is the least attractive as an installation 
instrument. Overall, for monitoring throughput in a facility such as UNCLE, an error 
of less than 0.17% is required in order to detect the diversion of 1 significant quantity 
(SQ) of UN. Although calibrated gamma-ray detection systems are capable of 
determining the concentration of uranium content in NUCPs, it is only in combination 
with supporting data (such as flowrate, enrichment) and verifiable declarations that 
safeguards conclusions can be drawn. Consequently, lessons learned and 
recommendations are provided. 
 
In addition to the technical assessments and sensitivity analyses presented, the 
proposed changes in IAEA safeguards policy are described, as are the political and 
operational challenges associated with advancing front-end safeguards monitoring.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The nuclear safeguards requirements of the 
235
U-based nuclear fuel cycle historically 
began with uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), having precluded any precursor products 
in the conversion part of the fuel cycle. Conversion is the process by which natural 
uranium ore (yellowcake) is purified through a series of chemical processes into UF6. 
With each intermediary step in the conversion process, unmonitored intermediary 
uranium oxide and uranium fluoride compounds could become attractive products for 
misuse or diversion to clandestine or undeclared activities. The International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) has recently revised its policies to recommend safeguarding 
this potential feedstock material in response the increased availability of dual-use 
nuclear technology in the changing global political environment. 
 
1.1 Project Significance  
Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards when 
any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic 
enrichment or fuel fabrication exist. Under the revised policy, IAEA Policy Paper 18 
(PP18), “Safeguards Measures Applicable in Conversion Plants Processing Natural 
Uranium,” the starting point for nuclear material under safeguards was reinterpreted 
and a new definition of source material in this category was introduced [1].
 
Under 
IAEA PP18, the IAEA suggests that these purified uranium compounds should be 
subject to safeguards procedures no later than at the first point in the conversion 
process. In response, the IAEA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) have 
become interested in developing instruments, tools, strategies, and methods that could 
be used in safeguarding materials and detecting diversion in the front end of the 
nuclear fuel cycle prior to the production of UF6 [2]. Efforts thus far have largely 
2 
focused on conceptual approaches, not integrated technology development for 
safeguards monitoring, to determine if IAEA requirements can be met. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Objectives 
The aim of nuclear safeguards is to deter diversion of nuclear material from peaceful 
uses by maximizing the chance of early detection. This work evaluates whether 
passive nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques using gamma-ray spectroscopy can be 
used as a technical method for drawing safeguards conclusions, and if the IAEA 
detection requirements of 1 significant quantity can be met. In the scope of natural 
uranium conversion plants (NUCPs), 1 SQ translates to 10 metric tons of natural 
uranium over a period of 1 year with a detection probability of 50% [2]. This project 
creates and evaluates a technical design basis using passive gamma-ray spectroscopy 
for the safeguarding of nuclear material at the first identified key measurement point 
(KMP) in an NUCP. PP18 articulates that the uranyl nitrate (UN) stream exiting 
solvent extraction during conversion is the first point at which uranium is of suitable 
purity for enrichment or fuel fabrication.  
 
Trials of the proposed NDA system in operational settings will test and evaluate new 
applications of safeguards instrumentation. The precision, capabilities, and 
applicability limitations of the NDA-based integrated safeguards system is to be 
determined through validating existing plant operations, as well as providing a 




1.3 Research Questions  
The following key research questions will be addressed in the scope of this project: 
First, although there is precedence for reinterpretation of Integrated Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle Information Circular (INFCIRC) 153 in response to technology changes, there 
will be plurality of legal and political hurdles to implement safeguards earlier in the 
fuel cycle. A dichotomy between states with and without Complementary Access 
(CA) will become evident, as will the safeguards burdens further imposed on non-
nuclear weapons states (NNWS) versus those of nuclear weapons states (NWS). With 
increased interest in civilian nuclear energy and a subsequent increase in demand for 
conversion capacity, this legal and political issue will have to be imminently addressed 
for existing facilities and new facility builds. With the evolution of new nuclear fuel 
cycle technology, the requirement for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a binding 
legal and policy agreement must continue to evolve with these technology changes. 
The technology-policy nexus is evaluated with respect to the recommendations of 
PP18 in the purview of technological progress. 
 
Second, given that passive gamma-ray techniques have long been employed in front-
end enrichment monitoring, this tradition continues to be applicable for process 
monitoring (PM) of UN. Although high-resolution semiconductor detectors provide 
the most precise signatures, lower-resolution scintillator detectors will likely prove to 
be more robust under field operating conditions, but require advanced techniques to 
unfold lower resolution signatures from high interference/background. Based on these 
premises, this project evaluates what gamma-ray detection system is suitable for 
safeguards monitoring of intermediate compounds during the conversion process. 
Also, the capabilities and limitations of these NDA gamma-ray systems provide for 
PM of UN in NUCPs are assessed. 
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Third, due to the high uranium throughput of conversion facilities, meticulous 
monitoring will be required along the entire conversion process. Although PM at a 
single KMP will provide essential safeguards data for a small NUCP, the complex 
structure of large NUCP facilities will require more extensive in-line monitoring 
points in order to differentiate diversion activities from inventory differences and 
material unaccounted for (MUF). The IAEA’s criteria for diversion detection of 1 SQ 
at an NUCP corresponds to a diversion of 10%, 1%, and 0.1% production from small, 
medium, and large production plants, respectively. Although it may be easier to detect 
a 10% diversion with a smaller production facility, the nature of the diversion threat 
becomes increasingly more complex with increasing facility size, and the burden for 
accurate detection becomes increasingly challenging. Once the capabilities of each of 
the tested detection systems are ascertained, the robustness of the NDA 
instrumentation is evaluated for detecting undeclared diversion, misuse, or “spoofing” 
activities during conversion. Detection limits and sensitivities from detection 
capabilities are then translated into an assessment of safeguards conclusions that can 
be drawn. 
 
1.4 Dissertation Overview 
To address the posed research questions, this dissertation is structured as follows: In 
Chapters 2–4, current natural uranium conversion facilities subject to IAEA 
inspections and inspection approaches are identified. Potential measurement locations 
and associated technologies for doing so based on previous technical and policy work 
are also summarized. The potential impact and benefits of unattended PM for both the 




Chapter 5 outlines the methodology for developing the proof-of-principle for NDA 
monitoring at NUCPs. Candidate NDA systems are further explored in Chapter 5, 
where IAEA technical requirements, compliant instrumentation, and methods are 
identified. Experimental measurement designs are described and serve to assess each 
instrument’s PM capability in determining instrumentation sensitivities and 
limitations.  This includes fully characterizing the UN source term, with calculations 
provided in Chapter 6. As Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) 
employs UN from uranium that is 40 years old, a source term analysis is required to 
determine aged-based signature changes vis-à-vis freshly solvent-extracted UN in 
NUCPs. Once the source term has been characterized and potential monitoring 
signatures have been identified, attenuation measurements are conducted in Chapter 7. 
At the established KMP, UN exiting the solvent extraction stream in an NUCP flows 
through an intricate array of stainless steel piping. Consequently, for gamma-ray 
detection, UN emissions must penetrate stainless steel piping. In addition, use of an 
external gamma-ray source for densitometry measurements must be calculated to 
determine emission intensity through the entire diameter of the UN-bearing pipe.  
 
Chapter 8 outlines the simulation geometry, source term, and tallies that are conducted 
via Monte Carlo simulations, which are validated via the subsequent measurements. 
Results of experimental dilution measurements in a controlled laboratory setting for 
validation, as well as for operational measurements in the UNCLE facility, are 
provided in Chapters 9 and 10, respectively. Chapter 11 provides the results of the 
Monte Carlo simulations in order to simulate the detector response function based on 
the dilution experiments. With validated simulation models at each of the dilution 
concentrations, the detector responses for both passive and a variety of transmission 
sources are simulated to determine the optimum transmission source for UN 
densitometry measurements. In addition, simulation measurements are conducted in 
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order to assess instrumentation sensitivity to varying enrichments of UN solution. 
Based on dilution and facility data, the robustness of monitoring signatures is assessed 
via statistical analysis and error propagation in Chapter 12. Chapter 12 further 
provides a more detailed sensitivity analysis of the detector response to a variety of 
key factors affecting detection efficiency (geometry, attenuation, sample self-
attenuation, intrinsic efficiency). 
 
From data obtained from both the experimental measurements and simulations, in 
combination with a detailed sensitivity analysis, evaluations are made in Chapter 13 
regarding the optimization of gamma-ray NDA instrumentation for PM at this KMP. 
Assessments are made regarding whether the IAEA timeliness and detection goals are 
feasible, and whether passive gamma-ray techniques are capable of detecting 
undeclared, misuse, or diversion scenarios at an NUCP. Finally, Chapter 14 provides 
conclusions and recommendations for ensuing work, as well as lessons learned 




CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 
At present, the IAEA’s Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System (INFCIS) 
database lists 22 conversion facilities currently with a total design capacity of 155.6 kt 
of heavy metal (uranium)/yr. [3] [4]. Approximately 75% of the current capacity is 
held in NWS. Four new facilities are either in planning or under construction in Brazil 
and France, increasing the projected capacity by 31.5 kt HM/yr. All projected, 
operational, and decommissioned conversion facilities and statuses from INFCIS are 
summarized in Appendix A. 
 
Distributed worldwide, the conversion facilities provide fuel to a growing number of 
nuclear power plants (currently totaling 495) [5]. Conversion facilities worldwide can 
be broadly grouped into the following three distinct sizes, based on production in 
metric tonnes uranium (MTU): [6] 
 
 Small (S) ~ 100 MTU/yr, 
 Medium (M) ~ 1000 MTU/yr, and  




2.1 Conversion Methods in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
To develop a framework for assessing the technical basis of a safeguards system 
employing NDA technology, it is first necessary to outline the chemical processes 
common to NUCPs. In the 
235
U-based nuclear fuel cycle, conversion is considered to 
be part of the front end of the fuel cycle, following the mining and milling steps.
1
 
Conversion is necessary in order to purify the uranium compounds from the ore 
components resulting from the milling phase of the fuel cycle. In the conversion 
process, uranium ore concentrate (UOC) containing 75–80% U3O8 [7] is purified and 
converted through a series of chemical procedures into uranium dioxide (UO2), 
uranium trioxide (UO3), or uranium metal for fuel fabrication, as well as uranium 
hexafluoride gas (UF6), as feedstock for enrichment prior to fuel fabrication [8]. The 
main conversion processes are shown in Figure 2-1, which depicts conversion to UO3. 
 





 Note that this is not applicable to the products of in situ leach mining. 
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Figure 2-1. Typical Processing Phases for Conversion (UO3). 
Reproduced from Francis [9]. 
 
Two methods are commercially employed for converting UOC to UF6 in the 
conversion process: (1) the dry hydrofluor process [Figure 2-2(A)], in which 
fractional distillation is employed in the final stages to purify the feed materials to 
produce UF6, and (2) the wet solvent extraction process [Figure 2-2(B)], in which 
yellowcake is dissolved, purified, and converted via a series of chemical processes to 







Figure 2-2. Uranium Conversion (A) Dry Hydrofluor (B) Wet 
Solvent Processes. 
Figure 2-2(B)-Small-scale batch NUCP (left chain) and medium/large-scale 
continuous (right chain). Reproduced from Faulkner et al. [11]. 
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 Dry Hydrofluor Process 2.1.1
For an NUCP employing the dry hydrofluor process [Figure 2-2(A)], the chemical 
processes can be summarized as follows [6] [7].  
 
 Roasting and fluidized-bed reduction of yellowcake or uranium oxides 
(U3O8 or UO3) to UO2 using hydrogen from cracked ammonia [5]: 
 
U3O8 + 2H2  3UO2 + 2H2O         [2-1] 
    or 
UO3 + H2  UO2 + H2O        [2-2] 
 
 Fluidized-bed hydrofluorination of UO2 to produce crude UF4 using 
anhydrous HF 
 Fluidized-bed fluorination of UF4 to UF6 using elemental fluorine 




 Wet Solvent Extraction Process 2.1.2
As the production capacity of a conversion facility increases, so does the complexity 
of the processing system. Depending on the size and throughput of the NUCP, the 
intermediary processing steps vary in the conversion of uranium ore to fluoride gas. 
For an NUCP employing the wet solvent extraction process [Figure 2-2(B)], the 
chemical processes (according to plant size) can be summarized as follows [5] [6] [7]. 
 
Common to all sizes of natural uranium conversion facilities employing wet solvent 
extraction, the conversion process begins as follows. 
 
 Dissolution of yellowcake with hot nitric acid to form a uranyl nitrate 
(UN) solution as UO2(NO3)2
.
6H2O 
 Purification of UN using solvent extraction with tributyl phosphate in 
kerosene or dodecane 
 Evaporation, stripping the uranium from the organic phase, and 
washing with dilute nitric acid, producing a purified and concentrated 
UN solution  
 
For a selection of small plants (100 MTU/year), and most medium- to large-sized 
plants (1000 MTU to 10,000 MTU per year), denitration is employed in continuous 
operation to accommodate higher production. 
 
 Heat is applied to dehydrate and denitrate pure UN, producing UO3. 
 Hydrogen induces oxide reduction from UO3 to UO2. 
 
For all plant production sizes, the final phases converge. 
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 Anhydrous HF is used to produce UF4 via hydrofluorination of UO2: 
 
UO2 + 4HF  UF4 + 2H2O.     [2-3]    
 
 UF4 can follow one of two routes:  
o Fluorinated into UF6 using F2 by being fed into a fluidized bed 
reactor or flame tower with gaseous fluorine;   
 
UF4 + F2  UF6        [2-4] 
 
o Reduced to uranium metal by using magnesium or calcium and heat 
 
The resulting UF6 is moist and highly corrosive and is prepared as a gas for 
enrichment activities [12]; however, under pressure at lower temperatures, UF6 can be 
liquefied and stored in thick-walled steel shipping cylinders, weighing over 15 tons 
when filled [5]. The cooled UF6 crystallizes from liquid to form a white solid within 
these cylinders. 
 
It is possible for a small size plant to operate continuously, as outlined in the above 
process, but it is also suited to batch production techniques, where denitration is 
replaced by the following.  
 Ammonia/ammonium hydroxides are used to precipitate ammonium 
diuranate, or carbon dioxide is used to precipitate ammonium uranyl 
carbonate (AUC). 
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 Calcination in a fluidized bed reactor in the presence hydrogen is 
employed to produce UO3, or UO2 if heated sufficiently.  
 
The typical process steps for the conversion from yellowcake to UF6 for small-, 
medium-, and large-scale production plants are summarized in Figure 2-2. 
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2.2 Potential Diversion Pathways in Conversion Facilities 
Each step in the conversion process at an NUCP increases the nuclear material 
attractiveness for diversion as the uranium is successively purified. Products created 
later in the conversion process are more attractive products for diversion. Although 
uranium in liquid form as UN is the first attractive diversion point, the handling of 
solid material (uranium oxides and fluorides) in a solid phase may be a more attractive 
medium, as solids are more easily handled than liquids. Naturally, the most desirable 
product for diversion would be a UF6 cylinder for diversion to a poorly safeguarded or 
clandestine enrichment facility. A variety of potential diversion paths exist for a 
generic NUCP, as shown in Figure 2-3. Thus, a detailed understanding of the 
processes during conversion operations is essential to selecting instrumentation and 
strategies for NUCP safeguards and controls. At various points in the conversion 
process, the intermediary material becomes attractive in relevant scenarios, where the 
level of appeal for each of these diversionary activities is contingent upon the state 
facilities available. For example, diversion to a laser enrichment facility only becomes 
a major point of interest if the host state has access to such a facility, or access to a 
clandestine means of transferring it to a complicit state with the required 
infrastructure. Consequently, not only does the intermediary product become more 
attractive, it holds a higher strategic value. 
 
As UN is denitrated to UO2 or UO3, these compounds produce UCl4 via chlorination, 
which is an attractive feedstock for electromagnetic isotope separation chemical-ion 
exchange enrichment [11]. Alternatively, following reduction, UO2 can be 
hydrofluorinated into UF4 or metallothermically reduced to uranium metal for use in 
atomic vapor laser isotope separation or for plutonium production [11]. Thus, 
unmonitored UF6 could be shipped to a clandestine location for distillation prior to 
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enrichment in gaseous diffusion or centrifuge facilities. In essence, diversion could be 
as simple as draining UN into a drum in a trickle-diversion (“garden-hose”) scenario.   
 
 
Figure 2-3. Generic Conversion Wet Process (Central Axis) and Potential 
Diversion Paths (Periphery) for a Natural Uranium Conversion Facility.  









UO2(NO3)2  UO3 or U3O8
Reduction


















UO2 Product Certification 














2.3 Drivers for New Conversion Capacity Production 
With global interest in civil nuclear energy production gaining momentum, aspiring 
nuclear energy states will undoubtedly be placing increasing demand on current 
facilities. Nuclear Engineering International has projected a nearly 100% increase in 




Figure 2-4. Conversion supply and requirements (reference and high cases) 
forecast. 
Reproduced from Schwartz and Steyn [13]. 
 
In tandem with IAEA drivers for reinterpreting early fuel cycle safeguards policy, this 
increase in projected demand presents a complex technology-policy nexus that must 
be rectified for existing and new facilities in order to ensure the peaceful civilian 
development of nuclear energy, on a global scale.   
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CHAPTER 3. POLICY CONTEXT: IAEA POLICY-DRIVEN 
TECHNOLOGIES  
3.1 International Atomic Energy Agency Changes in Early Fuel Cycle 
Policy 
Prior to 2003, the IAEA did not consider the feedstock (UOC) or intermediary 
products (UO3, UF4) within the conversion process to be of safeguards relevance [14]. 
The two principal products from the NUCPs that fall under IAEA safeguards are UF6, 
feedstock for subsequent enrichment at commercial facilities, and UO2, used for fuel 
in heavy-water-moderated reactors [i.e., the Canada Deuterium Uranium reactor 
(CANDU)] and, to a limited extent, in light water reactors. Industrial practices have 
changed at the front end of the fuel cycle, resulting in high-purity uranium-bearing 
products. Consequently, IAEA safeguards practices must remain current with 
technology developments and industrial practices in order to ensure safeguards are 
operating with efficacy. With the ambiguous technical interpretation of INFCIRC/153 
(Corrected) paragraph 34(c), the IAEA has been inconsistent in the implementation of 
safeguards at NUCPs. Traditionally, states have only been bound by comprehensive 
IAEA safeguards under INFCIRC/153, beginning with the end product of NUCPs 
[15]. As such, the IAEA has limited access to early fuel cycle activities, which would 
fall under the scope of the Model Additional Protocol (AP) for subscribing states 
(INFCIRC/540), limiting IAEA monitoring capabilities [16]. Thus, the declared final 
product (UF6 or UO2) from an NUCP was the starting point for safeguards 
accountability, with no assurance or accountability metrics for any undeclared 
production. 
 
The new approach to safeguarding NUCP intermediate compounds was first outlined 
by Doo et al. in reference to INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) paragraph 34(c), when it was 
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first stated that the IAEA considers all purified aqueous uranium solutions or uranium 
oxides suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication as products as candidates for 
safeguards under 34(c) [14] [15]. Paragraph 34 (c) of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) reads 
[1] [15] as follows:  
 
(a) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not 
reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in sub-
paragraph (c) below is directly or indirectly exported to a non-
nuclear-weapon State, the State shall inform the Agency of its 
quantity, composition and destination, unless the material is 
exported for specifically non-nuclear purposes; 
 
(b) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not 
reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in sub-
paragraph (c) below is imported, the State shall inform the Agency 
of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for 
specifically non-nuclear purposes; and 
 
(c) When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for 
fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched leaves the plant or 
the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such 
nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at a later 
stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into the State, the 
nuclear material shall become subject to the other safeguards 
procedures specified in the Agreement.  
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Under the revised interpretation, Doo et al.  highlight that “full safeguards procedures 
should be applied no later than the first point in the conversion process at which such 
material leaves the process stage or the plant in which it is produced” [14]. This was 
later codified in 2003 in PP18, “Safeguards Measures Applicable in Conversion Plants 
Processing Natural Uranium,” stating that the point for nuclear material under 





Under IAEA PP18, the IAEA suggests that these purified uranium compounds should 
be subject to safeguards procedures no later than the first point in the conversion 
process. Before the issue of this policy, only the final products of the uranium 
conversion plant were considered to be of a composition and purity suitable for fuel 
fabrication or for being isotopically enriched and, therefore, subject to all the 
safeguards procedures described in the safeguards agreements. The IAEA now 
considers that the UN solution meets the above requirement, and if there are no 
procedures to account for this material in a particular facility, the full safeguards 
procedures should be extended upstream in the process. Further points addressed in 
PP18 to support advancing the starting point of safeguards include (1) a new definition 
of source material, which potentially brings yellowcake under safeguards; (2) new 
requirements for design information verification (DIV) and provision; and (3) use of a 
complementary access-type concept [1] [17] [18]. 
 
The IAEA’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) was 
formed to address the issue of UOC materials meeting 34(C) criteria. Recent work by 
the SAGSI has begun to more concretely define where safeguards should start in the 
conversion process, as conversion plants in some states produce high-purity uranium 
oxides that meet nuclear industry standards, such as those of the American Society for 
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Testing and Materials (ASTM) [19] [20]. SAGSI’s analysis and recommendations of 
where safeguards should be applied in the fuel cycle and in conversion facilities are 
provided in Appendix B. SAGSI advised that measures should be determined on a 
state-by-state basis, taking into account safeguards by design (SBD), integrated 
safeguards, and state-level concept activities [21].  
 
3.2 Legal Context and State-Level Concepts 
As noted by SAGSI, a variety of technical and strategic implementation challenges 
exist in response to implementing PP18. This analysis extends into a comprehensive 
assessment of the motivations, impacts, and effectiveness of such safeguards efforts on 
the overall nonproliferation regime. The recommendations made under PP18 must 
further be extrapolated for states with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) 
in effect under INFCIRC/153 [15] versus states with CA under the AP in effect under 
INFCIRC/540 [16]. Based on the INFCIS, approximately 25% of the global 
conversion capacity lies in NNWS [3]. 
 
 Case Study for States with Complementary Access: Canada 3.2.1
From the NNWS with conversion facilities, almost all the conversion capacity 
(~37 kt HM/yr.) is produced in Canada, which has ratified the AP [3] [22]. Canada 
represents a case study for a state with CA in effect that was successfully able to 
implement the requirements under PP18 [23] [24]. From 2003 to 2005, Canada was 
able to bring two of the world’s largest conversion facilities – Port Hope and Cameco 
Blind River – into compliance with PP18. In PP18, the primary recommended 
measurement point was the UN stream exiting solvent extraction, which the Canadians 
noted was a well-measured point by the operator for sampling. However, due to the 
intermixing of unsafeguarded recycle streams, this point prove to be an unacceptable 
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point for PM, as safeguarded and unsafeguarded material were intermixing. Flexibility 
among the IAEA, Canadian regulatory authorities, and the operators was instrumental 
in eventually establishing the two facilities, each as a single material balance area 
(MBA) to meet PP18 requirements. 
 
Two key challenges were faced by the Canadians in bringing their conversion 
facilities into compliance with the requirements under PP18: First, the Canadians 
noted that it was difficult to implement safeguards in facilities with throughput that 
were built prior to safeguards implementation, thus lacking an integrated safeguards 
design. Second, a sizeable effort was required to characterize the large inventory of 
historical waste, as well as to account for the large difference in their inventory, which 
is a natural result of large-scale chemical operations. This latter statement was 
similarly echoed by the Brazilians, who are non-signatories of the AP, during the joint 
study between DOE and Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) [25]. 
  
 Case Study for States without Complementary Access: Brazil 3.2.2
and Argentina 
Brazil and Argentina hold the minority remainder of the world’s NNWS conversion 
capacity (~357 kt HM/yr.) [3]. For Argentina and its Brazilian regional counterpart in 
the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(ABACC), the starting points of safeguards and the requirements for any changes of 
this definition have been legally outlined in the Quadripartite Agreement [17] [18]. 
Both parties of the Quadripartite Agreement are not signatories to the AP [22], and 
both ascertain that the recommendations under PP18 are beyond the legal framework 
and requirements of the Quadripartite. Beyond legal precedence, challenges cited by 
the Quadripartite echo the challenges aforementioned by the Canadians. Like the 
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Canadians, the Quadripartite parties also identified waste management optimization 
and process recycling as being limited under PP18. The Quadripartite also challenges 
the use of CA echoed in PP18, as neither enforce the AP, which also permits CA. 
Ultimately, ABACC feels that the new safeguards recommendations would require 
additional effort by all stakeholders “without having profitable return” [17]. Instead of 
legally binding the recommendations under PP18, the Quadripartite recommends the 
use of mail-box declarations by the operator on a weekly basis, noninvasive 
containment and surveillance (CS) measures as a deterrent for misuse,  and the use of 
short notice random inspections (SNRI) [17]. 
 
Based on these case studies, it seems that implementing recommendations under PP18 
are more intuitive to states with the AP in force, as seen with Canada. Having prepared 
for the requirements of complying with the CA requirements of INFCIRC/540, which 
extend to facilities beyond those in INFCIRC/153, states with this requirement are 
more readily compliant and equipped to address changes in interpretation of 34c 
materials. However, regional bilateral politics have contributed to the rationale behind 
why the Quadripartite has not signed the AP, and thus feels that there is no legal 
precedence under PP18 to implement the recommendations. However, 
recommendations were made by ABACC on how safeguards could be improved in a 
non-binding manner for existing facilities, in order to comply with the broader 
safeguards concerns regarding front-end monitoring. These case studies represent the 
successes of and obstacles facing existing conversion facilities in NNWS. However, 
the implementation of PP18 in new facilities gives rise to implementation using 
safeguards-by-design (SBD) principles, which may potentially alleviate some of the 




3.3 Integrating Safeguards by Design 
The challenge of meeting the recommendations of PP18 involved retrofitting existing 
conversion facilities that were not originally designed in the purview of safeguards 
activities. The emergence of SBD becomes especially pertinent in the implementation 
of safeguards in future conversion facilities. SBD is defined as the  “approach wherein 
international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a nuclear 
facility—from initial planning through design, construction, operation and 
decommissioning” [26]. The IAEA further identifies three critical enablers for 
implementation of SBD: (1) defining the requirements and acceptance criteria for the 
design and SBD processes; (2) developing the design process for SBD based on 
interactions and agreements amongst all stakeholders; and (3) motivating all 
stakeholders to apply SBD [26]. 
 
In the case of NUCPs, SBD must address providing adequate measures for either 
limiting diversion pathways from declared feed or detecting the processing of 
undeclared/substituted feed to produce undeclared purified uranium products. 
Conversion facilities are essentially large complex chemical facilities containing 
interconnecting pipework, tanks, vessels of uranic and non-uranic chemicals, and 
recycle loops. For existing facilities, diversion can occur in an infinite number of ways 
but can be mitigated using SBD through optimizing DIV and process design for 
physical inventory verification (PIV), as well as establishing MBAs for PM at 
sample/flow measurement points in conjunction with CS [9]. In the purview of the 
latter case study, Brazil is undertaking the construction of a new the pilot plant in 
Sorocaba [27]. SBD may mitigate some of the aforementioned challenges – both legal 
and technical – in implementing front-end safeguards in such new conversion facility 
builds. In essence, the design basis of any new conversion facility will directly impact 
the burden for providing DIV or developing a nuclear MC&A system. Integration of 
25 
consultative DIV and accommodating MC&A in SBD can consequently lead to a 
more efficient and cost-effective safeguards regime in new conversion facilities. 
 
3.4 Safeguards System Requirements 
From a technical perspective, a safeguards system for monitoring processes and 
facilities producing 34(c) material would require the following capabilities  [28] [29]:  
 verify production and shipments of 34(c) source material;  
 detect excess production of 34(c) source material; and  
 support detection of undeclared both within the state and auxiliary 




CHAPTER 4. RELATED WORK ON SAFEGUARDING URANIUM 
CONVERSION FACILITIES 
In response to the issuance of IAEA PP 18, DOE has become interested in developing 
instruments, tools, strategies, and methods that could be used by the IAEA in the 
application of safeguards for materials in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, prior 
to production of UF6 [2]. Previous work has investigated monitoring locations using 
conventional, non-NDA instrumentation for an NUCP.  
 
4.1 Previous Approaches to Safeguarding Conversion Facilities 
This work started with Doo et al. at the IAEA in 2003, which proposed the first mass-
balance measurement points for operations monitoring at NUCPs [14]. Since then, 
several DOE national laboratories have become involved in developing tools or 
techniques for safeguarding conversion plants. In 2004, Elayat et al. at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) developed a system of analysis of safeguards 
effectiveness in conversion plants using digraph and fault tree analysis [30]. The 
digraph and fault tree analysis assessed the deviation of input parameters required to 
indicate diversion and how the same safeguards system could deviate from the base 
case. This simulation involved employing decision-making based on input inspector 
verification of material declaration and on the output probability of diversion success. 
The statistical analysis was based on mass difference and material unaccounted for 
(MUF) indicators, proposing various scenarios of gross, partial, and bias defects. 
Although statistical methods have been recently investigated theoretically through the 
development of generic error models by Burr et al. [31], no PM data specific to 




An overall safeguards approach was proposed in 2004 by Boyer et al., who suggested 
the use of unattended PM equipment to measure flows of uranium through unit 
processes [2]. Boyer states that traditional CS could provide some detection capability, 
but the IAEA has revised its approach for NUCP safeguards to rely on SNRIs to 
permit more flexibility and unpredictability in conducting inspections [2]. Ideally, a 
continuous presence or continued monitoring of unattended monitoring systems by 
IAEA inspectors would be effective for detecting the processing of undeclared 
materials in an NUCP; however, resource shortages require that more innovative 
approaches be employed. Boyer recommends that the use of unattended PM 
equipment would suffice or that the facility operator could make daily “Mailbox” 
declarations of nuclear material quantities and operating parameters on a periodic 
basis. Boyer states that resources should be allocated according to the following 
criteria [2]: (1) unattended monitoring instruments to monitor uranium content flow 
and (2) generation of PM data that will enable the inspector to determine if undeclared 
feed or misuse is occurring. As per IAEA guidelines, the safeguards goal of 1 SQ of 
natural uranium over a period of 1 year must be within a detection probability of 50%. 
Boyer describes this detection probability (PD) as [2]  
 
(PD)  = (PS) × (PR) × (PP) ,     [4-1] 
 where 
(PS): probability that a falsified item is selected for verification measurement,  
(PR): probability that measured falsified item is identified as falsified, and 
(PP): probability based on operator’s falsification strategy, residence time (duration 
over which diversion would occur), and number of SNRIs. 
 
Nusbaum et al. further ascertain that although the IAEA prescribed limit is 1 SQ of 
10 MTU/year, a rogue diverter with a clandestine enrichment capability requires only 
5 MTU to produce 1 SQ (25 kg U) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) [32]. 
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4.2 Previous Technology Development for Process Monitoring in Uranium 
Conversion Facilities 
Work at ORNL began in 2004, when Faulkner et al. investigated material balance 
approaches to safeguards through preliminary research at the ORNL UNCLE facility 
[11]. In addition, the FLOW simulation platform was developed to simulate generic 
conversion plants of various throughputs. It was limited to mass balance, not energy 
balance or source term analysis.
 
At ORNL, international safeguards approaches for 
NUCPs were addressed by Raffo-Caiado et al. in conjunction with the Brazilian 
Nuclear Energy Commission in 2009 [33]. This work proposed to establish a technical 
basis for NUCP safeguards, primarily outlining process modeling and configuration, 
from which the proposed material balance points in Faulkner et al. were integrated 
into IAEA-focused monitoring and verification activities. However, that report only 
loosely addressed NDA radiation detection technologies by proposing technologies 
that may be fruitful for safeguards purposes but were never simulated, implemented, 
or evaluated for verification monitoring or diversion purposes.  
 
More recently, Pickrell et al. and Ladd-Lively et al. have benchmarked a Coriolis flow 
rate meter in addition to testing the 20-array 
3
He tube clamp neutron detector 
developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (now installed at the ORNL 
UNCLE facility), originally tested at the Springfields NUCP in the United Kingdom 
[34] [35]. Equipment calibration of the 
3
He detector was later completed by Ladd-
Lively at the UNCLE facility [6] [36] [37] [38] [39]. Operations monitoring at the 
UNCLE facility have been preliminarily analyzed by Lee, employing the second-
generation Transverse Uranium Neutron Detector (TUrND) developed by LANL, 
based on the first-generation design by Miller and Pickrell in 2004 [40] [34] [41]. 
Neutron monitoring efforts have not met performance specifications, nor have they 
been analyzed for drawing conclusive safeguards conclusions with respect to the 1 SQ 
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requirement by the IAEA [42] [43] [44]. Employing neutron detection does not meet 
performance specifications due to 
3
He shortages in addition to the inability to 
distinguish (α,n) interactions in nitrogen and oxygen in the UN solution,  and cosmic-
ray-induced spallation neutrons in an outdoor operational environment. This results in 
poor signal-to-noise discrimination using such principles. With the 
3
He shortage and 
the associated high costs of development, employing commercially available gamma-
ray detectors in this study provides an ideal opportunity to test alternatives to 
3
He 
technology and neutron detection.  
 
Ladd-Lively has proposed multivariate statistical methods involving singular value 
decomposition to develop a framework to detect the diversion of intermediate products 
at an NUCP using only material-balance points [45]. Nuclear source term and 
radiation detector responses have not been evaluated for statistical determination of 
diversion. According to Boyer et al., the verification of declared material based on 
material balance alone is insufficient to detect undeclared production or diversion of 
material in larger NUCPs [2]. Thus additional safeguards measures are necessary to 
detect undeclared processing. This dissertation work builds upon this recommendation 
by addressing how detection techniques and low-cost distributed PM technologies can 
be used to create an effective safeguards system that is operational and verifiable.  
 
4.3 Proposed Monitoring Points 
Optimal locations for PM in an NUCP have been discussed by Doo, Boyer, and 
Faulkner in detail [2] [11] [14]; however, none of the proposed methods or key 
measurement points (KMPs) has been tested operationally, nor have the limits of 
instrumentation capability been ascertained for providing a technical basis for drawing 
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safeguards conclusions. The placement of KMPs should take into account the 
following factors [28] [29]:  
 measurement of in-process material during PIV;  
 interconnecting arrays of piping; 
 internal recycle streams; 
 storage fluctuations within the facility; 
 access to measurement points; 
 potential diversion routes; and 
 processing undeclared feed. 
 
For a small NUCPs, Boyer has suggested that the following three monitoring points 
should suffice for PM (Figure 4-1) [2].  
 
1) Output of dissolver tank at 400–450g U/L to acquire a measurement of 
feed material.  
2) Where purified uranium becomes available, at the solvent extraction output 
columns at a concentration of 80–100g U/L. A K-edge or LIII-edge 
densitometer and flowmeter could be installed to measure uranium 
concentration and volumetric flow, respectively. Spectrometry-based 
instrumentation may be suitable for this monitoring point. 
3) Prior to withdrawal of UF6 into cylinders, to provide an indication of 
product produced. CS in addition to load-cell-based weighing systems 




Figure 4-1. NUCP Process Diagram with Proposed Safeguards Instrumentation. 
Reproduced from Boyer et al. [2]. 
 
Although simple accounting using input/output traditional mass balance would 
provide some assurance through PM, the use of unattended monitoring would validate 
accountability and improve safeguards assurances. Eight such KMPs were 
recommended by Faulkner et al. in Table 4-1 (corresponding to points depicted in 
Figure 4-2) and safeguards systems recommended by Loden and Begovich [29], also 
integrated in Table 4-1. These monitoring points provide a high probability of 
detecting diversion for small- and medium-sized NUCPs, and the probability for high-
throughput plants can be remedied if attention is placed on monitoring waste stream 
materials.  
 
The recommended measurement techniques for each KMP are drawn from the 
recommendations and requirements outlined in the IAEA Safeguards Techniques and 
Equipment: 2011 Edition [46]. These techniques include [25] (1) nondestructive 
analysis (NDA), (2) destructive analysis (DA), (3) containment and surveillance (CS), 
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(4) unattended monitoring, (5) attended monitoring, (6) remote monitoring, (7) data 





Figure 4-2. Recommended Material Balance Locations for Uranium Conversion 
Process.  
Reproduced from Faulkner et al. [11]. 
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Table 4-1. Monitoring Points Suggested from ORNL Studies. 
Monitoring 
Point  
Location Justification Safeguards System Brazilian  
NUCP 
(MTU/yr.) 
1 Yellowcake feed entering NUCP 
for processing. 
Record of uranium entering plant (required). Grab samples taken for destructive 
analysis (DA) 
500 
2 Solid yellowcake fed from hopper 
to dissolver. 
Independent verification of yellowcake entering. 
Prevents introducing “unaccounted” material 
that can be diverted before next monitoring 
point.  
NDA measurement of U in drum. 
 
500 
3 Unpurified uranyl nitrate solution 
exiting tank downstream of 
dissolver. 
First analysis of uranium dissolved from 
yellowcake; helps prevent diversion of dissolved 
uranium or misuse of equipment to process 
unaccounted uranium.  
Solid mass flow rate using 
gravimetric techniques combined 
with analysis of U content (Point 
1) or destructive analysis (Point 2). 
498.9 
4 “Stripped” organic stream exiting 
strip column for solvent extraction. 
Prevents inefficient stripping and possible 
diversion of uranium away from main uranium 
path through solvent recycle/disposal. 
In-line monitoring of U 
concentration, pH, density, 
conductivity, temperature, and 
flow rate. 
3.4 
5 Purified uranyl nitrate solution 
exiting strip column after solvent 
extraction. 
Mass balance check after purification of uranium 
(attractive diversion point). 
In-line monitoring of U 
concentration, density, 
temperature, and flow rate. 
495 
6 a or b Concentrated purified aqueous 
uranyl nitrate solution exiting 
evaporator: (a) In the line exiting 
evaporator before passing through 
valves or equipment; or (b) before 
the cooler leading to storage tank. 
Another attractive diversion point. 
Each valve provides another opportunity for 
diversion. Monitor right out of evaporator, or 
downstream of reflux leg back into evaporator 
and before cooler leading into storage tank. 
In-line monitoring of U 
concentration, pH, density, 




7 First purified dry solid uranium 
(AUC or UO3) precipitating/ 
denitrating.  
 
Verifies uranium dissolved and purified, 
preventing diversion during 
precipitation/denitration. Sometimes collected in 
drums for transport to next step (traditional 
accountability using CS and NDA to estimate U 
content). 
In-line monitoring of U 
concentration, pH, density, 




8 UF6 collected in cylinders Provides product output value for mass balance 
analysis. Inventory of uranium output plus waste 
streams should match input uranium value. 
Point for mass balance (required). 
Accounting with grab samples 
taken for destructive analysis and 
mass rate on total U produced. 
488.4 
Data from [11] [25] [28]. 
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LaMont et al. developed a conceptual approach for the use of chemical and isotopic 
tracers as part of an improved safeguards approach at NUCPs, where the latter would be 
advantageous in verifying declarations in waste streams and MUF [47]. Chemical tracers 
would be useful for UOC products prior to dissolution (where they would be stripped) in 
order to verify that undeclared UOC batches were not introduced. As NDA techniques 
are a standard complement to IAEA methods and technologies employed, these 
approaches are investigated herein. 
4.4 UNCLE Facility at ORNL 
The completion of a field trial of safeguards monitoring equipment by Ladd-Lively et al. 
at the Springfields NUCP demonstrated the need for a facility to perform full-scale 
equipment testing under controlled conditions prior to field deployment of safeguards 
systems at additional plants [34] [35]. UNCLE serves as a calibration facility for 
safeguards monitoring instrumentation (e.g., flowmeters, density probes, neutron 
detectors) and as a test facility for simulation of diversion of UN products in NUCPs. 
This unique facility within the US DOE is designed to simulate the operating conditions 
for a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting a solvent extraction process 
conducted in an NUCP operating up to 6000 MTU/year throughput [40]. The UNCLE 
facility represents a test bed of monitoring points 4 and 5 in Faulkner’s monitoring 
scheme in Figure 4-2 [11]. Monitoring instruments, including the neutron detector and 
the second-generation TUrND, both developed at LANL, and the Endress+Hauser 
Promass 83F Coriolis flowmeter, are currently installed at the UNCLE facility. The UN 
solution circulating in UNCLE contains decay products that are more than 40 years old, 
dating back to approximately 1968, and was produced from ground fuel pellets (see 
Chapter 5). This facility, which was modeled based on the design specifications of the 
Springfields conversion facility, now decommissioned in the United Kingdom, circulates 
UN of near-natural uranium compositions. A photo of UNCLE is shown in Figure 4-3, 





Figure 4-3. UNCLE Facility with First-Generation TUrND Neutron Detector. 
Reproduced from [36]. 
 
As shown in Figure 4-3, Tanks A and B represent sources of holdup, as well as a source 
of changing background in UNCLE. Preliminary work regarding the source term and age 
effects modeling of the UN in UNCLE, simulated detector responses to the UN-filled 
pipe, and validated experimental measurements were conducted by Dewji et al. [48] [49], 
[50] in accordance with the scope of this dissertation . 
 
4.5 Challenges for Developing a Safeguards System  
An objective of a rogue diverter would be employing NUCP equipment to process 
undeclared feed for a weapons program with diversion of intermediary products prior 
to any KMPs. Specific categories of diversion must be identified before an adequate 
strategy can be applied to meet safeguards objectives of (1) detecting the processing 
of undeclared feed and (2) verifying that declared feed is not being diverted [2]. The 




 Introduction of undeclared feed:  Substitution of feed materials with higher-
than-declared uranium content. This can be accomplished by introducing 
undeclared UOC into the dissolution vessel or during recycle processing.  
 Material substitution: Material could be substituted with higher concentrations 
or enrichments. Uranium concentration is either understated in the product/feed 
streams or overstated in the waste stream. In either case, the uranium quantity is 
understated in accounting procedures. The substitution of dummy product 
materials with similar characteristics but no uranium content is also consistent 
with such activities. 
 Equipment alteration: Operating procedures and/or equipment configurations 
are modified to alter the physical uranium output quantity through diversion 
earlier in the process or through unreported activities. This is also manifested 
through the installation of valves or bypasses to syphon material, or the 
modification of equipment to produce excess uranium in the waste/tails. This 
would manipulate the declared amounts of uranium in the MUF. 
 Falsification of records and/or data tampering: Material balance records are 
adjusted, such as understating throughput, or incorrectly recorded to reinforce 
diversion activities. 
 
Accountability systems, enhanced by conventional surveillance methods, provide 
some capability measures for detecting diversion. Unattended monitors based on 
NDA detection systems would provide real-time accountability information, thus 
making diversion a more arduous undertaking. Effective monitoring to enhance 
diversion detection requires combining accountability principles with unattended 
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monitors. Optimization of such a system would supersede the verification of 
accountability data with the assistance of inline PM systems, comprising both 







CHAPTER 5. INSTRUMENTATION AND METHODS 
Assessing the use of NDA instrumentation for PM of UN in transfer pipes of NUCPs 
entails theoretical, simulation, and experimental methods to investigate the viability of 
gamma-ray methods for safeguards applications.  
 
The theoretical basis is described in Chapter 6, with a source term analysis of the UN 
circulating in UNCLE. Since the UNCLE employs 40-year-old UN with decay products, 
which varies from freshly solvent extracted commercial UN, the source term analysis 
evaluates the subsequent age effects on potential measurement signatures. Based on the 
emission properties of the UN, the attenuation analysis detailed in Chapter 7 of the UN-
filled Schedule 40 304L pipe determines the transmission of signatures of photon 
emissions in this detection geometry. In addition, investigation of potential transmission 
sources for densitometry measurements correlating uranium concentration was 
conducted. Finally, an analytical model of a self-attenuation correction factor is 
investigated as a way to determine the effects of self-attenuation on detection efficiency. 
This analysis also sets up the framework for distinguishing changes in attenuation (self, 
piping) with changes in material properties (enrichment, concentration, density) with 
respect to the peak efficiencies of the monitoring signature emissions. 
 
Experimental measurements were conducted in two settings: The first measurements 
were taken in a low background environment, where the sensitivities in detector 
responses are determined for concentrations of UN diluted from 90g U/L to 10g U/L. 
These are described in Chapter 9. Dilution measurements were taken for each of the 
selected gamma-ray detectors with a UN-filled pipe segment. This pipe segment was 
created from the same Schedule 40 304L pipe used in UNCLE, which was chosen to 
mimic the Springfields NUCP in the UK. The source UN at 90g U/L was obtained from 
UNCLE for the dilution experiments. Passive measurements of 
235
U emissions are 
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conducted for dilution concentrations to determine monitoring signatures. Transmission 
source measurements were also conducted to determine the densitometry source 
sensitivity to uranium content and UN density for sample dilution concentrations. Finally, 
spatial offset measurements are taken vis-à-vis the central detection axis to determine 
spatial effects on detection efficiency for a pipe containing 90g U/L solution. This is 
important in assessing variation due to reproducibility and control of the geometry. 
 
Chapter 10 describes further experimental measurements conducted at UNCLE to 
determine detector responses in an operational environment. Steady-state measurements 
are taken at a two flowrate values, which mimics the throughput at the Springfields’ 
NUCP. Shadowshield measurements are also taken at UNCLE to determine the leakage 
into the collimator from adjacent UN-filled transfer pipes and tanks. 
 
Simulations were conducted using Monte Carlo photon transport codes, as explained in 
Chapters 8 and 11, to determine the pulse height detector response for high-intensity 
235
U 
emissions from the UN-filled pipe configuration employed in the dilution experiments. 
Comparing dilution measurement data with the constructed Monte Carlo models, the 
intrinsic detection efficiency was determined for a high-resolution detector system. 
Subsequently, various transmission sources were tested to determine the optimal gamma-
ray source for UN densitometry and sensitivity to uranium content in UN. 
 
Finally, a comprehensive statistical and sensitivity analysis is summarized in Chapter 12. 
Estimates of the optimal counting time for each of the tested gamma-ray detectors to 
meet a 5% and 10% uncertainty threshold due to Gaussian count-rate statistics are 
provided. The sensitivity analysis provides insights regarding how variables, such as pipe 
thickness, material properties, and source-detector geometry, affect the overall detection 
efficiency of the assayed 
235
U signatures. The analysis provides a benchmark from which 
performance can be reliably scaled to other conditions. Monte Carlo models were created 
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to determine the particle flux of signature 
235
U emissions traversing each shielding 
boundary. Ray-tracing simulations were modeled to determine the peak efficiencies for 
the specific source-detector geometries. This geometry-specific efficiency calibration is 
applied to spectra acquired in the dilution and UNCLE measurement spectra to determine 
the mass and activity of 
235
U in the UN-filled pipe segment. The ray-tracing simulations 
were also employed to determine how variations of specific absorber thicknesses and 
source-detector locations affect the signature peak efficiencies. Ray tracing is more rapid 
than Monte Carlo but provides only full energy peak efficiency scaling, rather than the 
full pulse height distribution. Furthermore, Monte Carlo simulations are employed to 
determine how changes in material properties affect the detection efficiency of 
235
U 
signature peak emissions in UN.  
 
Harnessing all the passive and densitometry gamma-ray measurement data with the 
effects of the statistical, absorber, geometry, and source material variations determines 
whether IAEA guidelines can be met to detect diversion of 1 SQ of 10 MTU/yr. with a 
50% probability. As the UN concentration increases, 
235
U assay emissions are expected to 
increase; however, as the 
235
U content increases, so does the solution density and hence 
self-attenuation, counteracting an otherwise proportional relationship. This discussion of 
assessing whether the tested detectors can acquire statistically relevant data in a timely 
way is discussed in Chapter 13. Whether in-line transmission source can monitor the UN 
concentration independently is further discussed. 
 
5.1 Source Term Analysis 
As UNCLE employs UN from uranium that is 40 years old, a source term analysis is 
required to determine aged-based signatures changes vis-à-vis freshly solvent-extracted 
UN in NUCPs. This is accomplished through harnessing the program, RadSrc [51], 
which solves the Bateman equations to determine age effects of fresh (0 years) and aged 
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(~1 year, secular equilibrium) uranium in the UN source term for various concentrations 
(10, 50, 75, 85, 90 g U/L). In conjunction with Sources4C [52], gamma-ray and neutron 
radiation emissions are calculated for the UN source term, in order to characterize the 
radiation signatures of UN.  
 
 Solution Preparation of Uranyl Nitrate in UNCLE 5.1.1
A variety of intermediary uranium compounds are connected with the conversion 
process. UNCLE was designed to reproduce the conditions of the purified aqueous UN 
stream exiting the solvent extraction process in an NUCP. The scope of this project is 
focused on this specific phase of the conversion process containing purified aqueous UN. 
Traditionally, UN salt is a water-soluble yellow salt that forms uranyl nitrate hexahydrate 




The UN (molecular formula UO2(NO3)2 ) for UNCLE was prepared in 2004 using UN 
acid-deficient solution in a two-step process [54]: First, UO2 pellets were oxidized to 
U3O8 powder in air at 450°C. Second, the U3O8 was dissolved using concentrated nitric 
acid in several batches. The resulting stock solution had a pH of 1.65 and uranium 
concentration of 630 g/L.  
 
U3O8 + 6HNO3  3UO2(NO3) 2 + 2NO2 + 4H2O.   [5-1]    
 
Preparation using acid-deficient UN was conducted because the lower acid concentration 
led to a quicker precipitation reaction, resulting in a stock solution with a NO3/U mole 
ratio of 1.53. The stock solution was diluted with water from 630 g U/L to 90 g U/L. 
 
The UN solution circulating through the UNCLE facility contains 90 g of naturally 







C. The elemental solution composition was calculated 
stoichiometrically for a 1 L (= 1000 cm
3
) volume of natural uranium-bearing UN with the 
density and concentration of UNCLE. These properties are summarized in Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-1. Uranyl Nitrate Composition in 1 L (1000 cm
3
















U 238.03 0.080 90.00 
234U 0.0059% 89.31 
 235U 0.76% 0.68 
 238U 99.2% 0.01 
N 14.01 0.007 7.94 Nat.   
O 16.00 0.815 914.64 Nat.   
H 1.01 0.098 109.42 Nat.   
TOTAL 364.90  1122.0    
 
 Radiation Signatures for Assaying Uranyl Nitrate 5.1.2
From an NDA-monitoring perspective, two radiation decay modes are of potential 
interest: (1) gamma-ray production due to radioactive decay of natural uranium and (2) 
neutron production from spontaneous fission, (α,n) and cosmic-ray interactions in the UN 
solution. To assess the radiation signature from the UN in the UNCLE facility, the decay 
properties of the daughter products of the dissolved uranium must be assessed as a 
function of time.  
 




U in natural uranium, via 
the actinium and radium (uranium) series, respectively. These series are summarized in 
Figure 5-1. As decay time progresses, the varying half-lives of daughter products cause 





U specifically) is reached, where the half-life of the daughter 
product is smaller than that of the parent, the concentration of such daughter isotopes will 
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reach a near-constant ratio over time. As shown in Figure 5-1, decay chains can branch 
into more than one excited daughter product, resulting in more than one pathway for 





where the probability of a specific decay is quantified by its branching fraction [51].  
 
 
Figure 5-1. (A) Actinium and (B) Uranium Radioactive Decay Series for Natural 
Uranium. 
Reproduced from [55]. 
 
The behavior of decay chains is governed by the Bateman equations, which describe the 
serial radioactive decay of a parent into multiple daughter products [56]. The Bateman 
equation reduces each individual decay scheme into an inherently recursive solution from 
which each decay chain can be represented as a linear system of differential equations for 
each decay pathway. Equations [5-2] and [5-3] describe the relationship between the 
concentration of parent nuclide (N0) and first daughter product (N1) as a function of 
time, t. 
      
  





      
  
                     [5-3] 
where 
0 = decay constant of parent nuclide and 
1 = decay constant of daughter nuclide. 
 
The UN solution circulating in UNCLE contains decay products over 40 years old, dating 
back to approximately 1968. Aged UN is atypical for commercially produced UN, which 
is freshly processed following solvent extraction during conversion. Solvent extraction 
was not available to process the UN in UNCLE. Thus, the following section focuses on 
identifying radiation signatures for freshly processed and aged UN, specific to gamma-
ray responses as a function of decay time. By comparing signatures of the aged with 
freshly processed UN, we can focus on characterizing the signatures associated with 
freshly processed UN.  Results of signature identification and age effects are explored in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 Age Effects of Decay Products in UN 5.1.3
Accounting for the aged UN employed in UNCLE vis-à-vis freshly processed UN in 
conversion facilities, the predominant photon sources maintained a relatively constant 





Pa specifically) is reached, where the half-life of the 
daughter product is smaller than that of the parent, the concentration of such daughter 
isotopes will reach a near-constant ratio over time, given in Equation 5-4 and shown in 




 y) decays via -emission to 
234
Th (half-life 24.10 d), which subsequently decays via - emission to 
234m
Pa (half-life 
1.17 m), where a signature 1001 keV photon is emitted with a probability of 0.837%. 
 
                        











Subsequently, as the UN in UNCLE is ~40 years old and in equilibrium, the UN from 
commercial conversion facilities cannot be assumed to be in equilibrium. As a result, the 
scope of this project assumes that secular equilibrium cannot be ensured, hence focusing 
on the direct 
235
U-based assay signatures, though the other lines are available to measure 
experimentally in this special situation to add complementary information. 
 
5.2 Attenuation Analysis 
Monitoring 
235
U gamma-ray emissions from freshly processed UN provides insights into 
the characteristics of the material flowing in conversion facilities. Identifying gamma-ray 
interactions occurring in the UN media flowing through pipes of an NUCP will help 





































verifying uranium presence, flow, concentration, and enrichment. First, attenuation and 
transmission calculations for uncollided particles in UN can be made using XCOM: 
Photon Cross Sections Database [58]. The mean free path (MFP) of the UN flowing in a 
pipe of an NUCP must be calculated in order to determine the fraction of the sample that 
will reach the detector uncollided. Also, use of external gamma-ray transmission sources 
can provide further insights regarding the density, concentration, and enrichment of UN. 
Finally, determination of the correction factor due to self-attenuation enables the 
observed signal, which is essentially proportional to the fraction of the signature photons 
emitted in the direction of the detector that actually reach the detector, to be placed on a 
common reference scale for qualitative comparison. Using the source term composition 
values for dilution concentrations, mass attenuation coefficient (MAC) values were 
calculated (without coherent scattering) for each of the dilution UN concentrations. 
 
An ideal monitoring signature would be an intense, penetrating gamma ray 
(>10
4
 gammas/g-s), with an energy of several MeV [59]. This is because between 1 and 
5 MeV, the mass attenuation of all materials show a broad minimum (Figure 5-3); very 
few natural gamma rays exist above 1 MeV. In the purview of freshly purified UN, where 
decay products have been removed during solvent extraction, such gamma rays do not 






U occurs. In the scope of this work, the 
dominant gamma-ray signatures most suitable for assaying 
235
U for solvent-extracted UN 
would be the 185.7 keV emissions.   
 
 Mass Attenuation Properties of Uranyl Nitrate 5.2.1
The probability of a photon interacting in a medium is characterized by the mass 
attenuation coefficient (MAC), μ (cm
2
/g). In the range of 
235
U high-intensity emissions 
(~100–200 keV), photoelectric effects are the predominant interactions, followed by 
Compton scattering. As photon energy increases, scattering interactions become the 
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predominant mode of interaction. Coherent (Raleigh/Thompson) scattering makes a 
minor contribution to MAC attenuation in high-resolution gamma-ray measurements by 
scattering the photon through the combined action of the atom. Coherent scattering 
results in elastic scattering of photons, yielding no net energy loss, conservation of 
momentum of the photon and the atom, and no ionization or excitation of the atom [60]. 
 
Transmission at full energy through a medium with the energy-dependent MAC (without 
coherent scattering) is the ratio of the transmitted (I) and incident (Io) photons through an 
attenuating medium of thickness, x (cm), and density,  (g/cm3), is governed by Equation 





       .     [5-5] 
 
As shown in Figure 5-3, the attenuation behavior of elemental uranium, plutonium, 
californium, and lead are compared. Furthermore, the k-edge x-ray for uranium falls at 






Figure 5-3: Total Mass Attenuation without Coherent Scattering of Uranium (Z=92) 
Compared with Plutonium (Z=94), Californium (Z=98), and Lead (Z=82). 
 
Identification of the photon interactions occurring provided an assessment of the behavior 
of the 185.7 keV photons as a monitoring signature. Furthermore, attenuation analysis 
provides a basis for identifying which external densitometry transmission sources were 
optimal for monitoring density and uranium content. Results of the full attenuation 










































5.3 Detection Efficiency 
Gamma rays must undergo interaction with the detector crystal before being registered. 
The efficiency of a detection system is typically defined as the observed peak area count 
rate divided by the source gamma emission activity, as given in Equations 5-6a and 5-6b 
[62]. 
   
                 
                                      
                                   
 .  [5-6a] 
 
                                                        
                          
                        
  . [5-6b] 
 
 
Variation of the variables that contribute to the total detection efficiency originates from 
any of the of four factors  contributing to the overall efficiency [63] [64]: 
 
                               .   [5-7] 
 
 Geometric efficiency (geom) is explicitly dependent on the point-to-point source-
to-detector distance (R) as the inverse square law (i.e., geom ∝ 
 
  
 ) [64]. It is 
essentially independent of the photon energy. In the scope of this work, spatial 
offset measurements during the dilution experiments were taken for each of the 
three detectors. This experimental data is coupled with simulation data from the 
In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS). 
 Absorption efficiency (absp) accounts for the effects of intervening materials. In 
the case of the NUCP measurements, these include the detector housing, detector 
collimator/endcap, and shielding, in addition to attenuation due to pipe thickness. 
This is an energy-dependent parameter (i.e., absp ∝   
∑     where  denotes the 
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sum over all materials and gamma-rays) dependent on exponential attenuation by 
the MAC (μ), in addition to density () and attenuator thickness (x) for the 
detector housing, shielding, collimators, and sample containers  [64]. This factor 
should be <<1 for low-energy photons, at which absorption effects are most 
pronounced, making it very sensitive to the exact dimensions in an absolute sense. 
In the scope of this work, the effect of pipe thickness on the absorption efficiency 
was tested using ISOCS simulations. 
 Sample efficiency (samp) quantifies the self-attenuation within the sample 
material, yielding the fraction of emitted gamma rays that actually emerges from 
the source (UN) material. This value is the reciprocal of the self-attenuation 
correction factor, CF(AT), elaborated by Parker’s method calculated as a function 
of transmission values (T) in Chapter 7 (absp ∝ 
 
      
 
   
      
 ) [64]. In the scope 
of this work, measurement data and MCNPX simulations were calculated to 
determine the CF(AT) for sample efficiency values. 
 Intrinsic efficiency (int) is the probability that the gamma ray entering the 
detector will interact and produce a full-energy peak. The intrinsic efficiency 
is dependent upon the interaction probability of the detection material  
(int            [64]. Only a fraction of the interactions results in complete 
energy deposition, and a combination to the full energy peak. In Equation 5-6b, 
the ratio by which the total detector efficiency is multiplied is called the peak-to-
total ratio. 
 
The energy dependence of the detection efficiency causes the detected photons recorded 
by the detector to differ from the emission intensities. If multiple 
235
U signatures are 
employed, each with different intensities, this energy dependence must be taken into 




Subsequently, evaluation of the sensitivity of each of these parameters to the overall 
detector response will provide insights into interpretation of variations affecting assay 
signatures. A detailed assessment of factors affecting detection efficiency (geometry, 
attenuation, sample self-attenuation, intrinsic efficiency) is made by conducting a 
sensitivity analysis of the detector response to changes in pipe thickness, material 
properties (density/concentration/voiding), and source-detector placement/offset. These 
are conducted using the ISOCS software [63], as well as Monte Carlo simulation tools. 
The sensitivity analysis is presented in Chapter 13. 
 
 Self-Attenuation Correction Principles 5.3.1
The NDA of nuclear material often encounters large sample containers with high self-
absorption properties. If the detector efficiency is accurately known as a function of 
source position and energy and if the geometry and source emission rates are also 
accurately known, calibration standards are not necessarily required to determine the 
attenuation correction factor due to self-absorption.  
 
Nondestructive assay of UN flowing in NUCP piping presents a geometry configuration 
that is susceptible to high self-attenuation. In determining the correction factor for self-
attenuation, CF(AT), we are addressing what fraction of the signature photons emitted in 
the direction of the detector actually reaches the detector. The MAC calculated in the 
previous section quantifies material composition and density; however, these are 
restricted to narrow-beam (good) geometry. Use of transmission calibration provides a 
reference for assay using transmission techniques to determine the self-attenuation for a 
sample, in this case, for UN-filled piping. In order to conduct the calibration, 
transmission detection measurements are taken for both the empty and UN-filled pipe. 
The transmission ratio of the full to empty container is used to determine the sample-
specific CF(AT) using the method developed by J. L. Parker [65], which has previously 
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been employed in NDA field measurements for waste-drum assay [66] and pipe slurry 
measurements [67]. In these approaches and applications, the CF(AT) is empirically 
derived for a cylinder in far field geometry and is best applied using high-resolution 
gamma-ray detectors. 
 
Following the methods for the characterization of a passive gamma-ray detection system 
recommended by Parker formed the basis of the efficiency analysis conducted in the 
scope of this work [65].  To determine the CF(AT) contribution to the overall detection 
efficiency, Parker recommends the following approach: 
 
 measurement of the raw data acquisition rate;  
 determination of gamma-ray self-attenuation correction; 
 computation of corrected as proportional to the mass of the isotope being assayed; 
and 
 determination of the efficiency calibration for both the non-attenuating 
geometrical shape in the same position with respect to the detector. 
 
In the calculation of the correction factor for self-attenuation in the cylindrical pipe 
geometry, CF(AT), the method based on transmission measurements outlined by Parker 
[65] is adopted:  
 
        
       
      
  ,      [5-8] 
 
where    
 = geometrical calibration parameter     
(  <1 for cylindrical samples)  
(   π/4 for far-field approximation for reasonably transparent cylinders) and 




The diametrical transmission, T, through the cylindrical sample is the ratio T=I/Io, where 
I is the detected count rate of the transmission source energy through the pipe with UN 
and Io is the detected transmission through the empty pipe. For our purposes, T is the 
predictive variable, Equation [5-8] provides a convenient functional form, and   is an 
empirical parameter chosen to describe the data. 
 
If the sample can be characterized by a linear attenuation coefficient, μl, the fraction of 
photons that detected from the sample can be determined via the following relation: 
 
         .      [5-9] 
 
Two key assumptions must be satisfied in the scope of this method in order to ensure that 
the μl can sufficiently compute the photon escape-fraction on a macroscopic scale [65]: 
First, the gamma-ray source material (i.e., UN solution) is reasonably homogeneous in 
composition; second, the gamma-ray emitting constituents are small enough such that 
self-attenuation within the individual particles (i.e., uranium) is negligible.  
 
Employment of the CF(AT) method accounts for variation in sample size, shape, 
composition, and density. In Parker’s derivation of CF(AT), the most significant 
parameters in decreasing order of importance are [65] 
 
1. linear attenuation coefficient of the material;  
2. volume and shape of the sample material;  
3. linear attenuation coefficient of the sample container;  
4. size and shape of the sample container;  
5. position and orientation of the sample relative to the detector; and  




While the first and third parameters are consistent, the sample (pipe-filled UN) is 
positioned closer to a collimated detector, which will affect the detector geometry and 
efficiency. In the purview of the CF(AT) calculations, it is preferable to increase the 
sample-to-detector distance to simplify calculations; however, for NDA in this work, this 
would reduce the signal count rates and introduce high background signals if the 
collimator was not positioned close to the sample. 
 
Mathematical simplifications best occur in the far-field case, where the sample and 
detector dimensions have less impact compared to their separation distance and photons 
reach the detector along parallel paths. As our detector is in near-field approximation to 
the source, there is high dependence on detector size/shape, sample-to-detector distance, 
and sample size, which all affect the fraction of gamma rays escaping from the sample. 
However, it is possible to calculate CF(AT) in such situations through analytic expression 
of sample shapes (cylindrical in the scope of this work). CF(AT) for a cylindrical 
geometry is less than that of a slab or box-shaped sample. Consequently, if the CF(AT) is 
smaller, the fraction of photons escaping the sample is greater. 
 
Parker provides a baseline example for the computation of CF(AT) using depleted UN 
samples in cylindrical containers [65], whose CF(AT) results as a function of uranium 





Figure 5-4. Results of Depleted UN Measurements in Parker’s Calculation of 
CF(AT) Based on One-Dimensional Model. 
Reproduced from [65]. 
 
Compared to three-dimensional calculations, the one-dimensional model gives lower 
values of CF(AT) compared to the three-dimensional model. In the one-dimensional 
model, photons pass through a slightly greater thickness of sample solution than in the 
three-dimensional model. Also, increasing the container diameter also increases the 
CF(AT) for lower values of T.  In quantifying CF(AT), Eqn. 5-4 shows that CF(AT) is 
linearly proportional to –         for T<<1 [65]. 
 
5.4 Detection Instrumentation Selection  
Assessment of instrumentation that could potentially be employed to measure material 
flow and inventory at NUCPs requires specific criteria in evaluating which systems 
would be best suited for this purpose. The criteria that were considered included [40]  
[41] the following.  
 
 Applicability to uranium measurements: Differentiating from systems 
optimized for other common NDA measurements, such as plutonium assay or 
spent fuel, for example. 
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 Cost and complexity: Cost not only includes the purchase cost of the system but 
also extends to include the operation, repair and maintenance, and 
personnel/training costs associated with maintaining the system. Methods should 
be minimally invasive and not interrupt operator activities. 
 Consistency with current IAEA protocol and procedures: Employing standard 
complement of measurement techniques, instrumentation, and practices. 
 Resilience to tampering or spoofing: The system should be designed for timely 
detection of the aforementioned safeguards challenges with confidence, where 
instrumentation is optimized to avoid false positives and false negatives. In 
addition, the instrumentation should be tamper-proof by a potential diverter. 
Although many instruments can be employed for PM at NUCPs, not all are 
capable of being employed for drawing safeguards conclusions. 
 
 Detection Principles 5.4.1
Passive gamma-ray methods can be conducted using high- or low-resolution 
measurements and are provide signatures that are difficult to spoof. Gamma-ray methods 
are relatively inexpensive and are part of the IAEA standard complement of measurement 
techniques, although assaying larger volumes is difficult due to insufficient penetration 
for low-energy photons (
235
U). The exception is with uranium enrichment determination 
where an infinitely thick sample is required for the gamma rays of interest. 
 
Selecting gamma-ray radiation detection technology as the basis of the NDA safeguards 
system was based on previous work by LANL and ORNL. The decision to monitor 
gamma rays as opposed to neutrons is an alternative to the analysis conducted by Miller 
et al. in 2004 [41]. However, Miller did not provide any comparative quantitative metrics 
or data upon which the decision to use neutron detection was made. Recent experience 





He technology and the inconclusiveness of recent neutron monitoring data). 
Neutron detection may be appropriate for operations monitoring, but gamma-ray 
detection may better lend itself to detecting diversion in a timely manner and is more 
robust to “spoofing” efforts.  
 
 Gamma-Ray Instrumentation Selection 5.4.2
Based on the source term analysis and subsequent calculation of emission intensities from 
the attenuation analysis, candidate NDA instrumentation for passive gamma-ray 
acquisition were selected for experimental validation measurements in a controlled 
laboratory setting, as well as for operational measurements in the UNCLE facility.  
 
A variety of methods exist for assaying fissile material, constituting either active or 
passive methods for gamma-ray or neutron detection. Robustness and practical 
implementation must be considered for safeguards monitoring.  A suite of detectors, 
primarily commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), was selected for testing detection sensitivity 
to various dilutions and shielding configurations of UN (Figure 5-5). These included the 
Canberra 2×2-inch NAIS with the Osprey digital tube base, which prevents gain drifts; 
Canberra Inspector 1000 with 1.5×1.5-inch LaBr3 Probe; and Canberra Falcon BEGe. 
 
In addition, the variety in detector selection permitted comparison of resolution and 
efficiency parameters in monitoring UN. This includes both scintillators – sodium iodide 
(NaI) and lanthanum bromide (LaBr3) – as well as semiconductors – high-purity/broad-
energy germanium (HPGe/BEGe). The detector properties are summarized in Table 5-2.  
Walford et al. conducted a comprehensive measurement of various uranium compounds 
using COTS detectors to test a parallel-plate collimator to mitigate scatter from 
238
U [68]. 
Although this work characterizes the effects of a novel collimator, the scope of the work 
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herein is focused upon characterizing the detector responses and sensitivities of UN in 
transfer pipes of NUCPs in response to specific IAEA safeguards requirements.  
 
Furthermore, the ease of operational implementation and robustness in an operational 
setting is accomplished through field tests at the UNCLE facility. As a result, an 
evaluation was made regarding the fidelity with which the system can process monitor 
throughput, as well as determine the ease/difficulty of detecting “spoofing” scenarios, 
indicative of diversion/undeclared activities that may occur at an NUCP.  
 
 
     (A)            (B)  (C) 
Figure 5-5. Gamma-Ray Detectors Employed in Measurement Experiments. 
A) Canberra NaI(Tl) Osprey; (B) Canberra Inspector 1000 with LaBr3 Probe; (C) Canberra Falcon BEGe 
[69] [70] [71] [72] [73]. 
 
Table 5-2. Properties of Selected Gamma-Ray Detectors for Validation 
Experiments.  






Canberra 2×2-inch NAIS + 
Osprey Digital Tube Base 
1.28 NaI(Tl) 4.08Ø  4.08 
Canberra Inspector 1000-
INPROL-1 
2.4 LaBr3 3.81Ø  3.81 
Canberra Falcon BEGe 15.5 Ge 2.985 Ø  2.0 
 Data from [69] [70] [71] [72] [73]. 
 
The accuracy, capabilities, and applicability limitations of the gamma-ray-based 
detection system were determined through validating existing plant operations at the 
UNCLE facility at ORNL. The monitoring of uranium using passive gamma techniques 
determines the optimal instrumentation to authenticate uranium presence, flow, 
concentration, and enrichment. Upon completion of simulation activities, the suite of 
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gamma-ray detectors was tested for safeguards applications in an operational setting. 
Diversion and “spoofing” activities are computationally simulated to test detector 
sensitivities and to determine the radiation signature as indicators of diversion activities. 
Based on an assessment of the detector data and each detector’s robustness as a 
safeguards monitoring instrument, a design concept for an optimal monitoring detection 
system for PM will be proposed.  
 
5.5 Dilution Measurements  
Dilution measurements were taken with a UN-bearing 304L pipe segment (described in 
Chapter 7) in a controlled, low-background laboratory facility. This is in order to 
determine each detector response’s sensitivity to diluted concentrations of UN prior to 
operations measurements in the UNCLE facility. A previous study by  Scargill analyzed 
the lower limit of naturally enriched UN using high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy 
for concentrations of UN up to 350g U/L in an 11.2 mL sample vessel [74]. The study 
determined that the lower limit of detection of natural uranium was a concentration of 
30 g U/L within an accuracy of 5% for a counting time of 5 minutes. Another study by 
Sundar et al. investigated a variety of methods to determine sample concentrations 
ranging from 5 to 450 g U/L using high-resolution gamma-ray measurements, among 
other methods (potentiometric, x-ray fluorescence, differential pulse volumetric, 
ultraviolet-vis) using 10 mL aliquot samples [75].  As discussed earlier, the absolute 
efficiency of a detection system is dependent upon geometry, container wall attenuation, 
self-attenuation, and intrinsic factors. Thus, varying certain parameters of the 
experimental setup will determine how each of the three former factors (geometry, 
container attenuation, self-attenuation) affects the overall sensitivity of the detector 
response to each parameter. In addition to passive gamma-ray measurements using 
HPGe, LaBr3 and NaI detectors, a passive gamma-ray transmission source is employed 
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for densitometry measurements to correlate source transmission and UN 
density/concentration.  
 
Peak areas for the 
235
U high-intensity emissions (notably at 185.7 keV and 143.8 keV) 
were determined as a function of UN density and uranium mass. Canberra’s VMS 
Standard Peak Search in the Genie 2000 Gamma Analysis software was employed. The 
peak selection, fit and background (continuum) subtraction methods are described in full 
detail in the Genie 2000 manual [76]. 
 
The dilution experiment results and peak area correlations are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 9. Additionally, spatial resolution is determined from pipe-offset measurements 
to determine the geometry effects on detection efficiency due to detector offset. These 
results are discussed as part of a comprehensive sensitivity analysis in Chapter 12. 
 
 Dilution Measurement Setup 5.5.1
The following measurements were conducted in order to test the sensitivity of the 
detector responses: 
 I) Passive Measurements: Spectra were acquired for 3600 s measuring 
the 
235
U high-intensity photons for each of the three candidate detectors 
for uranium concentrations ranging from 10 g to 90 g U/L of UN. 
 II) Transmission Measurements: Spectra were acquired for 3600 s 
measuring the 
235
U emissions as well as the 661.7 keV 
137
Cs transmission 
from an external source through the UN-filled pipe for each dilution 
concentration. Transmission measurements were taken to determine UN 
densitometry signatures. 
 III) Spatial Offset Measurements: Passive 235U spectra were acquired 
for 3600 s for each of the three detectors at various offset positions from 
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the centerline of the detector shifted off-center from the pipe in order to 
determine the sensitivity of pipe positioning to the detector response.  This 
measurement was a component of a comprehensive sensitivity analysis. 
 
Data were taken over 3600 s live time for passive and external source transmission 
measurements and over 1800 s for each position in the offset measurements. Although 
spectra were saved in 300 s increments, temporal analysis is beyond the scope of the 
current work; thus, integrated count rates at 3600 s are analyzed.
2
 For all measurements, a 
¼-inch (0.635 cm) distance was maintained between the pipe and the face of the detector 
endcap/collimator. The detector was shielded on all sides with a 20.3cm 10cm 5cm 
lead brick. Schematics of the dilution measurement setup are depicted in Figure 5-6. 
 
(A)   (B) 










Figure 5-6. Dilution Measurement Experiment Configurations. 
Top view of: pipe (blue); detector (green); and Pb shielding (grey).  
(A) Passive setup; (B) Transmission source setup; and (C) Spatial offset setup. 
 
 Densitometry Measurements 5.5.2
A transmission-based in-line densitometer using the 661.7-keV gamma ray from 
137
Cs 
was selected based upon availability. As investigated in detail in Chapter 7, a 122 keV 
transmission measurement from the
 57
Co line is theoretically preferable, as it does not 
interfere with the 185 keV 
235
U assay peak or the 115.6 keV k-edge X-ray peak; it does 
not contribute Compton continuum downscatter to 
235
U emissions; and 
57
Co at 122 keV is 
highly sensitive to uranium content. However, one caveat is that it may be too sensitive to 
content such that Compton contributions from the 
235
U emissions in the 140–205 keV 
range may interfere with densitometry signatures, notably for low-resolution 
measurements. 
 
5.6 UNCLE Measurements 
The dilution measurements in a low-radiation background environment permitted testing 
the instrument sensitivity and the development of monitoring signatures. Transition to the 
UNCLE facility provides a test bed for assessing gamma-ray instrumentation monitoring 
capabilities in an operational setting. Similar to the dilution measurements, passive and 
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transmission measurements were conducted in UNCLE to determine the detector 
responses in comparison to the static dilution experiments. Where the dilution 
measurements employed static UN, the UNCLE measurements provide detection data on 
dynamic, flowing UN in a small-scale facility representing the KMP following solvent 
extraction. In actuality, this KMP is where PP18 defines the starting point of 34(C) 
materials. Operational deployment assesses issues such as high-radiation background, 
shielding configurations, collimator leakage, voiding and vibration effects due to changes 
in flow rate, and environmental factors. The UNCLE facility measurement results are 






Cs transmission densitometry measurements were conducted at 
UNCLE using the three detectors employed in the dilution experiments: Canberra Falcon 
BEGe, Canberra Inspector 1000 1.5×1.5 LaBr3, and Canberra Osprey 2×2 NaI(Tl). 
Detector responses to changes in flowrate, shielding configurations, background 
determination, and transmission densitometry were assessed in the UNCLE measurement 
excursion. The detectors employed in the UNCLE field measurements were similarly set 
up as the dilution experiments, where the detectors were each shielded with lead bricks 
and collimated. 
 
 Monitoring of Fissile Flow 5.6.1
Characterizing mass flowrate in an NUCP provides auxiliary verification data to aid in 
determining material throughput. Flowrate data alone provides limited information 
regarding uranium concentration, especially in cases where material substitution, 
instrumentation tampering, and falsification of records are potential means of 
misuse/undeclared activities (discussed further in Chapter 13). In addition, the feasibility 
of installing a flowrate instrument was viewed as intrusive and undesirable by operators 
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in nation states which would fall under this safeguards effort (identified in Chapter 3) 
[77]. Non-intrusive flowrate instruments tend to be inaccurate. 
 
As part of a comprehensive NDA safeguards system that accurately provides 
concentration data, flowrate measurements help correlate mass throughput at an NUCP, 
as described in Equation 5-10 [42]. 
 
M(t) = C(t)  F(t)  ,      [5-10] 
where 
M(t) = mass flowrate of UN as a function of time, t, 
C(t) = uranium concentration (g U/L), and 
F(t) = flowrate (L/h). 
 
Ladd-Lively et al. describe measurements using the Coriolis flowrate meter installed at 
UNCLE [39], which benchmarked the mass flowrate of the uranium flowing through 
UNCLE. The flowrate tests conducted by Ladd-Lively et al.  on UNCLE included 
steady-state measurements at the following pump speeds (RPM): 450, 750, 1000, 1250, 
1500, 1700, and 1071. The pump speed of 1071 RPM approximates the average flowrate 
that was used during the field test at Springfields NUCP [39]. From Ladd-Lively et al.’s 
results of the steady-state tests, shown in Figure 5-7, the mass flowrate shows a strong 
positive linear correlation with the pump speed. Based on this data, the tests conducted in 
this work at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM correspond to mass flow rates of 7963.4 kg/h and 
3528.9 kg/h, respectively. With respect to plant classification at this throughput explained 
in Chapter 2, if UNCLE was run continuously for a whole year, this would correspond to 
~2.5 kt U/yr. and ~5.7 kt U/yr., respectively. The potential of diversion from a facility of 





Figure 5-7. Mass Flowrate Averages for Varying Pump Speeds in UNCLE. 
Data reproduced from [39]. 
 
 UNCLE Measurement Setup 5.6.2
Field measurements under steady-state conditions at UNCLE were taken for the 
following setup configurations. 
 I) Passive-High Flowrate: Spectra were acquired at a flowrate of 
1070 RPM. 
 II) Passive-Low Flowrate: Spectra were acquired at a flowrate of 
500 RPM. 
 III) Transmission: Spectra were acquired at 1070 RPM of the UN 
solution with external 
137
Cs source exposed. Transmission measurements 


























 IV) No Backshield: Measurements were taken in the absence of the pipe 
backshield in order to determine environmental background in the 
operational facility with UN flowing at 1070 RPM. 
 V) Shadow Shield: A frontshield or “shadow shield” was employed to 
shield the UN-bearing pipe in order to determine the background signals 
or “leakage” into the collimator reaching the detector.  
 






(A)  (B)  
(C) (D) 
Figure 5-8. Detector Setup in UNCLE Facility. 
 Top view of: detector (green); pipe (red); and Pb shielding (grey).  
 (A) Passive change in flowrate setup; (B) Transmission source setup; (C) No backshield setup; 
(D) Frontshield/Shadowshield setup. 
 
5.7 Validation Simulations  
Experimental measurements undertaken in the scope of this project provide an overall 
assessment of the sensitivity of gamma-ray detection technology to variations in 
concentration, as well as to determine the monitoring capabilities in an operational 
conversion facility. However, a myriad of variables – both from solution properties 
and detector efficiency – were not able to be experimentally tested. Thus, simulations 
provide detector responses to test variables such as variations in transmission 
densitometry. Computational models were constructed to simulate the detector 
responses for passive dilution and transmission measurements. All simulations were 
conducted using the Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) photon transport 




The modeled UN was a solution of 90 g of uranium dissolved per 1000 mL of water, 
0.76 wt.% enrichment, with a measured solution density of 1.122 g/cm
3
. The 
elemental solution composition was calculated in the UN solution to be 8.0 wt.% U, 
0.70% N, 81.5% O, and 9.8% H, as given in Table 5-1. As the detector providing the 
highest resolution signatures, the Falcon BEGe detector was modeled in detail to 
determine validated detector responses.  
 
The simulation was modeled after the experimental setup for the dilution 
measurements, employing lead brick shielding around the perimeter of the collimator, 
as well as behind the pipe acting as a backshield.  
 
 MCNPX Simulations 5.7.1
Simulations were conducted for the following scenarios with the modeled Falcon 
BEGe. 
 I) Passive Simulations: Spectra were simulated for the 235U source 
emissions for uranium concentrations ranging from 10 g to 90 g U/L of 
UN and compared with experimental dilution measurement spectra. 
 II) Transmission Measurements: Transmission simulations were 
taken to determine UN densitometry signatures.  
o 137Cs: Spectra were simulated measuring the 235U emissions as 
well as the 661.7 keV 
137
Cs transmission from an external 
source through the UN-filled pipe for each dilution 
concentration (10 g to 90 g U/L). These simulations were 
compared with the experimental dilution measurement spectra.  








sensitivity of the respective 356 keV and 122 keV transmissions 
through the dilution concentrations of UN (10 g to 90 g U/L). 
 III) Enrichment Measurements: Spectra were acquired measuring the 
235
U high-intensity peaks for enrichments ranging from 0.76% 
(UNCLE) to 10% at a concentration of 90 g U/L. Although the U 
concentration remains the same, reproduction of the detector response 
due to subtle changes in enrichment provides data regarding the 
detection sensitivity.  
 
 Gaussian Energy Broadening Calibration 5.7.2
In the unsmoothed MCNPX pulse-height tally, nearly all photoelectric interactions 
result in a delta function at the photon energy rather than a resolution-broadened 
photopeak, where only a small fraction may be lost to K-x-ray escape. The Gaussian 
Energy Broadening (GEB) function [78] in MCNPX was used to simulate the detector 
resolution, based on the full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) data. In principle, the 
use of the unsmoothed counts at the full gamma-ray energy would also provide 
photopeak counts, as would smoothing to the monoenergetic output using alternative 
software. Use of the GEB in MCNPX enables the emulation of the specific detector 
resolution in situ based on a specific detector. The parameters required for the GEB 
function (a, b, c) were calculated based on the measured detector response, and 
iteratively fit to Equation 5-11 to obtain the GEB parameters.  
 




In this expression, 
 
E = Energy (MeV)and  
FWHM =full-width-at-half-maximum value of photopeak (MeV). 
 
Data obtained from the calibration data of the dilution measurements were used to 
determine the GEB fit parameters, and are provided in Chapter 8. 
 
 MCNPX Tallies 5.7.3
A pulse-height tally (F8) was performed over the active region of the detector crystal 
to determine the pulse-height spectrum for passive, transmission, and enrichment 
measurements. The peak efficiency can be determined from the corrected net peak 
area under the simulated response peaks from 
235
U as a function of the source 
emissions from UN. A detailed description of the simulation model is provided in 
Chapter 8, and juxtaposed with experimental results in Chapter 11. 
 
As part of the comprehensive sensitivity analysis in Chapter 12, a surface current tally 
(F1) was performed over each of the modeled material boundaries for a UN-filled pipe 
at 90 g U/L in the dilution measurement setup: (1) UN boundary; (2) pipe boundary; 
(3) collimator/endcap; and (4) detector housing. The UN boundary provides a 
simulation complement in the determination of CF(AT) by providing data on the 
fraction of particles that escapes the UN sample. Propagating the tally across the pipe, 
collimator, and detector housing determines the fraction of signature photons 
traversing each absorber in the given geometry. The simulations employed for this 






5.8 Algorithm Development for Peak Area Interpretation 
Use of a densitometry source provides a transmission measurement that determines the 
density of the UN in an NUCP transfer pipe. The transmission, T, is calculated by 
taking a transmission ratio of the UN-filled pipe (I) with an empty pipe (Io). From any 






Cs), the T ratio is related to the density () 
of the solution flowing in the pipe (inner diameter deff) via the following relation: 
 
     
 
 
          
    .     [5-12] 
  
Using this relation, the density using dilution measurements provided a calibration for 
UN solution measurements.  
 
Although densitometry measurements may provide the solution density and potentially 
uranium concentration through calibration, this still does not tell us about the 
throughput of 
235
U, specifically. Consequently, a combination of the transmission 
energy and the 185.7 keV peaks are required to determine not only the uranium 
concentration in the NUCP transfer pipe but also the 
235
U content. The concentration 
(C) of 
235
U in the circulating UN is determined by the peak area count rate of the 
235
U 
185.7 keV signature emission given in Equation 5-13 [67]: 
 
  
        
     
  ,    [5-13] 
where 
r = net count rate of 185.7 keV emission peak (cps), 
 = solution density (g/cm3), 
CF(AT) = self-attenuation correction factor, 
V = volume of solution in detector field of view (cm
3
), 
 = peak efficiency of 185.7 keV (cps/Bq), and 
C = 
235




        
As conducted with densitometry measurements, the use of an empty and full pipe 
during calibration can determine the 
235
U enrichment as a function of transmission 
(Equation 5-14), in addition to analysis of the 185.7 keV emission [79]. 
 
    
 
     
     [5-14] 
where 
r = net count rate of 185.7 keV emission peak (cps) 
T = external source transmission 
k  = calibration constant 
 
5.9 Background, Uncertainty, and Sensitivity Analysis 
Experimental measurements from both the dilution and operational activities provided 
a basis for identifying passive gamma-ray signatures from 
235
U in UN. Detailed 
uncertainty, statistical and sensitivity analyses are required in order to evaluate the 
robustness of these monitoring signatures.  
 
Peak area uncertainty due to the underlying Compton continuum from 
238
U in secular 
equilibrium from aged UN, in addition to 
137
Cs emissions during transmission 
measurements, affect the peak area, uncertainty statistics, and required counting times 
to meet a specified confidence interval. In addition, background from adjacent tanks 
and pipes containing uranium in a field setting contributes to background under the 
assay peak areas, which must be characterized, discriminated, and appropriately 
shielded during implementation of field instrumentation. 
 
A sensitivity analysis provides an indication of how variables, such as pipe thickness, 
material properties, and source-detector geometry affect the overall detection 
efficiency of the assayed 
235




quantifies the UN mass (hence, activity) in the 304L pipe through a series of ray-
tracing calculations, and provides an absolute efficiency for the modeled source-
detector configuration. To model the UN-filled pipe geometry, two of the three tested 
detectors – the Falcon BEGe and the Osprey 2×2 in. NaI(Tl) – were available to model 
in ISOCS. In addition, MCNPX (F1 tally) simulations were created to determine the 
effects of source-detector geometry and absorbers in the overall peak efficiency of 
assay signatures. The details of the statistical and uncertainty analysis are provided in 
Chapter 12. 
 
 Statistical Uncertainty and Error Propagation 5.9.1
In order to determine the net peak area under the ROI, the background must be 
subtracted (Equation 5-15), and the error from both continuum and background 
contributions must be propagated to determine the associated uncertainty of the net 
peak area. Nuclear counting is a random process that obeys Poisson statistics. 
Consequently the standard deviation of the mean follows as the square root of the true 
mean number of counts. In ROI peak analysis, the associated statistical error (±) with 
a net count rate (r) is related to the variance by the sum of the errors of each of the 
gross and background count rates added in quadrature, as defined in Equation 5-16 
[80]. 
 
      ,      [5-15] 
where 
r= net count rate (cpm) in ROI, 
g=gross count rate (cpm) in ROI, and 
b=background count rate (cpm) in ROI. 
    











In the purview of gamma-ray spectroscopy measurements, for a well-characterized 
background, it is advantageous to know the optimal sample counting time required to 
meet a precision of relative standard deviation of a% [80]: 
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 .    [5-17] 
 
 In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) 5.9.2
A detailed assessment of factors affecting detection efficiency is made by conducting 
a sensitivity analysis of the detector response to changes in pipe thickness, material 
properties, and source-detector placement/offset. These are conducted using 
Canberra’s ISOCS software [63]. Unlike classical efficiency calibrations, ISOCS can 
be employed without calibration materials. The geometry is modeled in the ISOCS 
software and uses ray tracing (described in Chapter 5) to determine the peak efficiency 
of the source-detector system. When this efficiency calibration is applied to an 
acquired spectrum, the mass (and hence, activity) can be determined for the modeled 
geometry. The use of ISOCS negates having to run multiple MCNPX simulations, 
hence permitting testing of a multitude of variables affecting the overall peak 
efficiency of photon signatures emitted from the UN-bearing pipe. 
 
The ISOCS program works by drawing upon efficiency lookup tables that are 
generated using pre-simulated and validated MCNPX models. For a given detector, a 
detailed MCNPX model is created incorporating 30 dimensional parameters. An 
efficiency is generated for each of the eight source geometries and validated with 
experimental measurements. The efficiency is computed at 800 spatial locations, 




distances in all directions, spanning an energy range of 45 keV to 7000 keV. In-vacuo 
efficiencies are determined from the “nodal” – or voxel – points of a spatial response 
grid, where a large number of "sub-nodal" points are generated using a cubic-spline 
algorithm in between the nodal points. A gridding process is employed to interpolate 
efficiencies between the modeled points, and the efficiency parameters are supplied 
into a detector characterization file in ISOCS. The efficiency for the point source is 
obtained from the characterization file (i.e., lookup table) modified by attenuation 
through any materials between the source and the detector, given in Equation 5-18: 
 
       ∑                                     .   [5-18] 
 
In essence, the four-factor efficiency from Equation 5-7 is calculated at the individual 
voxel level and factor in attenuation. Figure 5-9 depicts the voxel validation technique 
employed in ISOCS [63]. 
 





 ISOCS Peak Efficiency Simulations 5.9.3
Models were created to emulate the geometry employed for both the dilution and 
UNCLE measurements. The pipe dimensions from Table 6-1 and the UN composition 
from Table 7-1 were employed in the ISOCS models. When modeling the Falcon and 
Osprey detectors, the ISOCS template permitted only one collimator/shield. The 
ISOCS model of the Falcon BEGe was the W collimator, where the endcap modeled 
as an epoxy absorber to best simulate the Falcon’s collimator composition, as shown 
in Figure 5-10 [81]. The Osprey was modeled approximating the encompassing Pb 
shielding  arrangement to approximate the combined effects of the Pb brick shielding 
as well as the 7419E Shield/Collimator, as modeling both was not permitted by the 
template. The Osprey configuration is depicted in Figure 5-11. The input parameters 
for each of the pipe-detector and collimator/shielding models for the Falcon and 
Osprey are provided in Appendix K. 
 
 






Figure 5-11. Pipe Dilution Model of Osprey NaI(Tl) with Shielding Using ISOCS. 
 
5.10 Discussion and Recommendations 
Based on the experimental and simulation data obtained from both the dilution and 
operational measurements, in combination with a detailed uncertainty, statistical and 
sensitivity analysis, evaluations will be made regarding the optimizing gamma-ray 
NDA instrumentation for process monitoring at this KMP in an NUCP. The IAEA 
requirement for detection of 1 SQ – 10 MTU – in a period of 1 year with 50% 
detection probability represents 0.1%, 1%, and 10% of plants with throughput of 10, 
100, and 1000 MTU/yr., respectively. Although the IAEA prescribed limit is 1 SQ of 
10 MTU/year, a rogue diverter with a clandestine enrichment capability requires only 
5 MTU to produce 1 SQ (25 kg U) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) [32]. 
 
An uncertainty of 0.1–10% due to counting statistics, attenuators, or source material 
variables must be evaluated in an overall safeguards monitoring regime using gamma-
ray instrumentation. This range considers that 10 MTU represents the uncertainty 




whether the IAEA timeliness and detection goals are feasible, and whether passive 
gamma-ray techniques are capable of detecting undeclared, misuse, or diversion 
scenarios at an NUCP. The discussion of safeguards applicability is presented in 
Chapter 13. 
 
Based on the culmination of the experimental and simulation data, in addition to the 
in-depth sensitivity and uncertainty analyses, a prototype design is proposed for full-
scale field tests in an NUCP, in addition to exploring operational implementation 
requirements for this instrumentation in a comprehensive safeguards system. These 




CHAPTER 6. THEORY: SOURCE PROPERTIES OF URANYL 
NITRATE 
As UNCLE employs UN from uranium that is 40 years old, a source term analysis is 
required to determine aged-based signatures changes vis-à-vis freshly solvent-
extracted UN in NUCPs. This is accomplished through harnessing the program, 
RadSrc [51], which solves the Bateman equations to determine age effects of fresh 
(0 years) and aged (~1 year, secular equilibrium) uranium in the UN source term for 
various concentrations (10, 50, 75, 85, 90 g U/L). In conjunction with Sources4C [52], 
gamma-ray and neutron radiation emissions are calculated for the UN source term, in 
order to characterize the radiation signatures of UN.  
 
6.1 Correlating Uranyl Nitrate Concentration with Density 
The UN base solution circulating through the UNCLE facility is a solution of 90 g of 
uranium, as uranyl nitrate, dissolved per 1000 mL of water, with a solution density of 
1.122 g/cm
3




U, and 99.2% 
238
U. The solution properties of natural uranium-bearing UN with the density and 
concentration of UNCLE are summarized in Table 6-1, as well as the properties of the 
proposed dilution concentrations. 
 




90 85 75 50 10 
Molarity (M) 0.378 0.357 0.315 0.210 0.042 
Density (g/cm3) 1.122 1.115 1.099 1.064 1.008 
 
A variety of studies have examined correlating UN concentration, solubility, and 




conductivity of UN/nitric acid solutions. Measurements were made on solutions of 
concentrations ranging from 0.05 to 1.27 M uranium, 0.1 to 2.0 M nitrate, and NO3/U 
ratios from 1.56 to 2.3 at temperatures of 25, 30, 40, 50, and 75°C [82]. The densities 
of the solutions were measured using pycnometric measurement, with an accuracy of 
+0.05%. Least-squares curve fitting of the experimental data was conducted 
(Equations 6-1 and 6-2) in order to relate the density parameters to the uranium and 
nitrate concentrations (Figure 6-1). Since such customized density measurement 
techniques were not available for characterizing the UNCLE UN and subsequent 
dilution solutions, the experimental density measurement used the traditional 
mass/volume calculation of each solution. The measured results were compared to the 
least-squares fit parameters calculated from the results of Botts et al. (Figure 6-2). The 
temperature in the UNCLE facility ranges from 12.7–29°C. 
 




U=uranium concentration of solution (M), 
B=0.0282071, 
NO3=nitrate concentration of solution (M), and  
DENW= density of pure water (Eqn. 10-3). 
 
                                       ,  [6-2] 
where 






Figure 6-1. Relationship between Density and Uranium Concentration at Various 
Temperatures (NO3/U mole ratio = 1.56).   
Reproduced from Botts et al. [82]. 
 
Given that the ratio of NO3/U in the UNCLE stock solution is 1.5 [54], Equations 6-1 
and 6-2 were applied to determine the correlation between measured solution density 
and concentration with the validated values at various temperatures. This comparison 
is plot in Figure 6-2. As expected, the solution density correlates positively with the 






Figure 6-2. Comparison of Measured and Calculated Densities of Uranyl Nitrate 
as a Function of Uranium Concentration. 
 
6.2 Gamma-Ray Signatures for Uranyl Nitrate Assay 
In principle, any of the gamma rays emitted from uranium can be used to determine 
the isotopic composition in UN. However, in practice, signature gamma rays must be 
selected based on intensity, penetrability, and isolation from interfering signals. 
Photon emission from radioactive decay occurs via de-excitation in the nucleus 
through gamma-ray emission, or de-excitation by atomic electrons via x-ray emission. 
Alternatively, if charged particles are emitted, this could lead to the production of 
bremsstrahlung radiation. Beta decay of the 
234m
Pa daughter of 
238
U can produce 
bremsstrahlung radiation, but this effect in the water-based UN solution is relatively 
weak.   



























Solution Concentration (g U/L)
Measured Density
Theoretical Density (10 deg. C)
Theoretical Density (15 deg. C)
Theoretical Density (20 deg. C)
Theoretical Density (22 deg. C)
Theoretical Density (25 deg. C)




6.3 Age Effects and Decay Products in UN 
Since the UN circulating in UNCLE is approximately 40 years old, which is 
substantially older than fresh UN in commercial facilities, a time-dependent source-
term analysis was required to determine which gamma-ray signatures would best serve 
PM purposes. Decay product calculations were preliminarily addressed over a 100-
year time span by Dewji et al. for the UN in UNCLE [48]. Thus, to ascertain the time-
dependent radioactive decay and emission of radiation from decay of each of the 
uranium and actinium decay series, the program RadSrc v.1.5 was employed to 
computationally solve the Bateman equations [51]. Given the initial isotopic mixture 
and decay age, RadSrc calculates the decay product concentrations, yielding an output 
list of gamma rays and x-rays produced by radioactive decay, and the lineage of the 
decay series producing these photons. From the 1207 lines calculated by RadSrc, 
predominant photon emitters for fresh (0 y) UN and at secular equilibrium (1 y) for the 
UN composition in UNCLE are summarized in Table 6-2. Energies above a 100 keV 







Table 6-2. Source/Progeny Decay Chains of Predominant Photon Emitters 
in UN Composition in UNCLE. 















235U]►231Th  185.72 343.30 [
235U]►231Th 
143.76 65.78 [
235U]►231Th  1000.99 103.42 [
238U]►234mPa►234U 
163.33 30.49 [
235U]►231Th  143.76 65.78 [
235U]►231Th 
205.31 30.07 [









 205.31 30.07 [
235U]►231Th 
109.16 9.24 [
235U]►231Th  112.8 29.87 [
238U]►234mPa►234U 
202.11 6.48 [




235U]►231Th  105.362 11.88 [
235U]►231Th 
194.94 3.78 [




238U]►234Th  120.912 9.29 [
234U, 238U] 234U 
►230Th 
182.61 2.04 [
235U]►231Th  109.16 9.24 [
235U]►231Th 
140.76 1.32 [
235U]►231Th  258.26 9.00 [
238U]►234mPa►234U 
  786.287 6.83 [
238U]►234mPa►234U 
[238U]►234Pa►234U 
 202.11 6.48 [
235U]►231Th 
 114.866 4.28 [
238U]►234mPa►234U 
[238U]►234Pa►234U 
 945.9 4.13 [
238U]►234mPa►234U 
[238U]►234Pa►234U 
 108.99 3.96 [
235U]►231Th 
 194.94 3.78 [
235U]►231Th 
 131.31 3.53 [
238U]►234Pa►234U 
 110.5 2.96 [
238U]►234Th 
 880.45 2.62 [
238U]►234Pa►234U 
 1737.73 2.61 [
238U]►234mPa►234U 
 883.22 2.60 [
238U]►234mPa►234U 
[238U]►234Pa►234U 
 569.3 2.51 [
238U]►234Pa►234U 






Reilly et al. state that an ideal monitoring signature would be an intense gamma ray 
(> 10
4
 gammas/g-s), with an energy of several MeV [59]. The gamma-ray emission 
properties of uranium isotopes are summarized in Table 6-3. 
Table 6-3. Gamma-Ray Properties of Uranium Isotopes. 
Isotope Energy (keV) Specific Activity 
photons/g-s) 











U equilibrium with 
234m
Pa assumed. 
Reproduced from [59]. 
 
As the scope of this work is focused on freshly processed UN, monitoring the most 
intense direct photons from 
235
U (185.72 keV, 143.76 keV, and where possible, 
163.33 keV) is recommended. Given the long half-life of 
235
U compared to the 40-year 
decay period of the UN in UNCLE, effects in decay activity for 
235
U are negligible in 
the scope of these measurements.  
6.4 Conclusions  
In anticipation of gamma-ray validation efforts, the time-dependent photon response 
was modeled with respect to contributions from radioactive decay products of the 
actinium and uranium decay series. Due to the attainment of secular equilibrium in the 




U within the first year of decay, age effects from circulating 
40-year-old UN showed no time dependence in anticipated photon response. Since 
235
U has a half-life of 7.0410
8
 years, decay over a 40-year time span is negligible.  
 
Identification of decay signatures will become important in analyzing measurement 
spectra from gamma-ray detectors, for features such as Compton buildup from higher 
energy 
238






These features will be further discussed in the experimental results for the dilution and 
facility measurements. 
 
The presence of 
238
U decay products in secular equilibrium in the UNCLE UN 
solution is not ensured from UN processed in an NUCP. In the scope of these 
experiments, use of aged UN must first confirm that there are no interferences of 
concern. Although continuum effects for the BEGe are less imminent than that of 
lower resolution measurements, the continuum subtraction from these latter spectra is 
more sensitive to the presence of other nuclides (i.e., 
238
U). Since the same materials 
are employed for all measurements, such effects are all proximate. Consequently, it is 
beneficial to employ the aged UN, as subsequent work can draw on this data to 
provide multiple energy lines from various sources to confirm our understanding of 







CHAPTER 7. THEORY: ATTENUATION FACTORS 
At the established KMP, UN exiting the solvent extraction stream in an NUCP flows 
through an intricate array of stainless steel piping. Consequently, for NDA 
measurements, UN emissions must penetrate stainless steel piping. In addition, use of 
an external gamma-ray source for densitometry measurements must be calculated to 
determine emission intensity through the entire diameter of the UN-bearing pipe. 
Attenuation calculations for the UN and stainless steel piping are made using data 
from XCOM: Photon Cross Sections Database [58] in order to determine emission 
intensities, mean free paths, infinite thickness requirements, and self-attenuation 
corrections.  
 
7.1 Attenuation Properties of UN-Bearing Pipe 
The pipe employed in the dilution experiments and in UNCLE is from the same 304L 
pipe inventory, with dimensions summarized in Table 7-1 and depicted in Figure 7-1. 
The one-wall thickness of the 304L pipe in UNCLE measures 0.52±0.05 cm. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the pipe specifications for UNCLE were modeled on the 
conversion facility at Springfields, UK, providing a realistic test bed and specifications 
for NUCP facilities. The uncertainty effects of pipe thickness on the absolute 
efficiency are discussed in detail in Chapter 11.  
 





Uranyl Nitrate Solution, 
90 g U/L 
1.122 7.84Ø × 60.2742 






 (A)      (B) 
Figure 7-1: (A) Pipe segment employed in dilution measurements; (B) piping 
assayed in UNCLE measurements. 
 
The transmission (as defined in Eqn. 7-1) through 304L pipe for 185.7 keV photons is 
calculated using XCOM and is plot in Figure 7-2. The linear attenuation coefficient at 
this energy through 304L pipe was found to be 1.14 cm
-1
, with a 55.4% transmission 












7.2 Attenuation Properties of Uranyl Nitrate 
Overall, the “visible volume” is determined by the combination of the detection 
geometry, collimation, and mean free path (MFP) of the gamma rays assayed [59]. If 
the uranium sample is large enough, a higher fraction of the 185.7 keV gamma rays 
emitted from 
235
U will reach the detector. In addition to attenuation from the piping, 
strong self-absorption may occur for samples of a large diametric cross section 
containing high concentrations of uranium. The penetrability of the gamma-ray 
emissions can be quantified in terms of MFP values. The MFP is the average distance 


































The linear attenuation coefficients of UN at dilution concentrations were determined 
using XCOM [58] and are given in Table 7-2. Table 7-2 also summarizes the 
subsequent calculations for MFP and infinite thickness values for dilution 
concentrations of the 185.7 keV photons from 
235
U in UN. As the concentration and 
density increase, the UN has a higher MAC, indicating that the average distance to 
interaction decreases. 
 
Table 7-2. Attenuation Properties of 185.7 keV Gamma Ray through 


















90 1.122 11.65 3.65  2.15 25.53 
85 1.115 12.36 3.75 2.09 26.25 
75 1.099 13.90 3.97 1.97 27.81 
50 1.064 18.75 4.68 1.65 32.78 
10 1.008 30.10 6.53 1.20 45.72 




Using the source term composition values for dilution concentrations calculated in 
Chapter 6, the calculated MAC values (without coherent scattering) for each of the 
dilution UN concentrations is summarized in Figure 7-3. In the range of 
235
U high-
intensity emissions (~100–200 keV), photoelectric interactions dominate in the 
calculation of the MAC, followed by Compton scattering. The energy range of the 
gamma-ray spectra resides above the uranium K-absorption edge, and we observe a 





Figure 7-3: Total Mass Attenuation Coefficient at Dilution Concentrations of 
Uranyl Nitrate. 
 
As shown in Figure 7-4, the diametrical transmission of UN is ~11.7% for 185.7 keV 
gamma rays at 90 g U/L across the UNCLE pipe (7.84 cm inner diameter). The 
transmission through UN (independent of pipe) is also summarized in Table 7-2.  
These calculated transmission values reflect transmission in narrow-beam (good) 
geometry for a highly collimated source emission traversing the full inner diameter of 










































Figure 7-4. Transmission of 185.7 keV Gamma Ray through Various 
Concentrations of Uranyl Nitrate as a Function of Thickness. 
 
7.3 Emission Intensities from Uranyl Nitrate-Filled Pipe 
If we compare the attenuation properties of various dilutions of UN with the 
penetrability of the 304L piping, 1 mm of piping provides the equivalent of ~ 4 mm of 
90 g U/L UN. Using the pipe specifications of Table 7-1, and the subsequent MACs 
and transmission values (Tables 7-1 and 7-4), the overall transmission of a 185.7 keV 
photon from the inner edge of pipe diameter penetrating the outer wall of the pipe 





































Figure 7-5. Transmission of 185.7 keV Photon within UN-Filled Pipe Segment as 
a Function of UN Concentration for Narrow-Beam Geometry. 
 
7.4 Properties of Transmission Sources for Densitometry Monitoring 
Densitometry is a measurement technique employed for determining the density of a 
material by determining the degree to which the sample material is attenuated the 
incident photons. Based on the source and sample attenuation properties, gamma-ray 
transmission measurements can provide further information on the composition of the 
sample and provide a measureable assay signal, as attenuation is dependent on both 
the atomic numbers (Z) and density of the sample. In the scope of this work, external 
transmission sources penetrating the UN-filled pipe can provide insights into the 




































Smith et al. identify a range of useful transmission values for a characteristic sample 
concentration, c=1/μx [83]. The measurement is favorable when |ln T| > 1 and  > c, 
which is consistent with the calculated transmission values for UN in the previous 
section, for which 1.35 < |ln T| < 1.48 and c (~0.7) <  (from Table 7-2). If c > , 
then the assay signal is too small and the measurement is unfavorable. Determination 
of the favorable operating range based on c assists in selecting an optimal sample 
thickness. On the basis of Smith’s analysis, the measurement parameters for passive 
gamma-ray assay for the UN-filled pipe are favorable. 
 
A transmission-based in-line densitometer using the 662 keV gamma-ray from 
137
Cs 
was selected; the 122 keV in 
57
Co line is certainly more preferable for assaying 
235
U as 
explained in Section 7.2, as it does not interfere with 185.7 keV peak, does not 
contribute to the Compton continuum under lower-energy 
235
U photons, and is much 
more sensitive in characterizing attenuation properties of various concentrations of 
UN (Figure 7-6). Similarly, the 356 keV photon as a transmission source from 
133
Ba 
would have been an adequate (though a less preferable substitute to 
57
Co), but the 
available source was too weak for laboratory measurements. As seen in Figures 7-3 
and 7-6, the MAC at 356 keV still possesses sufficient discrimination for the dilution 
concentrations of UN. However, 
133
Ba has three high-intensity photons in the 300–
400 keV range, which would interfere in unfolding low-resolution densitometry 
measurements. The selection of 
137
Cs is sufficient (though not optimal) for 
densitometry purposes, as it possesses a strong monoenergetic photon emission at 
661.7 keV, which will alleviate any transmission peak overlap discrimination with 




Co sources were not available for 
measurement in this project, their applicability is investigated in Chapter 11 in the 






The MAC and linear attenuation coefficients for transmission sources penetrating 
dilution concentrations of UN were calculated using XCOM and are summarized in 
Table 7-3. Transmission values for the external source energies through 304L pipe, as 









Table 7-3. Linear Attenuation Coefficients of External Transmission 




122.1 keV 356 keV 661.7 keV 
304L Pipe 1.85 0.76 0.57 
90 0.53 0.14 0.10 
85 0.51 0.14 0.10 
75 0.47 0.14 0.10 
50 0.36 0.13 0.09 









































Figure 7-7. Transmission of 122.1 keV 
57
Co Photon through Various 







































Figure 7-8. Transmission of 365 keV 
133
Ba Photon through Various Concentrations 





































Figure 7-9. Transmission of 661.7 keV 
137
Cs Photon through Various 
Concentrations of UN as a Function of Thickness. 
 
The highest energy photon - 661.7 keV from 
137
Cs – is most penetrative, where the 
57
Co 
with the lowest energy at 122.1 keV is the least penetrative, as expected. Where 
137
Cs 




Ba provide more 
discrimination regarding uranium content in the pipe. This is supported by Figure 7-6 and 
plot in Figure 7-10 for an external transmission source traversing the diameter of the UN-
filled pipe. Lower transmission as seen in 
57
Co can be remedied practically by using a 
higher activity source. Given that the half-life of 
57
Co is only 270 days, this may present 
some practical implementation challenge for safeguards PM. The half-life of 
133
Ba is 
more long lived at 7.2 years, which would require less frequency of replacement, but still 
presents challenges in discriminating transmission in low-resolution systems. The longest 
half-life is 30 years from 
137
































lower discrimination in uranium content for PM. Chapter 15 will outline the operational 




Figure 7-10. Transmission of 122.1 keV, 356 keV, and 661.7 keV Photons in UN-











































7.5 Self-Attenuation Correction Factor 
 Measurement and Calculation of Self-Attenuation Correction 7.5.1
Factor for UN in Pipe 
In determining CF(AT) in the scope of this work, T was calculated by taking a 
transmission  ratio of the UN-filled pipe (I) with an empty pipe (Io). The signal measured 
was from BEGe detector measurements of the 
137
Cs 661.7 keV transmission signal. As 
empty pipe measurements were not feasible in this experimental work, a Monte Carlo 
model was developed and validated based on acquired measurements. The measurement 
data are summarized in Chapter 9, and the parameters of the validation simulations are 
provided in Chapter 11. The ratio of I/Io is related to T through the inner diameter of the 




         .     [7-1] 
  
 The net peak area of the transmitted 661.7 keV photons through the full and empty pipes 
provided a value for T. Applying Eqn. 7-1 to the validated transmission simulations 
provides T for each of the dilution densities/concentrations.  The plot of ln(1/T) as a 








Cs Source Transmission as a Function of UN Solution Density for 
Calculation of CF(AT). 
 
Note that in Figure 7-11, the transmission measurements were compared to the 
transmission values calculated in the previous section with XCOM for narrow-beam 
geometry. The transmission values for XCOM were much higher compared to the 
transmission calculated using Parker’s method for CF(AT). Taking into account source-
detector geometry and self-attention of the material results in a lower transmission value, 
which is consistent with the results of Figure 7-11. 
 
Finally, applying Eqn. 5-8 for various values of κ (empirically determined) to the 
137
Cs 
transmission data provides us the overall calculation of CF(AT) for our UN-filled pipe, 
























transmission through UN of each of the dilution concentrations. Figures 7-12 and 7-13 
are consistent with the similar experiment conducted by Parker (provided in Figure 5-4). 
 
 
Figure 7-12. Calculation of CF(AT) for UN-Filled Pipe as a Function of 























Figure 7-13. Calculation of CF(AT) for UN-Filled Pipe as a Function of Dilution 
Concentrations for Various Values of κ. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
Analysis of the attenuation effects of the source and detector system provides essential 
insights into the characteristics of the UN material flowing in NUCPs. Identification of 
the photon interactions occurring provided an assessment of the behavior of the 
185.7 keV photons as a monitoring signature. Furthermore, attenuation analysis provided 
a basis for identifying which external densitometry transmission sources were optimal for 
monitoring density and uranium content. Although the 
57
Co was preferable to 
235
U 
transmission measurements, the availability of 
137
Cs suffices for determining the 
correction factor due to self-attenuation of the UN-bearing pipe. Determination of the 






















assessment of what fraction of emitted 
235
U gamma rays actually reached the detector. As 
expected, narrow-beam geometry theoretically predicted higher transmission values in 





CHAPTER 8. COMPUTATIONAL MODELS 
The experimental measurements undertaken in the scope of this project provide an 
overall assessment of the sensitivity of gamma-ray detection technology to variations in 
concentration, as well as to determine the monitoring capabilities in an operational 
conversion facility. However, a myriad of variables – including those affecting solution 
properties and detector efficiency – could not be experimentally tested. Thus, 
experimentally validated simulations provide a benchmarked detector response to 
examine these variables including variations in enrichment
3
, in addition to detector 
responses to variations in transmission densitometry. A summary of the computational 
models to simulate the detector response of the Falcon BEGe detector for the passive 
dilution and transmission measurements is presented in this chapter. All photon transport 
simulations were conducted using MCNPX [78].  
 
8.1 Falcon BEGe Detector Model 
As the detector providing the highest resolution signatures, the Falcon BEGe detector 
was modeled in detail to determine validated detector responses. A pulse-height tally (F8) 
was performed over the active region of the detector crystal to determine the pulse-height 
spectrum. Since actual measurements were accumulated as 8192-channel pulse-height 










spectra, the MCNPX pulse height spectra were similarly binned and tallied into 8192 
channels spanning a total energy range of 0 to 1.59 MeV (0.194 keV/channel).  
 
 Simulation Geometry 8.1.1
The dimensions and physical characteristics of the detector are outlined in the sample 
MCNPX input file in Appendix E, and the detector material properties are presented in 
Table 8-1. A VisEd [78] rendering of the detector model is given in Figure 8-1. As shown 
in Figure 8-1, the HPGe crystal is 1.37cm from the endcap surface of the collimator, and 
the detector endcap is maintained at a ¼-inch (0.635 cm) distance from the pipe surface. 
In practice, having the detector collimator maintained at a very short (off-contact) 
distance will prevent degradation in resolution due to vibrations from UN flowing in 
pipes, in addition to minimizing associated temperature variations. Maintaining the 
detector at a closer distance increases the rate of counts reaching the detector, while 
correspondingly lowering the relative background from the facility leaking into the 






Table 8-1. Detector Material Specifications. 









100.0% Ge 2.985 Ø  
2.0 
5.32 
Collimator Endcap Face 












Figure 8-1. VisEd Model of HPGe Detector and Collimator.  
 
The simulation was modeled after the experimental setup for the dilution measurements, 
employing lead brick shielding around the perimeter of the collimator, as well as behind 
the pipe acting as a backshield. This encompassing shielding configuration was to 
compensate for background from surrounding tanks and pipes in an industrial conversion 
facility. The pipe and brick characteristics are given in Table 8-2 and depicted in 
Figures 8-2 and 8-3. Figure 8-3 also shows a photograph of the experimental setup 
juxtaposed with the VisEd models, where dots in Figure 8-3(C) represent collisions by 











Table 8-2. Pipe, Detector, and Shielding Configurations. 







Lead Bricks 100% Pb 20.3  10  5 11.34 
Uranyl Nitrate Solution Table 8-3 7.84Ø × 60.27 Table 8-3 
Pipe  [84] Fe 5.936% 
Cr 1.743% 
Ni 0.772 % 
Mn 0.174% 
 
8.88Ø × 63.65 7.98 






   
 
Figure 8-2. VisEd Represenation of Pipe, Detector, and Pb Brick Shielding 






     
  (A)    (B)    (C) 
Figure 8-3. Falcon BEGe Detector Setup and Simulation Models.  
(A) Photograph of Dilution Experimental Setup of Pipe Segment with Falcon; (B) VisEd Representation of 
Dilution Experiment; (C) VisEd Simulation of Source Particle-Collisions of Dilution Experiment. 
 
 Gaussian Energy Broadening Fit 8.1.2
The GEB function [78] in MCNPX was used to simulate the detector resolution, based on 
FWHM data obtained from calibration measurements for the dilution experiments. The 
parameters required for the GEB function (a, b, and c) were calculated based on various 
gamma-ray sources, and iteratively fit to Equation 5-11 to obtain the GEB parameters.  
 
The detector resolution was determined from calibration sources.  The parameters and 
use of the GEB function may be found in the example MCNP input file in Appendix E. 
According to the Canberra, the crystal has a FWHM of 0.7 keV at 122 keV, compared to 
the measured ~0.8 keV FWHM. Any degradation in resolution could be due to 











the FWHM measurements for the GEB fit are plot in Figure 8-4. The GEB parameters 
were fit using Gnuplot 4.4.3[85] are shown in Figure 8-5. 
 
 







































Figure 8-5. Gnuplot Fit of FWHM as a Function of Energy to Obtain the Gaussian 
Energy Broadening Parameters.  
Y-axis: FWHM (MeV) vs. X-axis: Energy (MeV). 
Fit parameters: a=(59.5±6.15)10-5, b=0.000763±0.000147, c=0.85487±0.4942. 
 
8.2 Passive Dilution Simulations 
 Passive Dilution Material Composition 8.2.1
At 90 g U/L, the pipe contains 2.62 L of solution with a mass of 2939.64 g, of which 
~241 g is natural uranium. The UN material composition employed in each of the 
validation simulations for passive gamma-ray measurements using the BEGe detector is 





















90 85 75 50 10 
Molarity (M) 0.378 0.357 0.315 0.210 0.042 
Density (g/cm3) 1.122 1.115 1.099 1.064 1.008 
Total UN 
Solution Mass 
in Pipe (g) 
2939.64 2921.30 2879.38 2787.68 2640.96 
Wt.% U  8.02% 7.62% 6.82% 4.70% 0.99% 
Wt.% N  0.71% 0.67% 0.60% 0.41% 0.09% 
Wt.% H  9.75% 9.82% 9.95% 10.32% 10.94% 
Wt.% O  81.52% 81.88% 82.62% 84.57% 87.98% 
Wt.% 
UO2(NO3)1.5 12.23% 11.63% 10.41% 7.17% 1.51% 
Wt.% H2O 87.77% 88.37% 89.59% 92.83% 98.49% 
 
 Passive Dilution Source Definition 8.2.2
Since the MCNP F8 tally is normalized to emissions per source particle, the tally output 
was multiplied by the exact source activity of the sources employed in the validation 
measurements and intensities in order to replicate laboratory measurements. These are the 
number of particles emitted per decay, where 
235
U emits photons at multiple energies 
from each decay. Therefore, the sum of each of the emissions must be considered. The 
intensity of each 
235
U photon emission is summarized in Table 8-4 for intensities > 0.1%. 
The full source definition (energies and intensities/probabilities) is provided in 
Appendix E.  
 
The assay activities of the sources employed in the benchmark measurements are 
summarized in Table 8-5. The difference between fresh and aged UN for 
235






 %), given the long half-life of 
235
U; thus, we can assume the activity 
at 44 years (as in UNCLE) for 
235









 (keV)     
Intensity  
(%)     
185.712 1  57.2 5  
143.764 2  10.96 8  
163.358 2  5.08 4  
205.309 2  5.01 5  
109.16 2  1.54 5  
202.111 3  1.08 2  
194.94 1  0.63 1  
182.52 2  0.34 2  
279.50 5  0.27  
140.76 4  0.22 2  
221.399 1  0.12 1  
72.7 2  0.11  
199.6 1  0.1  






















U decay chain emissions will 
contribute to Compton continuum buildup under the 
235
U peaks between 140–205 keV 
compared to UN in secular equilibrium. In the scope of this work, since secular 
equilibrium for freshly processed UN from an NUCP cannot be ensured, analysis has 







U was not modeled in the scope of the MCNPX simulations provided in Appendix E in order to 




been confined to that of the 
235
U signatures. The simulation results compare the MCNPX 
output for source definitions of both fresh and secular equilibrium. These are provided as 
a reference in Appendix F. 
 
8.3 Densitometry Transmission Simulations 
 137Cs Transmission Dilution Simulations 8.3.1
As explained in Chapter 5, 
137
Cs was selected as an external transmission source for 
densitometry measurements. The UN-filled pipe, collimation, and shielding remained the 
same as modeled in the passive measurements (sample MCNPX input is provided in 
Appendix E). In the 
137
Cs transmission simulations using the same model, a plastic-
encased checked source is affixed to the midpoint of the pipe in direct line with the 
detector’s central axis. A VisEd rendering of the transmission source in given in 
Figure 8-6, where the dots in 8-6(B) represent the source emissions.  
 
 
   (A)     (B) 
Figure 8-6. External Transmission Source Simulation Models with Falcon BEGe.  









Cs source employed in the experiments was decay corrected from the date of 
certification, with an activity of 3.0610
4
 Bq (0.828 μCi). In the source definition of the 
external transmission source in the MCNPX model in Appendix E, the 661.7 keV 
137
Cs 
source is emitted with an intensity of 85.1%. An F8 pulse height tally was also conducted 
in this simulation. However, since two sources are employed – 
235
U in UN and 
137
Cs 
transmission source – a FUn tally modifier was required in the MCNPX tally card in 
order to separately tally contributions from each source. Since each tally is normalized to 
emissions per source particle, each separate tally was calculated using appropriate 
emission intensities and activities prior to summation to determine an overall detector 
response. 
 133Ba and 57Co Transmission Simulations 8.3.2





alternative transmission densitometry sources would prove more sensitive to uranium 
content based on mass attenuation coefficient interactions of photons at the 356 and 
122 keV energies, respectively. Since these sources were unavailable for experimental 
testing, use of validated simulations enables assessing the sensitivity of these sources to 
various concentrations of uranium in UN. The simulations emulated the setup in 
Figure 8-6, and sample MCNP input decks are provided in Appendix E. The source 




Co are summarized in Table 8-6. The activity required 
of the sources to penetrate the pipe and provide signature data is analyzed in detail 
Chapter 11. 





133Ba  57Co 
Energy  
 (keV)     
Intensity  
(%)     
  Energy  
 (keV)     
Intensity  
(%)     
 
276.398 2  7.164 22    122.0614 4  85.60 17   
302.853 1  18.33 6    136.4743 5  10.68 8   
356.017 2  62.05 19       
383.851 3  8.94 3       





8.4 Enrichment Simulations 
Finally, a validated simulation model is useful in determining the sensitivity of the HPGe 
to varying enrichments of uranium in UN, as it was not possible to test varying 
enrichments through experimental measurements (MCNPX sample in Appendix E). In 
these simulations, the concentration of 90 g U/L with a density of 1.122 g/cm
3
 is 
maintained; however, enrichments are varied from 0.76% to 10% 
235
U. The geometry, 
materials, sources, and tallies employed in the passive and transmission models as 
described in the previous two sections are the parameters modeled in this enrichment 
sensitivity simulation. The uranium enrichment in UN that is varied in the material and 












Fresh 235U  
(Bq) 
0.76 1.99 1.59105 
1 2.62 2.09105 
5 13.09 1.05106 
10 26.19 2.09106 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
The results of each of the validation simulations for passive measurement of UN dilution 
concentrations and 
137
Cs transmission source measurements are summarized in 





transmission measurement sensitivity to varying concentrations of UN are also provided 
in Chapter 11. The enrichment sensitivity results are provided as part of a holistic 






CHAPTER 9. RESULTS: DILUTION EXPERIMENTS 
An assessment of the sensitivity to the different gamma-ray detectors was conducted via 
a series of dilution measurements to determine emission signatures for monitoring UN in 
an NUCP. In the chapter, the results of the sensitivity analysis conducted for dilution 
concentrations of UN at 90 g, 85 g, 75 g, 50 g, and 10 g U/L using COTS gamma-ray 




Cs transmission densitometry 
measurements were conducted for three candidate detectors: Falcon BEGe [73], Osprey 
2x2 NaI(Tl)  [72], and Inspector 1000 LaBr3 [69]. The results of experimental dilution 
measurements in a controlled laboratory setting are described for detector sensitivity 
assessments in a low-background environment. The dilution detector responses were 
imperative in assessing the detection sensitivity to 
235
U emissions in order to determining 
monitoring signatures in an operational environment at UNCLE (Chapter 10), in addition 
to creating a basis for validation measurements for the computational simulations 
previously outlined in Chapter 8 with results provided in Chapter 11. 
 
9.1 Experiment Setup for Dilution Measurements 
The results of the passive and transmission dilution measurements are analyzed in this 
chapter. The results of the spatial offset measurements are provided as part of a 
comprehensive sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in Chapter 12. Photos of the 
experimental setup with each of the Falcon BEGe with the tungsten endcap [73] and 
Osprey 2×2 NaI(Tl) and Inspector 1000 LaBr3 with the Canberra 7419E 






  (A)     (B)   (C) 
Figure 9-1. Laboratory Set-up for Dilution Measurements: (A) Falcon BEGe; (B) 
Inspector 1000 LaBr3; and (C) Osprey 2x2 NaI(Tl). 
 
During the first dilution from 90 g U/L to 85 g U/L, a contamination incident occurred 
due to leakage from a faulty pipe weld. A new pipe segment was fabricated to the exact 
specifications of the 90 g U/L. This pipe segment was from the same Schedule 40 304L 
stainless steel pipe stock used for UNCLE and the first dilution pipe. Although no major 
contamination was detected in the setup area or in the detection instrumentation, the 
measurement area was consequently set up as a localized contamination zone. This 
required that all materials be sealed in plastic and that the pipe segment be wrapped in 
multiple radiation/leak-proof plastic bags, which challenged optimizing detector 
alignment and shielding.  
 
Measurements were taken with the first pipe prior to contamination for the Osprey and 
Inspector at 90 g U/L for 3600 s. The Falcon data were retaken with the new pipe 
segment for 1800 s for passive measurements and 3600 s for transmission measurements. 
Any variability in data could be due to these compensations for the contamination 






Figure 9-2. Experiment Setup following Contamination Incident. 
 
9.2 Energy Calibration 







Ba gamma-ray sources. The calibration was fit to a second-
order polynomial in Canberra’s Genie software, with a multi-channel analyzer spanning 
1591.8 keV over 8192 channels. The polynomial fit used for the energy calibration is plot 





Figure 9-3. Energy Calibration Curve of Falcon BEGe Detector for Dilution 
Measurements. 
 





Cs gamma-ray sources. The calibration was fit to a second-order polynomial in 
Canberra’s Genie software, with a multi-channel analyzer spanning 1613.0 keV over 




























Figure 9-4. Energy Calibration Curve of Osprey 2×2 NaI(Tl) Detector for Dilution 
Measurements. 
 
An energy calibration was conducted with the Inspector 1000 LaBr3 detector using a 
152
Eu gamma-ray source. The calibration was fit to a second-order polynomial in 
Canberra’s Genie software, with a multi-channel analyzer spanning 1512.3 keV over 




























Figure 9-5. Energy Calibration Curve of Inspector 1000 LaBr3 Detector for Dilution 
Measurements. 
 
9.3 Passive 235U Dilution Measurement Results 
Gamma-ray measurements of 
235
U for a series of dilution concentrations of UN in a 304L 
Schedule 40 pipe segment were conducted. A comparison of the measured spectra for all 
the detectors is presented in Figures 9-6 through 9-10.  As the UN is 40 years old, the 
spectra contain contributions from the higher energy 
238
U emissions, as well as other 
signatures given in Table 6-2. Although 
238
U is not a viable signature for measuring 
freshly solvent extracted UN, these emissions affect the overall detection efficiency, in 
addition to contributing Compton continuum downscatter underlying the lower energy 
235
U signatures. The entire energy range of the measured spectra is provided in 




























were only available at a live time of 1800 s, where the remaining detector/concentration 
count rates were calculated based on a 3600 s acquisition live time. This was due to 

























































































































































Figure 9-10. 10 g U/L Dilution Measurement Data for All Detectors. 
As shown for all dilution measurements in Figures 9-6 through 9-10, the Falcon BEGe 
possessed the highest resolution, whereas the 2×2 NaI(Tl) Osprey had the lowest 
resolution, being unable to resolve the 185.7 keV peak from the 163.3, 194.9, 202.1 and 
205.3 keV peaks. For the scintillator detectors, the Inspector 1000 provides superior 
resolution to the Osprey. The peak area boundary (ROIs), FWHM, and resolution values 





































Table 9-1. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries and Resolution Properties of 
185.7 keV 
235
U Peak in Passive Dilution Measurements. 
Detector 
 
ROI (keV) FWHM (keV) Resolution (%) 
Falcon BEGe 
 
[184.3, 187.6]  0.9 0.49 
Inspector 1000 LaBr3 
 
[158,204]  11.0 5.93 
Osprey 2x2 NaI(Tl) 
 
[124,227]   27.0 14.57 
*
Includes multiplet peak fit by Genie. 
 
As shown in the peak area analysis depicted in Figure 9-9, the Osprey had the highest 
peak area efficiency for the 185.7 keV 
235
U peak, whereas the Inspector 1000 had the 
lowest efficiency. At 10 g U/L, the peak for the Inspector was not discernible by Genie as 
an identifiable peak within the provided confidence limits, and thus no peak area data 
point is provided at this concentration (Figure 9-10, Figure 9-11). This is consistent with 
the results from Scargill, who determined the concentration limit for the analysis of 
natural uranium using the 185.7 keV line is 30 g U/L with an uncertainty of 5% during a 
counting time of 5 minutes [74]. 
 
The correlation fit with dilution concentration is strongly linear, with the net peak area of 
the 185.7 keV 
235
U emission. From 90 g U/L down to 10 g U/L, the peak area of 
8053 cpm drops overall by 95% at a rate of 85 cpm per g U/L UN for the Osprey 
detector. For the Inspector dilution concentrations from 90 to 50 g U/L, the peak area of 
1133 cpm drops overall by 57% at a rate of 16 cpm per g U/L. Finally, the Falcon net 
peak area of 3963 cpm  drops from 90 to 10 g U/L overall by 88% at a rate of 44 cpm per 
g U/L. Consequently, the Osprey is the most sensitive to concentration variations in 
235
U, 






Figure 9-11. Net Peak Area for 
235
U 185.7 keV Emission as a Function of Dilution 
Concentration. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
From 50 to 90 g U/L solution concentration, the statistical error associated with peak area 
counts for the Osprey is ranges from 0.18–0.22%, where the 10 g U/L has ~1.36% error. 
With the Inspector 1000, the statistical error from 50 to 90 g U/L ranges from 0.50–
1.01%. Finally, the statistical error associated with the Falcon from 50 to 90 g U/L falls 
within 0.21–0.29%, whereas at 10g U/L, it increases to ~0.87%.  
 
Table 9-2 provides the calculated peak-to-total ratios for each of the three detectors. The 
peak-to-total ratio is the value by which the total detector efficiency is multiplied by to 
determine the full energy peak efficiency [80]. At 185.7 keV, the Osprey has the highest 
peak efficiency vis-à-vis the Inspector and Falcon. Although the Falcon is more sensitive 
to 
235
U as a function of UN concentration, it has the lowest peak-to-total ratio, whereas 
y = 85.535x - 125.49
R² = 0.9234
y = 43.905x + 224.25
R² = 0.9792






































the Osprey possesses a higher peak-to-total measurement, followed by the Inspector. An 
in-depth discussion of detector efficiency is provided in the sensitivity analysis in 
Chapter 12. 
 
Table 9-2. Peak-to-Total Ratios of 185.7 keV Peak at 90 g U/L. 







Osprey [1.1, 1609.9] 0.28±(0.03%) 
Inspector [1.3, 1514.2] 0.13±(0.03%) 
Falcon [1.4, 1592.4] 0.08±(0.02%) 
 
Since the Falcon is able to resolve the 143.8 and 163.3 keV peaks, peak areas and ratios 
are provided in Figures 9-12 and 9-13 to show the relative strength of these signatures. 
Since the 163.3 keV is such a low intensity emission of 
235
U, the 143.8 is a more 










Figure 9-12. Peak Area Values for 
235
U Emissions as a Function of Solution 
Concentration for Dilution Measurements for Falcon BEGe. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph.
*
Data at 90 g 
U/L only available at 1800 s. Remaining dilution data at 3600 s acquisition time. 
y = 5.3343x + 39.452
R² = 0.9592
y = 3.2306x + 9.7375
R² = 0.956









































Figure 9-13. Peak Area Ratios of 
235
U Emissions (143.8 keV, 163.3 keV) to 185.7 keV 
for Dilution Measurement Data as a Function of Solution Concentration for Falcon 
BEGe. 
*
Data at 90 g U/L only available at 1800 s. Remaining dilution data at 3600 s acquisition time. 
 
  
y = -8E-05x + 0.1319
R² = 0.395



























9.4 137Cs Transmission Measurement Results 
For each of the dilution concentrations at 90 g, 85 g, 75 g, 50 g, and 10 g U/L, 
transmission measurements were taken using 
137
Cs for densitometry measurements for 
3600s live time
5
. The spectra for the measurements are given in in Figures 9-14 through 
9-18.The corrected source activity from 
137
Cs employed during measurement acquisition 
was 0.83 μCi. 
 
 
Figure 9-14. 90 g U/L 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data for All Detectors. 










































Figure 9-15. 85 g U/L 
137




































Figure 9-16. 75 g U/L 
137





































Figure 9-17. 50 g U/L 
137





































Figure 9-18. 10 g U/L 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data for All Detectors. 
 
A comparison of the detector resolution at the 661.7 keV peak at 90 g U/L is provided in 
Figure 9-19. At this energy, the Osprey has the poorest resolution, whereas the Falcon 







































Figure 9-19. Peak Resolution of 
137
Cs Transmission Measurement Data at 90 g U/L. 
 
The peak area boundary (ROIs), FWHM, and resolution values are summarized in 
Table 9-3 for 661.7 keV emissions at 90 g U/L solution concentration. Since this energy 
range does not have any overlapping peaks as the 
235
U emissions have in the 100–
200 keV energy range, the resolution is sufficient for all detectors in assaying the single 
661.7 keV 
137
Cs transmission photon energy. 
 
Table 9-3. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries and Resolution Properties of 
661.7 keV 
137
Cs Peak in Passive Dilution Measurements. 
Detector ROI (keV)  FWHM (keV) Resolution (%) 
Falcon BEGe [659.5, 663.8]   1.3 0.20 
Inspector 1000 LaBr3 [620,699]   21.2 3.21 




































Although the resolution does not affect overlapping signature emissions, the transmission 
peak efficiency becomes of paramount interest in signature identification for PM. Peak 
area signatures for the 661.7 keV emission for each detector are given in Figure 9-20 as a 
function of solution concentration. In Figure 9-20, the Osprey has the highest peak area 
efficiency for the 661.7 keV 
137
Cs peak, whereas the Inspector 1000 has the lowest peak 
area value, and hence the lowest efficiency.  
 
The linear correlation with dilution concentrations for the peak area fit of the 661.7 keV 
137
Cs emission is weak due to the self-attenuation, as well as the lack of MAC sensitivity 
at higher photon energies, as explained in Chapter 7. From 90 g U/L to 85 g U/L dilution 
concentrations, the peak area of 969.5 cpm changes by approximately 11.5% for the 
Osprey detector. For the Inspector dilution concentrations from 90 to 85 g U/L, the peak 
area of 248 cpm changes by approximately 13.4%. Finally, the Falcon peak area of 
629 cpm changes from 90 to 85 g U/L by ~9.1%. Transmission measurement peak areas 
expect to increase with decreasing solution concentration and density; however, in 
practice, due to mass attenuation properties, self-attenuation, source-detector geometry, 
and setup limitations in the contamination area, the 661.7 keV photons of 
137
Cs 
transmission measurements were rather insensitive to 
235
U in UN. In addition, the original 
pipe segment was assayed at 90 g U/L for the Inspector and the Osprey. Although the 
newly fabricated pipe replicated the dimensions of the original pipe, and was fabricated 







Figure 9-20. Peak Area for 
137
Cs Transmission Measurements as Function of 
Solution Concentration for all Detectors. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
From 10 to 90g U/L solution concentration, the statistical error associated with peak area 
counts for the Osprey is approximately 3.4%. With the Inspector 1000, the statistical 
error over the range of dilution concentrations is ~6.5%, where the statistical error 
associated with the Falcon is ~4%.  
 
Table 9-4 provides the calculated peak-to-total ratios for each of the three detectors. At 
661.7 keV, the Osprey has the highest ratio vis-à-vis the Inspector and Falcon. The 
validated Falcon detector simulations in Chapter 11 provide more in-depth analysis of the 
peak area signatures and detector efficiency, and the factors impacting peak-to-total ratio 
are provided in the sensitivity analysis in Chapter 12. 
 
y = -0.72x + 976.29
R² = 0.1754
y = -0.4786x + 710.21
R² = 0.2542





































Table 9-4. Peak-to-Total Ratios of 661.7 keV Peak at 90g U/L. 






Osprey [0.1, 1603.7] 0.038±(0.01%) 
Inspector [3.1, 1512.1] 0.028±(0.01%) 
Falcon [1.4, 1591.2] 0.011±(0.01%) 
 
Since the Falcon is able to resolve the 143.8 and 163.3 keV peaks, peak areas and ratios 
are provided in Appendix G (Figures G-6 and G-7) to show the relative strength of the 
137
Cs transmission signatures.  
9.5 Dead Time 
Dead time losses were also recorded by Genie [76] at each dilution concentration for each 
of the three detectors employed. As shown in Figure 9-21, the Falcon BEGe has the 
highest associated dead time losses. The Inspector has the lowest dead time (i.e., highest 






Figure 9-21. Dead Time for all Detectors as a Function of Dilution Concentration.  
 
9.6 Conclusions 
Dilution measurements were conducted in a controlled, low-background environment in 
order to assess the gamma-ray detector sensitivity to various concentrations of uranium, 
identify the robustness of signatures to these variations, and provide benchmark 
experiments for subsequent simulation modeling efforts. Using the Falcon 2.985×2.0-cm  
BEGe [73], Osprey 2×2-inch NaI(Tl)  [72] and Inspector 1000 1.5×1.5-inch LaBr3 [69] 
detectors, gamma-ray signatures were analyzed for dilution concentrations of UN of 90 g, 
85 g, 75 g, 50 g, and 10 g U/L.  
 
The passive measurements of the 185.7 keV 
235
U emissions provided strong sensitivity to 
dilution concentrations of UN, whereas the 661.7 keV transmission measurements with 
137

























is due to convergence of the MAC at higher photon energies for UN, making it relatively 
insensitive to the uranium content at the 661.7 keV energy range. With regards to 
resolution, the Falcon BEGe possessed superior resolution, which is useful in 
discriminating 
235
U signatures in the 100–200 keV range. However, the Osprey provided 
greater detection efficiency for both passive and transmission signatures. The 3600 s 
acquisition time (and even the case of the 1800 s acquisition time at 90 g U/L) provided 
sufficient counts for measurement statistics to fall within ~1% uncertainty for 
235
U 
passive measurements at all dilution concentrations. Overall, 
137
Cs was not highly 
sensitive to the uranium content in the UN, as discussed in Chapter 7. The selection of an 
appropriate monitoring transmission source will be further discussed in the computational 
simulations in Chapter 11. In addition, since the 661.7 keV peak falls above the 
185.7 keV energy range, Compton downscatter from this higher energy peak contributed 
to higher continuum counts. This affects the continuum background, for which higher 
continuum will lead to higher uncertainty values associated with the peak area, which 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 12. 
 
In Chapter 10, the robustness of the gamma-ray methods is determined through 








CHAPTER 10. RESULTS: UNCLE FACILITY MEASUREMENTS 
Passive gamma-ray monitoring methods were tested in the UNCLE facility to determine 
the robustness of gamma-ray instrumentation under operating conditions. The previous 
dilution measurements provided an indication of instrumentation sensitivity from which 
PM signatures could be extrapolated. These capabilities were transposed into an 
operational environment for monitoring of UN following solvent extraction in an NUCP 
at UNCLE. Where the laboratory dilution measurements provided a controlled, low-
background environment, the series of measurements at UNCLE provided more realistic 
background interference from adjacent pipes and tanks, in addition to introducing voiding 
and temperature variations from fluid flow. 
 
10.1 Experiment Setup for UNCLE Measurements 
The detectors were situated adjacent to one of the 100-gallon stainless steel tanks in 
UNCLE. Photographs of the experimental setup showing the Falcon BEGe with the 
tungsten endcap, Osprey 2×2 NaI(Tl), and Inspector 1000 1.5×1.5LaBr3 with the 







  (A)    (B)    (C) 
Figure 10-1. Detector Setup in UNCLE Facility: (A) Falcon BEGe; (B) Osprey 2×2 
NaI(Tl); (C) Inspector 1000 LaBr3. 
 
10.2 Energy Calibration 
The energy calibration was conducted with the Falcon detector using a 
152
Eu gamma-ray 
source. The trend was fit to a second-order polynomial in Canberra’s Genie software, 
with a multi-channel analyzer spanning 1592.5 keV over 8192 channels 
(0.19 keV/channel). The polynomial fit used for the energy calibration is given in 
Equation 10-1 and plotted in Figure 10-2. 
 







Figure 10-2. Energy Calibration Curve of Falcon BEGe Detector for UNCLE 
Measurements. 
 
The energy calibration was conducted with the Osprey 2×2-NaI(Tl) detector using a 
152
Eu 
gamma-ray source. The calibration was fit to a second-order polynomial in Canberra’s 
Genie software, with a multi-channel analyzer spanning 1616.3 keV over 2048 channels 
(0.79 keV/channel). The polynomial fit used for the energy calibration is given in 
Equation 10-2 and plotted in Figure 10-3. 
 
                                                          . [10-2] 
 



























Figure 10-3. Energy Calibration Curve of Osprey 2×2 NaI(Tl) Detector for UNCLE 
Measurements. 
 
The energy calibration was conducted with the Inspector 1000 LaBr3 detector using a 
152
Eu gamma-ray source. The calibration was fit to a second-order polynomial in 
Canberra’s Genie software, with a multi-channel analyzer spanning 1517.4 keV over 
2048 channels (0.74 keV/channel). The polynomial fit used for the energy calibration is 
given in Equation 10-3 and plotted in Figure 10-4. 
 
                                                        . [10-3] 
 
























































10.3 Change in Flowrate Measurements 
The tests conducted in this work at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM correspond to mass 
flowrates of 7963.4 kg/h and 3528.9 kg/h of UN solution (or 653 kg U/hr and 
289 kg U/hr), respectively. With respect to plant classification at this throughput 
explained in Chapter 2, if UNCLE was run continuously for a whole year, this would 
correspond to an L-scale NUCP with ~5700 t U/yr. and ~2500 t U/yr., respectively. With 
respect to flowrate, the conversion from kg UN solution/hr to L UN solution/hr for the 
UN in UNCLE is given in Figure 10-5. 
  
 
Figure 10-5. Volumetric Flowrate Averages for Varying Pump Speeds in UNCLE. 
Data reproduced from [39]. 
 
Gamma-ray measurements of 
235
U were taken in UNCLE at a temperature of 29±3
o
C and 

































adjacent to the detector location before the pump. A comparison of the measured 
235
U 
signature spectra in the 100–200 keV range for all the detectors is presented in 
Figures 10-6 and 10-7 for flowrates under steady-state conditions at 1070 RPM and 




U is not a viable signature for measuring freshly solvent extracted UN, as 
secular equilibrium of the daughters cannot be guaranteed, the 
238
U emissions from 
UNCLE contribute Compton continuum downscatter underlying the lower energy 
235
U 
signatures. The full spectra include contributions from 
238
U from the 40 year old UN in 
UNCLE, and are provided in Appendix H for the 1070 and 500 RPM flowrates.  
 
 
Figure 10-6. Comparison  of 
235
































Falcon HPGe UNCLE Setup1-1070RPM Inspector 1000 LaBr3 UNCLE Setup1-1070RPM






Figure 10-7. Comparison  of 
235
U Spectra for Flowrate Measurements at 500 RPM 
at UNCLE. 
 
Consistent with the dilution measurement results, the Falcon BEGe has the highest 
resolution, whereas the 2×2 NaI(Tl) Osprey had lowest resolution, being unable to 
resolve the 185.7 keV peak from the 163.3, 194.9, 202.1, and 205.3 keV peaks. Similarly, 
the Inspector 1000 provides superior resolution to the Osprey, but with a lower 
efficiency. If focused on this energy range and 
235
U contributes the only signatures at this 
range, then the lower resolution ROI could be a feasible monitoring signature. However, 
employment of this multi-peak ROI becomes problematic in a high-background 
environment of if Compton downscatter increased the continuum under the net peak area. 
The peak area boundary (ROIs) and peak-to-total values for the 185.7 keV peak are 





























Falcon HPGe UNCLE Setup2-500RPM Inspector 1000 LaBr3 UNCLE Setup2-500RPM




Figure 10-8, the Osprey has the highest peak area efficiency for the 185.7 keV range, 
whereas the Inspector 1000 has the lowest efficiency. However, as seen for all detectors, 
there is very poor discrimination in resolving the change in flowrate from the 1070 RPM 
to 500 RPM levels. For the Falcon BEGe, the peak area drops by 0.27% with an 
associated statistical peak area uncertainty at 1070 RPM of 1.68%. The change in peak 
area from the 1070 RPM to 500 RPM for the Osprey and Inspector is slightly more 
pronounced at 9.77% and 6.96%, but with associated statistical peak area uncertainties at 
1070 RPM of 2.76% and 1.29%, respectively. Consequently, passive gamma-ray 
detection poorly discriminates flowrate for all detectors in the tested 500 to 1070 RPM 
range. It is expected that passive gamma-ray discrimination will also be poor for 
flowrates above this range, since the detectors see the same active detector volume of 
filled pipe, in addition to being limited by temporal resolution. Activation analysis can 
perhaps remedy these limitations and will be discussed in the analysis and 
recommendations in Chapters 13 and 14. 
 
Table 10-1. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries and Efficiency Properties of 
185.7 keV 
235
U Peak in UNCLE Measurements. 




Falcon BEGe [184.1, 187.6]  0.0742(±0.21%) 0.0743(±0.21%) 
Inspector 1000 LaBr3 [161,199]
* 0.1235(±0.22%) 0.1420(±0.21%) 
Osprey 2×2 NaI(Tl) [125,225] 
* 0.3460(±0.11%) 0.2770(±0.12%) 
*









Figure 10-8. Comparison of UNCLE Peak Areas at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM. 
 
The pipe specifications and source-detector geometry employed in the dilution 
experiments were emulated in the UNCLE facility. In addition, the UN employed for the 
dilution experiment was extracted from UNCLE. However, despite keeping the 
aforementioned parameters consistent, variables such as changes in temperature and 
pressure from dynamic fluid flow, in addition to voiding effects, deviate from the 
measured gamma-ray static dilution signatures. A comparison of the 1070 RPM, 
500 RPM, and dilution peak spectra is given in Figure 10-9, with a zoom in on the 
185.7 keV peak from 
235
U in Figure 10-10. Spectra comparing the UNCLE and dilution 








































Figure 10-9. Comparison of UNCLE Spectra at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM with 
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Figure 10-10. Comparison of UNCLE Spectra at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM with 

































Falcon HPGe UNCLE Setup1-1070RPM









Figure 10-11. Comparison of UNCLE Spectra at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM with 
































Osprey 2x2-NaI(Tl) UNCLE Setup1-1070RPM










Figure 10-12. Comparison of UNCLE Spectra at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM with 




Even though the UN circulating in UNCLE is the same UN employed in the 90 g U/L 
dilution measurements, vibrations, environmental temperature, and most importantly, 
voiding effects due to dynamic fluid flow contribute to an overall effective density lower 
than that of static measurements. Since Figure 10-8 shows no overall difference in fluid 
flow, effects due to voiding and localized air bubbles contribute to the overall lower 
effective uranium content measured in UNCLE. Figure 10-13 compares the 185.7 keV 
peak area from 
235
U for both the UNCLE flowrate measurements and the static dilution 
measurements. The low efficiency of the Inspector measurements is inconsistent with the 
Falcon and Osprey measurements. Source-detector geometry, ROI selection, and peak 
discrimination methods employed by Genie, as well as localized voiding, background, 
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Figure 10-13. Comparison of 
235
U 185.7 keV UNCLE Flowrate Peak Areas at 
Dilution Peak Areas for All Detectors. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
If peak area is indicative of overall uranium content, the UNCLE data, as shown by the 
Falcon and Osprey measurements, indicate that voiding reduces the effective 







































10.4 UNCLE 137Cs Transmission Measurements 
As with the static dilution experiments, transmission measurements were taken with 
137
Cs 
to assess the 661.7 keV emission sensitivity to uranium content. Spectra were collected at 
the same location and setup as the flowrate measurements for 3600 s live time at the 
1070 RPM flowrate. A comparison of the full energy spectrum for all detectors is plot in 
Figure 10-14. In order to compare the 661.7 keV transmission peak area from the 
UNCLE measurements from the transmission measurements in the dilution experiments, 
these spectra were overlaid for the Falcon, Osprey, and Inspector detectors.  
 
Figure 10-14. Comparison of UNCLE 
137
Cs Transmission Spectra at 1070 RPM for 
All Detectors. 
 
The peak area boundary (ROIs) and peak-to-total values for the 661.7 keV peak are 
summarized in Table 10-2. As shown in the ROI 661.7 peak area depicted in 
































Falcon HPGe UNCLE Setup3-Transmission1070RPM
Inspector 1000 LaBr3 UNCLE Setup3-Transmission1070RPM




peak, whereas the Inspector 1000 has the lowest efficiency. This is consistent with the 
flowrate and dilution measurement results. In addition, peak ratio values are provided in 
Figure 10-16 comparing the 661.7-to-185.7 keV peak areas for the 1070 RPM flowrate 
with the static dilution measurements. 
 
Table 10-2. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries and Efficiency Properties of 
661.7 keV 
137
Cs Peak in UNCLE Measurements. 
Detector ROI (keV) FWHM (keV) Peak-to-Total Ratio 
1070 RPM 
Falcon BEGe [659.5, 663.9] 1.36 0.0093 (±0.55%) 
Inspector 1000 LaBr3 [615.8,696.0] 20.87 0.0304 (±0.40%) 








Figure 10-15. Comparison of UNCLE Transmission Peak Areas at 1070 RPM with 
Dilution 
137
Cs Transmission Peak Areas for All Detectors. 



































Figure 10-16. Comparison of UNCLE 
137
Cs Transmission Peak Ratios at 1070 RPM 
with Transmission Ratios at Dilution Concentrations for All Detectors. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
Even though the source was UN at 90 g U/L, pipe specifications and source-detector 
geometry employed in the dilution experiments were emulated in the UNCLE facility, 
changes in environmental variables, in addition to resettling from fluid flow, deviate from 
static transmission measurement parameters. A comparison of the transmission 
measurements at 1070 RPM in UNCLE and dilution peak spectra is given in 
Figures 10-17 through 10-19, focused on the 661.7 keV energy range for the Falcon, 



































Figure 10-17. Comparison of UNCLE Transmission Spectra at 1070 RPM with 





















Falcon BEGe - UNCLE -Transmission-1070RPM
Falcon BEGe - 90g U/L -Transmission
Falcon BEGe 85g U/L -Tranmission





Figure 10-18. Comparison of UNCLE Transmission Spectra at 1070 RPM with 





















Osprey 2x2 NaI(Tl) - UNCLE -Transmission-1070RPM
90g U/L - Osprey 2x2 NaI (Tl)
85g U/L - Osprey 2x2 NaI (Tl)





Figure 10-19. Comparison of UNCLE Transmission Spectra at 1070 RPM with 
Dilution Transmission Spectra for Inspector LaBr3. 
 
As tested with the dilution measurements, the 
137
Cs peak area and ratios provide a 
signature of overall uranium content in the UN. The UNCLE data indicates that voiding 
reduces the effective concentration to that of the 75–85 g U/L range, as seen with the 
Osprey measurements in Figures 10-15 and 10-16. However, as the dilution 
measurements found 
137
Cs to be relatively insensitive to uranium content, this may also 






















LaBr3 Inspector - UNCLE -Transmission-1070RPM
90g U/L - Inspector LaBr3
85g U/L - Inspector LaBr3









Cs transmission densitometry measurements were conducted in 
field trials at UNCLE using the three detectors employed in the dilution experiments. The 
dilution measurements provided indications of instrumentation sensitivity and potential 
monitoring signatures, which were tested in an operational environment. In the presence 
of realistic operating conditions, including facility background (pipes/tanks), 
environmental variables (temperature, pressure), and fluid flow dynamics, the robustness 
of the Falcon, Inspector, and Osprey were tested under such operating conditions. In the 
comparative flowrate measurements at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM, 
235
U signatures were 
assayed to ascertain whether uranium content could be determined. In comparison to the 
static dilution experiments, the dynamic flowrate measurements provided results 
indicating that voiding effects largely contributed to the observed decrease in the 
185.7 keV peak area, despite the maintenance of the pipe material, source-detector 
geometry, and UN material originating from the a common stock 90 g U/L solution. The 
effective count rate from the 185.7 keV peak from UNCLE was in the range of the 75–
85 g U/L measurements from the dilution experiments, indicating a net lower 
concentration in UNCLE as seen by the detector, likely due to voiding effects. Similarly, 
137
Cs transmission measurements were conducted at 1070 RPM, emulating the dilution 
transmission measurements, to determine the effectiveness of 
137
Cs in assaying uranium 
content. As seen with the transmission dilution measurements in Chapter 9, 
137
Cs is 
relatively insensitive to uranium content over the concentration range of 10–90 g U/L and 




The evaluation of a fieldable COTS detector and transmission monitoring source is 
finally contingent upon statistical and uncertainty variables, including background 




further efficiency variables. These factors will be discussed as part of a comprehensive 





CHAPTER 11. RESULTS: VALIDATION SIMULATION MODELS  
11.1 Passive Simulation Validation Results 
For each of the five measured dilution concentrations outlined in Table 8-5, a 
comparison of the measured and MCNPX simulated spectra for passive measurements 


























































































































Figure 11-5. 10 g U/L Comparison of Dilution Measurement Data with MCNPX 
Simulation. 
 
Consistent with the ROI selection in Chapter 9, the ROIs in the experimental 
measurements were emulated for the simulation spectra in order to determine the net 
peak areas at each dilution concentration for the high-intensity 
235
U emissions. These 
peaks are summarized in Table 11-1. Figure 11-6 plots the peak area of the simulated 
highest intensity emissions as a function of dilution concentration. Sources of 
deviations from linearity for both the simulation compared to the experimental data 
include variables that cannot be simulated, such as electronics variables, detector dead 



























Table 11-1. Region of Interest (ROI) Boundaries for Gamma-Ray 
Emissions from Dilution and Transmission MCNPX Simulations of UN 
for the Falcon BEGe. 
Peak Energy  
(keV) 
ROI Energy (keV) 
143.76 [142.5, 145.5] 
163.33 [161.6, 164.9] 
185.72 [184.5, 187.8] 
122.1 [120.6, 123.5] 
356.0 [354.1,358.0] 
661.7 [659.5, 663.8] 
 
 
Figure 11-6. Net Peak Area for 
235
U 185.7 keV Emission as a Function of Dilution 
Concentration for MCNPX. 
 
The fit values for passive measurements and simulations have correlation coefficient 
(R
2
) values higher than 0.9, indicating a strong linear fit for this signature ratio (y) as a 
function of solution concentration (x). 
y = 5.554x + 85.322
R² = 0.9646
y = 3.1173x + 31.251
R² = 0.9869








































Use of peak ratio methods for peaks within the same energy range ensures that the 
detector efficiency is also similar between the two peaks. Such peak ratio methods 
also allow for the uranium concentration to be determined without calibration 
constants or infinite thickness requirements, making ratios more robust signature 
indicators [87]. As given in Table 6-2, the highest intensity emissions beyond the 
185.7 keV (57.2%) signature emissions from 
235
U are (in order of decreasing intensity) 
143.8 keV (10.96%), 163.3 keV (5.08%), 194.9 keV (0.63%), 202.1 keV (1.08%), and 
205.3 keV (5.01%). All energies comparing simulation and experimental ratios are 
plotted in Figure 11-7 for the dilution concentration of 90 g U/L.  
 
 
Figure 11-7. Peak Area Ratios of High Intensity 
235
U Emission Photons to 

































MCNPX Ratio to 185.7 keV




In reality, the 143.8 keV signature would best be employed as a signature ratio to the 
185.7 keV peak, as its emission intensity is second only to that of the 185.7 keV 
emission. Diluting from 90 g to 10 g U/L (with a density decrease of ~10.2%), there is 
a relative 12% increase in the peak ratio values of the peak area of 143.8 keV to 
185.7 keV. 
11.2 Transmission Simulations of Dilution Experiments 
In addition to the passive NDA simulations, detector validation for 
137
Cs transmission 
measurements was simulated for 90 g, 85 g, 75 g, 50 g, and 10 g U/L of UN (outlined 
in Chapter 9). A spectral overlay of the measured and simulated 
137
Cs transmission is 
given in Figure 11-8 for 90 g U/L. The spectral overlay plots for the remaining 
concentrations are given in Appendix F, Figures F-1 through F-4. 
 
 
Figure 11-8. 90 g U/L Comparison of 
137


































Use of the external 
137
Cs densitometry source ratio methods was not as consistent due 
to variation in efficiency variables, which will be assessed in the sensitivity analysis in 
Chapter 12. However, gross peak areas showed strong linear correlation but were not 
highly sensitive to dilution concentrations to UN. This is consistent with the rationale 
explained in the attenuation calculations in Chapter 7; as shown in Figure 7-3, the 
convergence of the MACs for UN at higher energies provides less sensitivity to 
uranium content. The peak area of 661.7 keV emissions from 
137
Cs as a function of 
dilution concentration for both MCNPX and measurements is given in Figure 11-9, 
and fits with a strong linear correlation coefficient for the validated MCNPX values. 
Diluting from 90 g U/L to 10 g U/L, there is a relative peak area increase 10.3% of 
transmitted 
137
Cs 661.7 keV photons. As shown in Figure 11-9, statistically 
propagated uncertainty falls within < 1% error. 
 
 
Figure 11-9. Net Peak Area for 
137
Cs Transmission MCNPX Simulations at 
661.7 keV as a Function of Dilution Concentration. 
y = -0.4786x + 710.21
R² = 0.2542
































Solution Concentration (g U/L)
661.7 keV Measurement Peak Area




11.3 Transmission Simulations of 133Ba and 57Co 





Co would be more sensitive to uranium content, as shown in 
Figure 7-3. Since experimental measurements were not possible to test these sources’ 
sensitivity to uranium content, use of the validated simulations provides insights into 
transmission sensitivity for PM signature determination.  
 
For each of the five measured dilution concentrations outlined in Table 8-5, a 
comparison of the MCNPX simulated spectra for transmission measurements of 90 g, 











































Co Transmission MCNPX Simulation Data Spectra at Dilution 
Concentrations. 
 
The 356 keV transmission peak for 
133
Ba was assessed with the Falcon BEGe detector 
response for various concentrations of UN. Since the half-life of 
133
Ba source is 
approximately 10.5 years, it is favorable from an operational monitoring perspective, 
as source replacement would need to be less frequent than 
57
Co (half-life ~271 days). 
In order to have a peak ratio error < 5% at 90 g U/L (where the highest concentration 
has the lowest transmission peak area counts and hence the highest statistical 
uncertainty), use of a 0.7μCi 
133
Ba source in the simulation model source definition 
met this 95% confidence level criterion.  Since 
57
Co has such a short half-life, a very 
high activity source would be required to sufficiently penetrate the UN-filled pipe and 































radioactive source in order to meet the 5% criteria, use of a 3 μCi 
57
Co source in the 
simulations provides 90% confidence within 10% statistical error for the most 
conservative model with the lowest transmission (90 g U/L).  Peak area values of 





are provided in Figures 11-12 and 11-13, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 11-12. Net Peak Area for 
133
Ba Transmission MCNPX Simulations as a 




































Figure 11-13. Net Peak Area for 
57
Co Transmission MCNPX Simulations as a 
Function of Dilution Concentration. 
 































Figure 11-14. MCNPX Simulations Net Peak Area for All Transmission Sources 
as a Function of Dilution Concentration. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
11.4 Conclusions 
Computational models were created in order to simulate and test the detection 
response to various concentration and densitometry variables. Passive and 
137
Cs 
transmission models were validated with experimental data, and were consistent with 




Co as densitometry transmission 
sources were simulated to determine the optimal densitometry source for monitoring 

















































The slope values of the linear fit for the peak area of the transmission sources as a 
function of dilution concentration provide an indication of the level of sensitivity of 
the transmission source to the uranium content in the pipe. As posited in Chapter 7, 
137
Cs had the lowest slope value (Figure 11-7), with the least sensitivity to uranium 
content as a function of concentration. This is due to plateauing values of the MAC of 
UN at higher (500 keV+) energies, as shown in Figure 7-3. For 
133
Ba (Figure 11-12), 
the slope of the fit was more pronounced, indicating greater sensitivity to uranium 
content as a function of concentration. Finally, 
57
Co (Figure 11-13) had the most 
pronounced slope with the greatest sensitivity to uranium content. Although most 
sensitive, the operational implementation of 
57
Co as a viable monitoring source is 
deterred by its very short half-life and the need for a high source activity for the low-
energy 122 keV photons to penetrate the UN pipe. However, 122 keV also sits below 
the major uranium emissions and may be too sensitive to continuum subtraction, 
unless high-resolution instrumentation is employed (HPGe). The 
133
Ba provides a 
superior sensitivity compared to 
137
Cs and a sufficiently longer half-life compared to 
57
Co. However, if lower resolution measurements are to be considered in a monitoring 
scheme, degraded resolution would require corrections from the adjacent high-
intensity peaks in the 300–400 keV range from 
133
Ba. Finally, the validated 
137
Cs 
provided the least sensitivity to uranium content, but provided sufficient penetration 
with the singular high-intensity 661.7 keV emission and long half-life.  
 
Although the lower energy transmission peaks provided the greatest sensitivity, from a 




Cs also contribute higher Compton 
downscatter, increasing the continuum under the 100–200 keV 
235
U photon emissions. 
As we are evaluating natural uranium, higher Compton contributions could eclipse 




uncertainty associated with the underlying continuum. This latter concept is now 




CHAPTER 12. STATISTICAL, UNCERTAINTY, AND SENSITIVITY 
CALCULATIONS 
Experimental measurements from both the dilution and operational activities provided 
a basis for identifying passive gamma-ray signatures from 
235
U in UN. Detailed 
statistical, overall uncertainty, and sensitivity analyses are required in order to evaluate 
the robustness of these monitoring signatures. Systematic and random errors are 
further considered in the evaluation of monitoring signatures to meet a specific 
safeguards task. 
 
Peak area uncertainty due to the Compton continuum from 
238
U in secular equilibrium 
from aged UN, in addition to the 
137
Cs emissions during transmission measurements, 
affect the net 185.7 keV precision peak area and required counting times to meet a 
specified confidence interval. In a field setting, background from adjacent tanks and 
pipes containing uranium in a field setting additionally contribute to background under 
the assay peak areas, which must be characterized, discriminated, and appropriately 
shielded during implementation of field instrumentation. 
 
A sensitivity analysis provides an indication of how variables, such as pipe thickness, 
material properties, and source-detector geometry affect the overall detection 
efficiency of the assayed 
235
U signatures. Canberra’s ISOCS software quantifies the 
UN mass (hence, activity) in the 304L pipe through a series of ray-tracing calculations 
(explained in Chapter 5) and provides an absolute efficiency for the modeled source-
detector configuration modeled. To model the UN-filled pipe geometry, two of the 
three tested detectors – the Falcon BEGe and the Osprey 2×2 in. NaI(Tl) – can be 




effects of source-detector geometry and absorbers in the overall peak efficiency of 
assay signatures. 
 
12.1 Statistical Uncertainty and Error Propagation 
 Dilution Background Measurements 12.1.1
The background uncertainty as part of the overall statistical uncertainty was quantified 
for the laboratory environment where the dilution measurements were taken. 
Measurement spectra were taken for 1800 s live time and are provided for each of the 
three detectors in Figure 12-1. The Inspector 1000 detected the highest environmental 
40
K at 1460 keV.  
 
 























ROI gross and background values
6
 for the 
235
U high-intensity emissions were 
employed for each of the three detectors. The required counting (live) time to meet 
predetermined uncertainties of 5% and 10% for the Falcon, Inspector, and Osprey 
detectors are calculated in Tables 12-1, 12-2, and 12-3, respectively.
7
 
Table 12-1. Falcon BEGe Optimal Counting Time for Passive and 














Counting Time (s) 
5% 10% 
90 185.7 418.57 3.74 6.65 1.66 
661.7 54.30 1.35 40.30 10.06 
85 185.7 435.92 2.70 6.77 1.69 
661.7 34.42 0.76 74.84 18.68 
75 185.7 375.15 2.50 7.19 1.80 
661.7 27.88 0.68 78.68 19.65 
50 185.7 254.85 2.06 9.60 2.40 
661.7 43.02 0.85 35.23 8.81 
10 185.7 29.82 0.70 101.57 25.34 
661.7 6.88 0.34 70.06 17.51 
 
  





 ROI values from Tables 9-1 and 9-3 were employed in this calculation. 
7
 For Tables 12-1 through 12-3, 185.7 keV 
235
U emissions were calculated from passive dilution 
measurements; 661.7keV 
137




Table 12-2. Inspector 1000 LaBr3 Optimal Counting Time for Passive and 














Counting Time (s) 
5% 10% 
90 185.7 2166.10 8.50 42.03 10.40 
661.7 1028.43 5.86 86.77 21.24 
85 185.7 2492.82 6.45 52.78 13.10 
661.7 540.85 3.00 198.66 48.42 
75 185.7 1674.57 5.28 56.55 14.04 
661.7 468.30 2.79 169.17 41.45 
50 185.7 1182.95 4.44 75.22 18.63 
661.7 444.70 2.72 152.96 37.58 
10 185.7 500.58 2.89 470.39 109.87 
661.7 218.12 1.91 101.52 25.18 
 
Table 12-3. Osprey NaI(Tl) Optimal Counting Time for Passive and 














Counting Time (s) 
5% 10% 
90 185.7 11365.33 19.46 6.36 1.59 
661.7 3580.13 10.92 32.38 8.03 
85 185.7 8393.20 11.83 8.49 2.12 
661.7 1466.70 4.94 69.13 17.13 
75 185.7 9143.40 12.34 7.27 1.82 
661.7 1603.83 5.17 62.53 15.51 
50 185.7 8048.58 11.58 10.80 2.70 
661.7 1019.20 4.12 52.79 13.12 
10  185.7 1471.35 4.95 88.08 21.76 
661.7 575.28 3.10 34.49 8.60 
 
 
For the measurements conducted, count rates from signature 185.7 keV 
235
U emissions 
and 661.7 keV 
137
Cs emissions were sufficiently intense to satisfy counting times in 





 UNCLE Background Measurements 12.1.2
The background in UNCLE was characterized by first measuring background in the 
absence of the backshield, and second, by measuring background with a Shadowshield 
(as shown in Figure 12-2).
 8
 By shielding the source emissions from the UN-filled 
pipe, the shadowshield provides measurements for background signals or “leakage” 
reaching the detector penetrating the shielding arrangement (Figure 12-3).  There is no 
evidence of a peaked background. Thus, the net 185.7 keV intensity simply requires a 
continuum subtraction. This is determined for each assay from the collected spectrum. 
In relation to Equation 5-17, this means that tg= tb. 
 
 
Figure 12-2. Falcon Detector Setup in UNCLE (Setup 5: 
Shadowshield/Frontshield) Measuring Leakage into Collimator. 





 Environmental measurements were taken unshielded at a standoff distance at the entrance of UNCLE. 





Figure 12-3. Detector Comparison UNCLE - Setup 5: Shadowshield (Frontshield) 
Leakage into Collimator at 1070 RPM. 
 
Measurements taken in UNCLE in the absence of a backshield are given in 
Figure 12-4 for each of the Falcon, Inspector, and Osprey. Subtracting these 
measurements taken in Setup 1 (1070 RPM) with the backshield in UNCLE (given in 
Chapter 10) provides the background contribution from surrounding pipes and tanks 
reaching the detector. The background contribution from adjacent tanks and pipes is 






























Falcon HPGe UNCLE Setup5-Frontshield
Inspector 1000 LaBr3 UNCLE Setup5-Frontshield



































Falcon HPGe UNCLE Setup4-NoBackshield-1070RPM
Inspector 1000 LaBr3 UNCLE Setup4-NoBackshield-1070RPM





Figure 12-5. Full Energy Spectra of Counts Shielded by Backshield in UNCLE. 
 
Background signals from adjacent tanks/piping provide a 
235
U interference source that 
could alter the pipe signals assaying uranium content. However, since the emission 
range we are focusing on for 
235
U falls in the 100–200 keV range, the use of a Pb 
backshield, in conjunction with optimized shielding encasing the detector, sufficiently 


































ROI gross and background values
9
 for the 
235
U high-intensity emissions were 
employed for each of the three detectors. The required counting (live) time to meet 
predetermined uncertainties of 5% and 10% for the Falcon, Inspector, and Osprey 




Table 12-4. Optimal Counting Time for UNCLE 1070 RPM Flowrate 











Counting Time (s) 
5% 10% 
Falcon BEGe 185.7 422.23 2.65 7.49 1.87 
661.7 59.55 1.00 54.17 13.53 
Inspector 
1000 
185.7 2372.65 6.29 41.39 10.29 
661.7 739.15 5.53 218.59 53.02 
Osprey 185.7 7129.00 10.90 8.41 2.10 
661.7 1594.95 5.16 76.79 19.00 
 
 Compton Continuum Effects 12.1.3
In addition to environmental background contributing to ROI count rates, 
contributions from the Compton continuum shelf affect the associated uncertainty of 
the background (i.e., environmental background plus Compton continuum). Compton 
continuum, whether from a 
137
Cs transmission source or from higher energy 
238
U, in 
the case of natural UN in secular equilibrium, contributes to the continuum under the 
peak ROI. In principle, two 185.7 keV measurements may have the same net peak 





 ROI values from Tables 9-1 and 9-3 were employed in this calculation. 
10
 For Table 12-4, the 185.7 keV 
235
U emissions were calculated from passive dilution measurements; 
661.7 keV 
137




ROI (indicative of the same uranium content). However, in the presence of Compton 
downscatter, this increases continuum background, which increases the overall 
uncertainty associated with the measured peak area. 
 
In Figure 12-6, the integral ROI for the 185.7 keV peak area at 85 g U/L is shown. 
Figure 12-6 also assesses the same 185.7 keV ROI, but for measurements with the 
661.7 keV 
137
Cs transmission source present. The change in background in each 
situation was negligible between the two measurements, given the low-background 
environment, and the solution remained unchanged at 85 g U/L. Comparing both 
figures, the high-resolution measurements from the Falcon BEGe show comparatively 
no change in Compton effects between the passive and transmission measurements.  
However, for the lower-resolution scintillator detectors, continuum effects are very 
pronounced with the introduction of a higher energy 661.7 keV source, increasing the 
continuum under the net peak area. With the highest detection efficiency and low 
resolution, the Osprey yielded the greatest sensitivity in continuum contributions in 
the presence of high-emission Compton effects. These effects are echoed in the 






Figure 12-6. 185.7 keV 
235
U Integral Counts in the Absence and Presence of 
137
Cs 













































Figure 12-7. 185.7 keV 
235





If process monitoring 
235
U in UN included regular Compton downscatter from either 
high-energy transmission sources or from higher energy 
238
U in secular equilibrium, 
then a Compton suppression system could be explored to quantify such effects [80]. 
However, since 
235
U in UN is expected to be freshly processed, such measures are not 
a foreseeable requirement for an NUCP. 
 
12.2 Detection Efficiency  
Gamma rays must undergo interaction with the detector crystal before being 
registered. The efficiency of a detection system is typically defined as the observed 









































the peak efficiency values of the 
235
U 185.7 keV and 
137
Cs 661.7 keV emissions 
according to Equation 12-2 for the dilution and transmission measurements for the 
Falcon, Osprey, and Inspector is given in Figures 12-8 and 12-9, respectively.   
 
 
Figure 12-8. Peak Efficiency of 185.7 keV Emissions from 
235
U from Dilution 
Measurements. 











































Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
As seen in Figures 12-8 and 12-9, deviation from expected values is due variations in 
any of the variables that contribute to the total detection efficiency. As described in 
Chapter 5, the total efficiency is the product of four factors  [63] [64]: 
 
                               .    [12-1] 
 
Subsequently, evaluation of the sensitivity of each of these parameters to the overall 











































12.3 MCNPX Analysis 
Differentiating each of the four factors contributions to the total efficiency in 
Equation 12-1 is difficult to determine experimentally. However, the simulation 
models developed in Chapter 8 can be harnessed to determine the particle flux at each 
boundary in the experimental setup. Using the energy calibration parameters and 
detector geometry for the Falcon BEGe outlined in Chapter 8, an F1 flux tally was 
conducted over interacting surfaces (Figure 12-10). In Figure 12-10, the dots represent 
the source particles and collisions in the MCNPX model. The MCNPX input is 
provided in Appendix J.  
 
 
Figure 12-10. VisEd Model of MCNPX Simulation Source Particle Interactions. 
 
To determine the peak efficiency for the 185.7 keV emissions from the UN, the F1 
tally is was multiplied by the UN activity and sum of emission probabilities (SP card), 
and taken as a ratio of the 
235












branching ratio of 57% for 185.7 keV photons (Equation 12-2). This value provides 
the fraction of source 185.7 keV photons that escape the UN. 
 
                
                                                      
       
     
 
                                    
        [12-2] 
 
 (1) UN Boundary: The first F1 tally was conducted over the boundary of the 
source UN at 90 g U/L. The peak efficiency of Equation 12-2 provides the samp, 
the self-attenuation effects due to the sample UN. The inverse of this value 
provides the CF(AT) described in Chapter 7.  
 
The following three surface tallies contribute to the evaluation of absp and geom 
parameters in Equation 12-1. 
 
 (2) Pipe Boundary: The second F1 tally was conducted over the boundary of the 
304L stainless steel pipe. 
 
 (3) Collimator/Endcap: The third F1 tally was conducted over the boundary of 
the W endcap of the Falcon BEGe detector. 
 
 (4) Detector Housing: The fourth F1 tally was conducted over the Al housing of 
the detector. 
 
The final tally provides the intrinsic peak efficiency (int) values by determine what 
fraction of the photons reaching the detector crystal actually interact with the crystal to 




 (5) Crystal Surface: The final F1 tally was conducted over the surface of the 
HPGe detector crystal. The ratio of the F8 (energy deposition) from Chapter 8 for 
the 185.7 keV peak to this F1 tally value provides the intrinsic peak efficiency 
value, int. 
 
The peak efficiency at each of these tally points in the MNCPX model is summarized 
in Figure 12-11.  
 
 
Figure 12-11. 185.7 keV Peak Efficiency Values from MCNPX F1 Tallies. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
From the MCNPX F1 tally over the (1) UN boundary, the sample efficiency for the 







































reaching detector of the crystal surface [F1 tally at (5) Crystal Surface] with the 
emissions that interact with the crystal volume creating full energy depositions (F8 
peak area) is 46±6%. The culmination of the tallies from (2) Pipe Boundary, 
(3) Collimator/Endcap and (4) Detector housing contribute to the (absp geom) 
parameters. These efficiency values collectively contribute (0.415±0.001)% to the 
185.7 keV peak efficiency. From the source emissions of 185.7 keV photon activity of 
9.0810
4
 Bq with the detected photopeak area of 68.9 cps, the overall peak efficiency 
based on this validated MNCPX simulation is (0.076±0.009)%. 
 
In addition, tallies were made to determine the effects of the Pb brick arrangement, as 
well as the W collimator. Consequently, the emissions were tallied in the presence of 
both Pb shielding and collimator, without Pb with collimation, and without either Pb 
or collimation. A comparison of the Pb shielding arrangement and collimator is given 






Figure 12-12. 185.7 keV Peak Efficiency Values  
 
In the absence of Pb shielding, the peak efficiency increases from 0.95% (of initial 
185.7 keV activity) to 1.07%. Further elimination of the W collimator/endcap 
increases the efficiency by 0.72% to 1.79%. However, thereafter, the absolute peak 
efficiency only increases from 0.08% to 0.09% efficiency in the absence of 
collimation and shielding. The MCNPX models quantify the effects of the Pb 
shielding arrangement employed in the dilution measurements; optimization of source-
detector geometry in a field setting, as well as optimizing shielding, will mitigate 














































Uncollimated, No Pb Shielding





12.4 In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) Simulations 
A detailed assessment of factors affecting detection efficiency is made by conducting 
a sensitivity analysis of the detector response to changes in pipe thickness, material 
properties, and source-detector placement/offset. These are conducted using 
Canberra’s ISOCS software [63]. Unlike classical efficiency calibrations, ISOCS can 
be employed without representative calibration materials. A response model of the 
detector is established at the factory by a combination of measurement and MCNP 
modeling. The geometry is modeled in the ISOCS software and uses ray tracing 
(described in Chapter 5) to determine the absolute efficiency of the source-detector 
system. When this efficiency calibration is applied to an acquired spectrum, the mass 
(and hence, activity) can be determined for the modeled geometry. The use of ISOCS 
negates having to run multiple MCNPX simulations, hence permitting testing of a 
multitude of variables affecting the overall peak efficiency of photon signatures 
emitted from the UN-bearing pipe. ISOCS executes in a short time relative to MCNP, 
but generates only the full energy peak efficiency, not the energy deposition profile. 
 
 ISOCS Peak Efficiency Simulations 12.4.1
Models were created to emulate the geometry employed for both the dilution and 
UNCLE measurements. The peak efficiency values determined using ISOCS were 
calculated within 5% convergence error. The results for the Falcon BEGe are provided 
in Figure 12-13 and are plotted as a function solution density for the 185.7 keV peak 
efficiency in Figure 12-14. The Osprey NaI(Tl) ISOCS results are plot in Figure 12-15 
as a function of energy and in Figure 12-16 as a function of solution density for the 
185.7 keV peak efficiency. All data are plot with 5% error bars. One prominent feature 




100 keV. This local drop in efficiency is due to the K-edge absorption of uranium at 
115.6 keV. At lower uranium concentrations, the K-edge effect is less pronounced. 
 
 
Figure 12-13. ISOCS Calculated Peak Efficiencies for Collimated Falcon at 






































Figure 12-14. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations for Collimated Falcon 




















































Figure 12-15. ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for Shielded Osprey Dilution 






































Figure 12-16. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations for Shielded Osprey Dilution 
Measurements as a Function of UN Solution Density. 
 
A comparison of the Osprey and Falcon efficiencies with shielding/collimation is 




































Figure 12-17. Comparison of ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for 
Shielded/Collimated Falcon BEGe and Osprey NaI for 90 g U/L in Pipe. 
 
 ISOCS Mass and Activity Calculation of UN in Dilution 12.4.2
Experiments 
Modeling the source-detector setup enables ISOCS to generate the geometry-specific 
peak efficiencies. These efficiency calibrations were imported into the dilution data 




generated peak efficiencies, the mass and subsequent activity of 
235
U were determined 




U mass values 
were calculated using stoichiometric calculations and measured densities for the UN-
filled pipe. As the ISOCS system is best optimized for high-resolution detectors, the 
Falcon 
235
U mass were in very good agreement with the theoretical values. The ISOCS 
generated results are less practical for lower-resolution measurements, such as by the 
Osprey, as shown in Table 12-5. Lower-resolution results are more difficult to unfold 
and are much more sensitive to continuum effects, which may contribute to the higher 
mass estimation of 
235
U for the Osprey. Table 12-6 summarizes the same generated 
ISOCS efficiency for the 90 g U/L dilution for the UNCLE spectra taken with the 
Falcon detector. Consistent with the peak area results discussed in Chapter 10, a lower 
effective mass is seen by the detector due to dynamic flow, as well as any variations in 
the exact geometry setup from the dilution measurements translated to UNCLE. 
 
  




11 ISOCS calculates full energy peak efficiencies and should be suitable for HPGe and NaI detectors. 
However, in real-life applications, NaI detectors have poor energy resolution such that geometry-
dependent small-angle scattering stays within the ROI, which itself contains overlapping peaks (143, 
186, and 205 keV peaks). Consequently, the interpretation of the full energy peak area is an operational 





































90 1.99 1.85± 0.05 7.84104 6.59±0.33 7.83104 
85 1.87 1.79± 0.04 7.83104 5.15±0.21 7.83104 
75 1.66 1.62± 0.04 7.86104 5.51±0.22 7.83104 
50 1.10 1.09±0.02 7.81104 2.68±0.13 7.84104 
10 0.22 0.170±0.005 7.84104 0.54±0.03 7.83104 
 












Calculation 1.99 8.00104 
BEGe Dilution 
90g U/L 
1.85± 0.05 7.84104 
BEGe UNCLE 
1070 RPM 
1.73± 0.04 7.83104 
BEGe UNCLE 
500 RPM 
1.66± 0.04 7.83104 
 
 ISOCS Efficiency Models Due to Absorbers and Self-Shielding 12.4.3
The following ISOCS models build upon characterizing the full by determining the 
effects of removing the collimator/shielding. Since the Falcon is modeled with the W 
collimator endcap and the Osprey is modeled with the Pb brick arrangement, the 
uncollimated/unshielded models without 304L piping enable direct comparison of the 
variables contributing to full independent of absp.  
 
ISOCS models were constructed without the 304L pipe wall (modeled as dry air).  
Figure 12-18 shows a comparison of efficiencies calculated by ISOCS for the Falcon 
with 90 g U/L UN in for various shielding and absorber geometries. These geometries 




collimator. Similarly, Figure 12-19 compares various geometries for the Osprey. Full 
dilution concentration efficiencies and various shielding configurations are provided in 
Appendix K. All efficiencies were calculated by ISOCS within 5% uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure 12-18. Comparison of ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of 90 g U/L UN for 
Falcon BEGe (i) with Pipe and Collimation; (ii) with Pipe Wall Without 





























Falcon 90g U/L (Collimated with Pipe Wall)
Falcon 90g U/L (Uncollimated with Pipe Wall)
Falcon 90g U/L (Collimated without Pipe Wall)





Figure 12-19. Comparison of ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of 90 g U/L UN for 
Osprey NaI(Tl) (A) with Pipe and Collimation; (B) without Pipe with 
Collimation; and (C) Pipe or Collimation. 
 
At 185.7 keV, the peak efficiencies generated by ISOCS for these various geometries 
are summarized in Table 12-7. The notional uncertainty in the ISOCS calculation is 
+ relative, on the absolute values, based on general guidance from the product 
literature [63]. 
Table 12-7. ISOCS 185.7 keV Peak Efficiencies for Various Geometries. 
Geometry Falcon 















No Pipe Wall 
0.178% Shielded, 
No Pipe Wall 
0.172% 
Uncollimated, 
No Pipe Wall 
0.223% Unshielded, 




























Osprey 90 gU/L (Shielded with Pipe Wall)
Osprey 90g U/L (Unhielded with Pipe Wall)
Osprey 90 gU/L (Shielded without Pipe Wall)





For the Falcon at 90g U/L, the peak efficiency for a collimated detector with pipe wall 
is 0.080%. The presence of the pipe wall attenuates the source UN by 59.2%. The 
ISOCS simulation demonstrates that the presence of the W collimator attenuates 
12.1% of the incident 185.7kV photons. As a result, the contribution to absp for the 
Falcon at 90g U/L can be calculated as the quotient of the efficiency with 
shielding/collimation/piping with the efficiency without these absorbers. The result for 
the Falcon is a 35.8% contribution to absp, of due to pipe wall and collimator effects. 
Similarly, the pipe wall for the Osprey attenuates 60.3%, where the Pb shielding 
attenuates 15.7% of the 185.7kV photons. As a result, the contribution to absp for the 
Osprey at 90g U/L is 33.5% due to pipe wall and collimator effects. 
 
12.5 Self-Attenuation Correction Factor 
A variety of methods have been employed to determine the peak efficiency of the 
185.7 keV emission, including efficiency calculations from MCNPX, measurement 
data, and ISOCS simulations. Determination of the sample provides the CF(AT) as 
outlined by Parker’s method in Chapter 7. From the MCNPX F1 tally model 
conducted in this chapter, the flux over the UN boundary provides sample at 
40.2±0.2%. The inverse value of this efficiency yields a CF(AT) of 2.49±0.02. Using 
Parker’s method in combination with the MCNPX transmission model employed in 
Chapter 7, CF(AT) was plotted as a function of κ. From the calculated sample, the κ in 
Equation 7-2 can be determined from the CF(AT) for the Falcon. In addition, using the 
MCNPX Parker transmission analysis from Chapter 7 with data acquired in Chapters 9 
and 10, κ can be experimentally determined.  Figure 12-20 shows CF(AT) as a 




(Chapter 9), and UNCLE (Chapter 10). Since CF(AT) was determined  to be 2.49, the 
subsequent values for κ (based on dilution data) are provided in Table 12-8, where κ 
~0.75–0.76. XCOM is overstated as it theoretically predicts CF(AT) for narrow-beam 
geometry, as explained in Chapter 7 in detail.  Variations in reproducible geometry 
between the dilution and UNCLE measurements explain the difference in κ. 
 
 
Figure 12-20. Calculation of CF(AT) for Various Values of κ. 
 
  
y = 2.2023x + 0.7071
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Table 12-8. Calculation of κ Based on Derived Values of CF(AT). 
CF(AT) XCOM MCNPX Dilution Data 90 g U/L UNCLE 
2.49 0.81±0.01 0.76±0.01 0.75±0.01 0.65±0.01 
  
 Overall Peak Efficiency 12.5.1
Correlating Equations 12-2 and 12-3, the 185.7 keV peak area can be written as a 
function of source activity and efficiency variables for UN, given in Equation 12-3. 
 
                                                        .   [12-3] 
 
The Falcon measurement data yielded a 185.7 keV peak efficiency (peak of 
235
U  total 
in Equation 12-1) of (0.073±0.001)%, where the ISOCS yielded (0.080±0.004)%, and 
MCNPX yielded( 0.076±0.009)%. With a branching ratio of 0.572 for 185.7 keV 
photons per decay [61], and knowing the 
235
U specific activity of 7.8410
4
 photons/s/g 
calculated from ISOCS, peak area can be correlated with 
235
U mass as shown in 
Equation 12-4.  
 
          
                  
                                    
  .   [12-4] 
 
The ISOCS and dilution mass values all fall within 5% of the MCNPX simulations. 
The capabilities and limitations of this confidence level in a process monitoring 






12.6 Sensitivity Analysis of Detection Efficiency  
The use of simulation tools, such as MCNPX and ISOCS, permit testing the sensitivity 
of detector responses to how variables such as pipe thickness, source-detector 
geometry, and material properties affect the overall detection efficiency of the assayed 
235
U signatures.  
 
 Spatial – Offset 12.6.1
The effect of detector placement due to spatial offset was evaluated using both 
experimental measurements, in conjunction with the ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator 
[63]. As described in Chapter 5, offset measurement data were acquired 
experimentally for each of the three COTS detectors for a 90 g U/L UN-filled pipe in 
the dilution experiment setup. Central axis measurements were taken at 1800 s live 
time, and for 3600 s live time at offset locations. The Falcon measurements were taken 
with the W collimator/endcap at 0 cm (central axis), 6.5 cm (1/2 collimator diameter) 
half offset, and 13 cm (full collimator diameter) full offset positions. The Inspector 
and Osprey measurements were taken with the Canberra 7419 Shield/Collimator with 
measurements correspondingly taken at 0 cm, 6.5 cm, and 13 cm offset. Spectra for 
the data are given in Figures 12-21, 12-22, and 12-23 for the Falcon, Osprey, and 




























Falcon HPGe - 90g U/L Setup 3-Center
Falcon HPGe - 90g U/L Setup 3-Half Offset


























Osprey NaI(Tl) - 90g U/L Setup 3-Center
Osprey NaI(Tl) - 90g U/L Setup 3-Half Offset










U 185.7 keV peak area for each detector is plot in Figure 12-24. Although the 
Osprey has the highest peak area, it shows the lowest offset position sensitivity in 
relation to the pipe dropping to 62.3% at the half-offset location vis-à-vis the central 
peak area, and by 53.7% at the whole offset position. The Inspector and Falcon were 
comparatively more position sensitive. The Inspector peak area dropped to 70.1% at 
the half offset and by 23.9% at the whole offset position. The peak area sensitivity is 
less prominent at the half location for the Falcon, which drops 88.5% and by 23.4% at 






















Inspector LaBr3 90g U/L Setup3-Center
Inspector LaBr3 90g U/L Setup3-Half Offset





Figure 12-24. 185.7 keV Net Peak Area for Spatial Offset Measurements for All 
Detectors. 
 
The ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator was employed to calculate the 185.7 keV peak 
efficiencies at discrete offset locations ranging from 0 to 25 cm. Models created to 
simulate the Falcon with W collimator and Osprey with Pb shielding, as described in 
the previous section for the efficiency calculation simulations. Figure 12-25 shows the 
results of the peak efficiencies from high-intensity 
235
U signatures from 0 to 25 cm 
offset values for the Falcon, and Figure 12-26 shows the efficiency results for the 
Osprey. In both plots, the 185.7 keV emissions were empirically fit to determine the 
peak efficiencies at 0 cm, 6.5 cm and 13 cm to juxtapose with the measurement offset. 




























Figure 12-25. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations 
for Falcon Detector at Various Distances from Source along Central Axis. 
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Figure 12-26. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations 
for Osprey Detector Offset from Central Axis. 
 
For the 185.7 keV peak efficiency to drop to 50% of its initial value, the Falcon must 
be offset by 9.9 cm, whereas the Osprey must be offset a much greater distance of 17.3 
cm, making the Falcon much more position sensitive. 
Table 12-9. ISOCS Peak Efficiency Results for Falcon and Osprey 




185.7 keV Peak Efficiency  
Osprey 
185.7 keV Peak Efficiency 
0 0.090% 0.090% 
6.5 0.057% 0.069% 
13 0.036% 0.054% 
 
The ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator calculates the efficiency associated with displacing 
the pipe at set offset distances for the modeled geometry. However, unlike the 


















  143.8 keV
  163.3 keV
  185.7 keV




operational environment that may originate from adjacent pipes and tanks in an 
NUCP. Background additionally increases the continuum under the peak area. In 
reality, this can be remedied by an optimized shielding design that encapsulates the 
pipe and detector to prevent gross displacements between the source and detector, in 
addition to shielding leakage from background. 
 
 Spatial – Source-Detector Distance 12.6.2
Varying the source-detector distance along the central axis was simulated using the 
Uncertainty Estimator for values up to 120cm. Using Gnuplot [85], an inverse-square 
function was empirically fit to the efficiency data for the Falcon detector, given in 
Figure 12-27. The fit parameters are provided in Appendix K. 
 
 
Figure 12-27. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations 
for Falcon Detector at Various Distances from Source along Central Axis for 
185.7 keV Emissions. 
 
     
 
      
 
a= 0.473± 0.0.007 






As with the offset simulations, Uncertainty Estimator provides an estimate strictly 
independent of other operational background. Moving the detector further from the 
pipe would increase the solid angle of the detector over which adjacent radiation 
sources (and background) reach the detector. 
 
 Pipe Thickness  12.6.3
Attenuation due to the pipe wall thickness determines the transmission of the 
185.7 keV gamma rays reaching the detector. Correcting for pipe wall thickness also 
aids in correlating the density, concentration, and enrichment with measured detector 
data. Values of 304L stainless steel thickness fall within 0.52±0.05 cm. Using the 
ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator, the 185.7 keV peak efficiency was determined within 
the range of 0.52±0.05 cm and plotted in Figure 12-28. An efficiency comparison for 
other 
235
U high-intensity emissions is provided in Appendix K. Also, Figure 12-28 
show the Gnuplot fit for the peak efficiency as a function pipe thickness, with fit 






Figure 12-28. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations 
for Falcon Detector at Various Pipe Thickness Values 
 
As calculated in Chapter 7, the linear attenuation coefficient at 185.7 keV through 
304L pipe was calculated to be 1.14 cm
-1
 with a 55.4%. Figure 12-29 shows the 
relative efficiency compared to a relative thickness from 0.52 cm.  
 
                   







Figure 12-29. Relative Efficiency for Falcon Detector at Various Pipe Thickness 
Values 
 
At the lower end at 0.47 cm, the efficiency increases by 8%, whereas at the higher end 
at 0.57 cm, the efficiency drops by 7%. This pipe range represents a sampling of 
Schedule 40 304L stainless steel pipe available in industrial production [88] [89]. The 
result of the detection capability for safeguards monitoring becomes pivotal given a 
potential 0.1–10% variation in throughput (dependent on plant size, mentioned in 
Chapter 1) as safeguards criteria. In the absence of an empty pipe calibration, even 
minute variations in pipe thickness become augmented for monitoring low-energy 
235



























12.7 Enrichment Variables 
In the purview of process monitoring, a sensitivity analysis can be conducted to 
differentiate an increase in concentration vis-à-vis an increase in enrichment content. 
As described in Chapter 5, traditional verification of uranium content and enrichment 
is conducted by comparing the 185.7 keV of 
235
U with the 1001 keV 
234m
Pa under 
secular equilibrium conditions. If limited or unverified flowrate data or densitometry 
measurements are available, enrichment analysis assesses the capabilities and 
limitations in using passive gamma-ray detectors to characterize UN. As described in 
Chapter 8, MCNPX simulations were conducted for varying enrichments of UN for 
the Falcon BEGe. Simulations were conducted at enrichments of 0.76%, 1%, 5%, and 
10%. 
 
 MCNPX Enrichment Results at 90 g U/L 12.7.1
As described in Chapter 8, MCNPX simulations were conducted for varying 
enrichments of UN at 90 g U/L for the Falcon BEGe. Simulations were conducted at 
enrichments of 0.76%, 1%, 5%, and 10%. The resulting spectra are provided in 







Figure 12-30. MCNPX Spectral Comparison at Various 
235
U Enrichments for 


































Figure 12-31. MCNPX Peak Area Comparison at Various 
235
U Enrichments for 
90 g U/L. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
As shown in Figure 12-31, the MCNPX simulations of 90 g U/L show 
235
U peak area 
values to linearly correlate with enrichment at high-intensity emission energies. At 
185.7 keV, the peak area increases by approximately 5400 cpm per percent 
enrichment.      
         
 MCNPX Enrichment Results at 75 g U/L 12.7.2
For comparison with the concentration data in UNCLE, a mock scenario similar to the 
previous 90 g U/L enrichment variation was simulated using MCNPX at various 
enrichments at 75 g U/L for the Falcon. The material composition of the simulated 
y = 760.48x - 31.798
R² = 0.9999
y = 418.05x - 34.331
R² = 0.9994

































75 g U/L at various enrichments is given in Table 12-10. The resulting spectra are 
provided in Figure 12-32. Peak area comparisons for high-intensity emissions are plot 









235U in Pipe 
Calculated 
Activity 
Fresh 235U  
(Bq) 
0.76 1.49 1.19105 
1 1.96 1.57105 
5 9.82 7.86105 
10 19.65 1.57106 
  
 
Figure 12-32. MCNPX Spectral Comparison at Various 
235
U Enrichments for 


































Figure 12-33. MCNPX Peak Area Comparison at Various 
235
U Enrichments for 
75 g U/L. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
As shown in Figure 12-33, the MCNPX simulations of 75 g U/L show 
235
U peak area 
values to linearly correlate, with the 185.7 keV peak area increasing by approximately 
4300 cpm per percent enrichment. 
 
12.8 Conclusions 
Low- and high-background environment measurements were taken under laboratory 
and operating conditions, for inclusion into a detailed statistical uncertainty and 
sensitivity analysis in order to evaluate the robustness of the monitoring signatures.  
 
y = 624.9x - 30.1
R² = 1.0
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Peak area uncertainty due to Compton continuum from 
137
Cs emissions during 
transmission measurements, as well as from higher-energy 
238
U in secular equilibrium, 
increased the continuum, and consequently, the peak area uncertainty for the 
235
U 
emissions in the 100–200 keV monitoring range. For laboratory and operational 
measurements at 90 g U/L, a measurement count time of ~7 s live time was required to 
maintain a < 5% counting statistics error for the Falcon and the Osprey, where the 
Inspector required at least 42 s as the detector with the lowest counting efficiency.  
 
Efficiency values for each of the three COTS detectors were calculated for the 
185.7 keV peak from a combination of measurement data, ISOCS models, and 
MCNPX simulations. For the collimated Falcon BEGe, the dilution measurement data 
yielded a 185.7 keV peak efficiency of 0.073±0.001%, where the ISOCS yielded 
0.080±0.004% and MCNPX yielded 0.076%±0.009%. The Osprey 2×2 in. NaI(Tl) 
yielded a peak efficiency of 0.075% from the ISOCS simulations. In investigating the 
effects of each of the four variables (                         , the F1 MCNPX 
model yielded an         of 40.2±0.2% for the Falcon, resulting in a CF(AT) of 2.49, 
and κ of ~0.75 in Parker’s method in determination of self-attenuation effects. 
 
The sensitivity analysis using ISOCS’s Uncertainty Estimator provided an indication 
of how pipe thickness and source-detector distance and offset variables affected the 
overall efficiency for the modeled Falcon and Osprey detectors. Although the offset 
measurements varied exponentially as a function of offset distance and source-detector 
varied as the modified square of inverse of source-detector detector distance, such 
issues are remedied with effective shielding, sufficiently encasing the detector. The 
pipe thickness attenuation most affected the 185.7 keV signature peak efficiency by up 




UNCLE. The result of detection capability for safeguards monitoring becomes pivotal 
given a potential 0.1–10% variation in throughput as safeguards criteria. Even minute 
variations in pipe thickness become augmented for monitoring low-energy 
235
U 
emissions for process monitoring, which affect the confidence of safeguards 
conclusions. 
 
If UN concentration is overstated in a declaration and lower concentrations with 
higher enrichments are processed, this potential “spoofing” avenue could be employed 
in a scenario where the operator or state was attempting to conduct undeclared 
activities. This avenue may be possible using partially enriched spent fuel pellets 
ground into UN, in a similar way to the procedure for preparing the solution employed 
for UNCLE (which used ~natural enrichment fuel pellets). If independent verification 
is unavailable for mass flowrate, concentration, or density, then knowledge of 
potential misuse scenarios is useful in drawing safeguards conclusions. This concept 






CHAPTER 13. DISCUSSION: EVALUATING “SPOOFING”AND 
DIVERSION SCENARIOS 
Using experimental and simulation data from both the dilution and operational 
measurements, in combination with detailed uncertainty, statistical, and sensitivity 
analyses, evaluations are made regarding the optimizing gamma-ray NDA 
instrumentation for process monitoring at this KMP in this chapter. The feasibility of 
employing passive gamma-ray methods for safeguards monitoring must be evaluated 
in relation to the IAEA requirement of detecting 1 SQ of material (10 MTU/yr.) in a 
period of 1 year with a 50% detection probability. Evaluation of potential misuse or 
spoofing scenarios addresses the robustness of this monitoring system. Although 
diversion quantities are evaluated vis-à-vis plant throughput, the effects of 




13.1 NUCP Efficiency Considerations 
When estimating uranium losses during conversion in a small-throughput facility, 
Faulkner et al. estimated processing efficiency to be between 94% and 98%, yielding 
uranium losses that fall between 2 and 6 wt. % per year (~2–6 MTU/yr.) [11]. For 
medium- and large-scale conversion facilities, efficiency was estimated between 90% 





 Temporal analysis requiring plant-specific information and cycle lengths are outside the scope of this work. Only 




and 98%, yielding waste streams of 20 to 100 MTU/yr. for a medium design plant and 
as high as 200 to 1000 MTU/yr. for large-scale plants. 
 
In the study of developing a generic model of an NUCP, DOE and the CNEN 
quantified the material throughput of a Brazilian NUCP with a 500 MTU/yr. 
throughput (Table 4-1) [25]. This was assessed vis-à-vis the aforementioned 
monitoring points developed at ORNL. From this study, the annual difference between 
uranium mass entering the facility as yellowcake and exiting the plant as UF6 was 
approximately 12 MTU/yr., exceeding the IAEA requirement of 10 MTU/yr. 
 
From the DOE-CNEN study, the largest uranium losses were from insoluble uranium 
remaining in the filtered solids following dissolution, as well as from uranium aerosols 
as dust from the dissolver or from uranium powders (AUC, UO3, UO2) [25]. As 
recommended by various independent environmental monitoring studies, these 
streams could be considered for strategic monitoring points for process monitoring or 
environmental sampling to verify material balance, facility activities, and compliance 
[4] [29] [46]. Although these losses could be minimized via recycling, the cost for 
recapturing these materials is judged often to outweigh the environmental benefit for 
low-value natural uranium. The DOE-CNEN study concluded that an efficiency of 
95% was reasonable for an NUCP [25]; however, this still leaves a 5% inventory 
difference, which is beyond the 1 SQ proposed by the IAEA.  
 
In a parallel effort between DOE and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, waste 
streams were estimated at a loss of 1.7% of the total uranium inventory [32].  By 
overestimating the waste stream losses, diversion activities could occur undetected. 




high as 2.5%, postulating that MUF at an NUCP should be in the range of 0.1–0.5% 
with an operating efficiency higher that 99.5% [32].  Considerations in the diversion at 
an NUCP must be predicated on the quantity of available uranium, the ease of its 
removal from the conversion process, and the ability to mask this diversion from 
detection.  
 
13.2 Diversion Stream Modeling 
As discussed in Chapter 2, NUCP facilities can be classified according to their 
throughput (S, M, L). For each of the S, M, and L plants, 1 SQ quantity of 10 MTU 
represents 10%, 1%, and 0.1% of the yearly inventory that must meet IAEA detection 
safeguards in the period of 1 year.   
 
Making verification assessments requires converting NDA detector measurement data 
(185.7 keV peak area count rate) into a mass flow rate. 
 
1. Solution Concentration (cpm  g U/L): The concentration of the UN 
flowing in the transfer pipes can first be determined by an in-line 
collimated densitometry source and gamma-ray detector, which will 
determine UN concentration and density in the detector field of view 
(pending previous system calibration) from the signature peak area (from 
Equation 12-3).  
2. Flowrate (RPM kg or L UN/hr.): A combination of external/inline 
flowrate meters (Doppler, acoustic, Coriolis) and/or operator declarations 
provides the flowrate (RPM) and mass flowrate (kg or L UN /hr.) of UN. 




3. Mass Flowrate of U (kg/hr. MTU/yr.): From Equation 5-10, the 
concentration and flowrate data can are combined to determine the mass 
flowrate of U (kg U/hr.). For the 90 g U/L employed in this work, 8.2% of 
the UN solution. Conversion of kg U/hr. can be converted to NUCP 
throughput of MTU/yr. for comparison with IAEA requirements. This is 
discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
 
At a flowrate of 1070 RPM, representative of Springfields’ NUCP throughput 
translates into a mass flow rate of 7963.4 kg UN/hr. At 90 g U/L, this equates to 
653 kg U/hr. If UNCLE was run continuously for a whole year, this would correspond 
to ~5724t U/yr., with 1 SQ representing 0.17% of the annual throughput. This is 
consistent with the Springfields operating history listed in Appendix A. 
 
Gradually diverting 10 MTU/yr. requires that 1.14 kg U be diverted daily for a 24-
hour cycle, or 3.42 kg daily in an 8-hour cycle. These represent 0.17% (24 hr) and 
0.52% (8 hr) of throughput for a flowrate of 1070 RPM. At a lower flowrate of 
500 RPM, daily diversion values represent 0.39% and 1.18% for the 24- and 8-hour 
cycles, respectively. 
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   ,   [13-1] 
where 
M(t) = uncertainty in mass flowrate of UN (kg/hr), 
C(t) = uncertainty in uranium concentration (kg U/L),13and 
F(t) = uncertainty in flowrate (kg or L/h). 
 
Consequently, since 10 MTU represents 0.17% of the potential throughput at UNCLE 
(and 0.1%, 1% and 10% of L, M, and S NUCP throughput), the overall uncertainty –
statistical, “four-factor” gamma-detector efficiency, calibration, and electronic – 
associated with determining NUCP inventory throughput would be less than 1 SQ.  
 
13.3 Statistical Certainty for Detecting 1 SQ  
The required counting times to keep count rate uncertainty under 5% were outlined in 
Chapter 12. As dilution and operational measurements in UNCLE were taken for 
3600 s live time, statistical uncertainty was found to be <1.4% for all flowrates, 
dilutions, and detectors. At 90 g U/L, operational measurements in UNCLE were 
taken for 3600 s, with a conservative statistical uncertainty of 0.4% for the Inspector, 
0.17% for the Osprey, and 0.22% for the Falcon detector, respectively. These 
uncertainties are based on the resolution (ROI), where the lower resolution detectors 





 Both passive and transmission measurements provide the concentration data. Statistical count-rate 
error associated with the transmission peak and subsequent correlation can be represented as C, 







U emission energies (143, 163, 186 keV) under a single ROI, in 
addition to being more sensitive to Compton continuum effects. In addition, as 
concluded in Chapter 10, measurements at UNCLE at two different flowrates of 
1070 RPM and 500 RPM yielded no discernible difference with respect to passive 
gamma-ray measurements. In each case, the assay peak ROI was statistically 
indistinguishable, due to the fact that the detector is seeing a full pipe of UN, 
regardless of flowrate. Consequently, the passive gamma-ray measurements employed 
in the current setup in the scope of this investigation are unable to provide information 
about flowrate. Inclusion of time-of-flight methods employing a combination of active 
and passive gamma-ray methods proposed in the final chapter may permit NDA 
methods to provide this information. 
 
 Background Optimization to Detect 1 SQ  13.3.1
Statistical uncertainty always remains inherent in radiation detection measurements. 
Statistical uncertainty can be most easily minimized by increasing the counting time 
over which measurements are acquired, as well as having a well-characterized 
background (or well-shielded detector). To measure 1 SQ in UNCLE, the overall 
uncertainty of the measurement must be below 0.17%. For S, M, and L NUCPs, 
detection methods must have a substantially lower measurement uncertainty than 10%, 
1%, and 0.1%, respectively. Employing Equation 5-17 to meet these specific criteria, 
Tables 13-1 and 13-2 show the required counting time for all detectors for the Poisson 
statistics to fall below 0.10%, 0.17%, 1.0%, and 10%. These values are based on the 
dilution and 1070 RPM UNCLE measurements, respectively, for the passive 
185.7 keV 
235







Table 13-1. Optimal Counting Time for Passive and Transmission 




Counting Time (s) 
0.10% 0.17% 1.0% 10% 








661.7 - - 1051.25 
(17.52m) 
10.06 




661.7 - - 6946.46 
(1.93h) 
21.24 
Osprey 185.7 - - 167.11 
(2.79m) 
1.59 




Table 13-2. Optimal Counting Time for Passive and Transmission 




Counting Time (s) 
0.10% 0.17% 1.0% 10% 







661.7 - - 1408.66 
(23.48m) 
13.53 
Inspector 185.7 - - 1244.95 
(20.75m) 
10.29 
661.7   6471.92 
(4.49d) 
53.02 
Osprey 185.7 - - 216.86 
(3.61m) 
2.10 




As seen with both passive and transmission measurements in Tables 13-1 and 13-2, 
the penetration of the 661.7 keV 
137
Cs does not provide sufficient counting statistics to 
achieve  ~1% uncertainty for all detectors.  
 
In practice, the count rate in the peak area ROI, r (cpm), in Equation 13-2 is a function 
of the 
235
U content (i.e., UN concentration, density) from Equations 5-10 and 13-1, 




count rate, r is not only derived from NDA measurements but can be correlated with 
solution mass/density, i.e., r ≡ r[C(ρ)] and r ≡ r[C(ρ)].  
 
In addition, statistical uncertainty in Equation 5-16 further contributes to quantifying 
r. However, if we consider a period of 1 year of integrated data, the statistical error 
for an integrated count-rate (under steady-state conditions) is greatly reduced 
(assuming a well-characterized/shielded background). If the background from adjacent 
transfer pipes or tanks is poorly shielded for the pipe-detector setup, then (depending 
on the size/proximity) emissions from adjacent tanks of UN (similar to those of Tanks 
A and B in UNCLE) artificially increase the peak area underneath the ROI signatures 
if stray 
235
U emissions are detected. Optimized shielding and detector placement 
mitigate the potential of this interference. 
 
Use of the count rate in the ROI to provide information about UN content depends on 
the assay signature(s) employed in the calculation from either/both of the gross 
185.7 keV count rate and the transmission peak area of the densitometry source. The 
transmission source will determine the density uranium content (insensitive to 
uranium isotopic composition) and density, where the 185.7 keV will provide a 
signature indicative of the isotopic content, provided an efficiency calibration or 
employment of the ISOCS software. 
 
 Efficiency Effects on 1 SQ Detection 13.3.2
The product of the peak efficiency and 
235
U activity from Equation 12-3 yields the 
ROI signature peak area interrogating the UN sample to provide concentration 




subsequently be transposed into Equation 13-2 to provide the overall uncertainty of 






    
     
    
   ,   [13-2] 
     where 
    A = uncertainty in 235U activity (Bq), 
     = uncertainty in 235U 185.7 keV peak efficiency, and 
    r = uncertainty in 235U 185.7 keV peak area. 
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From the experimental dilution measurements, at 90 g U/L (and negating A from the 
passive or transmission signature emission), the efficiency was explicitly calculated 







%. The peak uncertainty for these detector measurements 
spans 0.20%–0.55%, and explicitly stems from peak ROI measurements (r). The 
values of 0.20%–0.55% in UNCLE translate to 11.6–31.4 MTU, which is in excess of 
the 10 MTU IAEA criterion. Although these data are based on 3600 s of data 
acquisition, integration over a longer time frame will reduce the statistical error 
associated with detection measurements.  
 
With the dilution measurements, the activity of the source was known and 
Equation 13-3 is applicable. For in-field measurements, the efficiency must be 
determined based explicitly on count-rate data, correlated to 
235
U mass, uranium 




for an unknown efficiency. Determination of the system efficiency (and efficiency 
uncertainty) can be alleviated experimentally through the use of extensive calibration 
methods or – as conducted in the scope of this work – the use of the COTS software, 
ISOCS, to simulate the source-detector geometry (based on IAEA DIV and operator 
declarations) and folded with the acquired spectra to determine the activity (and hence, 
mass) in the pipe segment in the detector’s field of view (see Section 12.4). 
 
As elaborated previously in Chapter 12 in Equation 12-1, the peak efficiency is a 
combination of factors from the source-detector geometry, source self-absorption, 
shielding and absorbers, and intrinsic detection efficiency. As a result, these four 
factors’ uncertainty contributes to the overall efficiency of the assay system.  
 
13.3.2.1 Changes in Pipe Thickness 
From the data provided in the sensitivity analysis of Chapter 12, the pipe thickness 
was the most prominent variable. With a change of 0.5 mm in pipe thickness, the 
detection efficiency decreases by up to 8% in the case of the Falcon and Osprey at 
90 g U/L, as calculated by ISOCS. The addition of 0.5 mm of stainless steel thickness 
decreases the 185.7 keV peak efficiency of the Falcon from 0.080% to 0.074%. 
Consequently, 8% of the UNCLE annual throughput is ~458 MTU, which is much 
greater than the IAEA requirement of 10 MTU. Even changing the pipe thickness by 
~0.1mm decreases the aforementioned peak efficiency to 0.078%. This 2.5% decrease 
in efficiency equates a difference of 143.1 MTU/yr., still in ample excess of the IAEA. 
Consequently, the utmost smallest modification in pipe specification is enough to 
spoof detected NDA signatures to produce enough variation to divert a much greater 






13.3.2.2 Changes in Concentration  
As concentration values change, the mass, density, and self-attenuation of UN also 
vary accordingly. However, we must delineate in mass as a function of concentration 
with changes in attenuation as a function of concentration. As the concentration of UN 
increases, so does the uranium mass, thereby increasing the 
235
U transmission. 
However, with an increase in concentration comes an increase in density, as well as 
self-attenuation, thereby decreasing the 
235
U transmission. In order to interpret stand-
alone NDA peak area measurements, we must attempt to distinguish between these 
two scenarios. Figure 13-1 summarizes the mass (g), self-attenuation correction factor 
for 185.7 keV photons, density (g/cm
3
), and linear attenuation (cm
-1
) of UN as a 
function of solution concentration (g U/L). All parameters linearly correlate with the 
concentration of UN. As a function of concentration, the mass is most sensitive to 
changes in concentration as ~2.6 g U per g U/L increase in UN solution, and the 
density varies 0.0013 g/cm
3
 per g U/L UN. The self-attenuation of the 185.7 keV 
235
U 
photons varies as 0.0074 per g U/L change in UN, where the linear attenuation varies 
as 0.0015 cm
-1
 per g U/L. Changes in mass are much more pronounced as a function 
of concentration, whereas changes in attenuation are less sensitive. Exploitation of 
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Based on the dilution experiments of Chapter 9, it is statistically indiscernible to 
differentiate a change of ~5 g U/L, especially in the case of low-resolution 
measurements, in the presence of high Compton continuum contributions, or the use 
of insensitive transmission sources such as 
137
Cs. As seen in the dilution experiments 
in Chapter 9, the area of the 185.7 keV peak decreases from 3963.2 cpm at 90 g U/L to 
3910.1 cpm at 85g U/L – a difference of ~53 cpm, or 1.34% 
 
If such a substitution were made in UNCLE at 1070 RPM, this quantity equates to 
318 MTU/yr. Even at the lower flowrate tested at 500 RPM, a change of 5 g U/L 
equates to 141 MTU/yr. Consequently, a change of < 0.5g U/L would produce on the 
order of ~10 MTU/yr. Based on the NDA measurements presented in Chapters 9 and 
10, a 0.5 g U/L change could not be confidently discriminated, relying solely NDA 
measurements, most notably in the case of low-resolution measurements. 
 
13.3.2.3 Changes in Enrichment  
Any variation in enrichment will remain undifferentiated by a transmission 
densitometry source, the density can remain unchanged, and these sources are 
elementally sensitive only to the uranium content. However, the combination of both 
the passive 185.7 keV and transmission peak further aid in determining the nuclide 
content of 
235
U in UN.  From 0.76% to 1%, the 185.7 keV peak area increases by 
31.5% from 4129 cpm to 5433 cpm, as calculated by the MCNPX enrichment 
simulations in Chapter 12.  
 
The UN measured in this work (originating from UNCLE) employed 0.76 wt.% 
enriched 
235
U. At higher enrichments, the concentration of uranium in UN remains the 




Noticeable modifications to plant configurations and equipment to accommodate for 
criticality safety would provide an obvious indicator of processing of much higher 
enrichments. However, for a would-be rogue diverter, processing a subtle change in 
enrichment, such as from 0.76% to 1% presented in the simulations of Chapter 11, 
would be a potential avenue for producing more undeclared 
235
U. For a concentration 
of 90 g U/L at an NUCP of UNCLE’s throughput, increasing from 0.76% to 1% 
235
U 
enrichment (i.e., 0.061 wt.% in UN to 0.0802 wt.%) keeps the annual throughput the 
same, in terms of MTU/yr., but increases the 
235
U throughput from 42.6 MT/yr. to 
55.9 MT/yr. – an excess of 1 SQ which could be diverted to undeclared UF6. Even 
with sophisticated inline flowrate meters, although the mass throughput can be 
determined, the absence of NDA sampling would not verify this increase. 
 
To determine how common 185.7 keV peak area signals correlate with UN 
concentration and/or enrichment, the dilution concentrations (10–90 g U/L at 0.76% 
enrichment) in Figure 13-2 (from Chapter 11 simulations) and the 75 g U/L and 
90 g U/L (0.76–10% enrichments) were compared in Figure 13-3 with respect to 
235
U 






Figure 13-2. MCNPX Net Peak Area for 
235
U 185.7 keV Emission as a Function of 
Dilution Concentration at 0.76% Enrichment (UNCLE). 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 











































 Figure 13-3. 
235
U Mass in Pipe Segment as a Function of MCNPX Net Peak Area 
for 185.7 keV Emissions for 75 g U/L and 90 g U/L Simulated Enrichments and 
Dilution Concentrations. 
Note: Error bars plotted for some data points are smaller than the resolution of the graph. 
 
Although operator declarations are meant to be verified with this process monitoring 
system, a combination of data (densitometry, mass flowrate) is required to verify UN 
content. As shown in Figure 13-3, in the absence of mass flowrate, densitometry data, 
or 
238
U signatures assuredly in secular equilibrium, passive gamma-ray count rates can 

























75g U/L: y = 0.00045x
R² = 1
90g U/L: y = 0.00048x
R² = 1







U Mass (g) in Pipe Segment as a Function of 185.7 keV Net 
Peak Area. 
185.7 keV Peak Area (cpm) 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 
75g U/L Enrichment (g) 0.45 0.91 1.36 1.82 2.27 2.73 
90g U/L Enrichment (g) 0.48 0.96 1.45 1.93 2.41 2.89 
Dilution Concentrations (g) 0.46 0.93 1.39 1.86 2.32 2.78 
  
Figure 13-3 and Table 13-3 show the corresponding 
235
U content in the pipe segment 
as a function of 185.7 keV peak area emissions derived from MCNPX simulation. 
Based on these values, for a peak area of 4000 cpm this corresponds to either 75 g U/L 
at 0.93% enrichment or 86.1 g U/L dilution concentration at 0.76%. As a result, a 
potential rogue diverter could exploit this property for unverified and uncorroborated 
NDA measurements.  
 
 Material Substitution 13.3.3
One of the major concerns outlined in Chapter 4 is the potential for material 
substitution to alter the throughput values. In the absence of independent verification, 
or sole reliance flowrate meters, the UN solution can be substituted with dummy 
materials. Material substitution occurs under two key modes: (1) direct substitution to 
spoof the inline flowrate meter while a subset of actual content is produced and 
diverted through undeclared activities and (2) partial substitution to spoof the inline 
flowrate meter while processing higher-than-declared 
235
U enrichments. To provide a 
quantitative estimate of these activities, a set of MNCPX simulations was conducted 
where 90 g U/L (0.76 wt.%) UN was partially substituted with lead (II) nitrate, 
Pb(NO3)2, dissolved in water. Lead (II) nitrate, occurs as a colorless crystal with a 
density of 4.53 g/cm
3
. Unlike other lead salts, it is water soluble with a solubility of 
52 g/100 mL at 293K [90]. These simulations were set up as outlined in Chapter 8 




Appendix L). The equivalent UN solution mass of 5 g U/L, 10 g U/L and 20 g U/L 
was replaced with Pb(NO3)2 dissolved in water and maintained at the original solution 
density of 1.122 g/cm
3
 In principle, maintaining this mass during material substitution 
would spoof a simple flowrate meter measuring throughput in kg/hr.  
 
In order to potentially spoof NDA instrumentation, the remaining UN was varied in 
enrichment from 0.76 wt.%–10 wt.% 
235
U to determine if the 185.7 keV peak area 
could be approximated to the original declaration of 90 g U/L at 0.76 wt.%. From the 
original 0.76% enriched solution at 90 g U/L, a substitution of 5, 10, and 20 g U/L UN 
solution equivalent represents a decrease of 5.6%, 11.2%, and 22.3% 
235
U content, 
respectively. By comparison, the dilution in UN concentrations (as conducted in 
Chapter 9) represents a 
235
U decrease of 6.0% to 89.0% ranging from 85 g U/L down 
to 10 g U/L. 
 
Substituting the equivalent of 5 g U/L with Pb(NO3)2 decreases the uranium mass in 
the simulated pipe segment of the 90 g U/L solution from 1.99 g by ~0.1 g U, where at 
10 g and 20 g substitutions, the uranium content decreases by 0.22 g and 0.44 g in the 
pipe segment, respectively. Table 13-4 translates these simulated mass substitutions 
made for the pipe segment into NUCP throughput for 1070 RPM (5724 MTU/yr.) and 
500 RPM (2537 MTU/yr.) mass flowrates, previously tested in UNCLE.  For each of 
the mass substitutions, the density of the Pb(NO3)2 was maintained at the same density 
as the UN solution (1.122 g/cm
3
). Since the density is maintained, it is clear that 






Table 13-4. Annual 
235
U Throughput (MTU/yr.) in UNCLE for 1070 and 
500 RPM Flowrates. 
1070RPM 
 
0.76% 1.00% 5.00% 10.00% 
MT 235U/yr. 
90g U/L 43.5  57.2  286.2  572.4  
5g U/L Pb 
Substitution 
40.2  52.9  264.4  528.8  
10g Pb 
Substitution 
37.8  49.8  248.8  497.6  
20g Pb 
Substitution 





0.76% 1.00% 5.00% 10.00% 
MT 235U/yr. 
90g U/L 19.3  25.4  126.8  253.7  
5g Pb 
Substitution 
17.8  23.4  117.2  234.3  
10g Pb 
Substitution 
16.8  22.1  110.3  220.5  
20g Pb 
Substitution 
14.7  19.3  96.5  193.0  
 
As shown in Table 13-4, it is possible to replicate the equivalent mass flowrate by 
maintaining the solution density and making the material substitutions given in 
Appendix L. The use of passive and transmission densitometry gamma-ray monitoring 
techniques provides an additional obstacle for rogue entities to spoof. Analysis of the 
235
U 185.6 keV peak provides further information regarding the uranium content in the 
flowing UN. Table 13.5 provides the ROI peak areas for this emission for the 





Table 13-5. Comparison of ROI Peak Area (cpm) for (A) Dilution and 
(B) Pb Substituted Solution at Various Enrichments. 
Values are graphically plot in Appendix L. 
(A) 
Dilution 
Concentration (g U/L) 












Peak Area in 185.7 keV ROI (cpm) 






0.76 4129±8 3954±8 3766±8 3392±8 
1 5433±10 5205±9 4956±9 4463±9 
5 27161±21 26021±21 24773±20 22311±19 
20 54330±30 52054±29 49558±29 44623±27 
 
In the absence of densitometry using a uranium-sensitive transmission source, 
determination of 
235
U throughput is easily defeated through flowrate measurements 
alone. In addition, Table 13-5 demonstrates that, although densities are maintained, Pb 
substitutions and enrichment alterations can be made to replicate declared baseline 
mass throughput and 
235
U throughput. As such, a baseline of 90 g U/L at 0.76% 
enrichment provides the same mass throughput and a statistically comparable 
185.7 keV peak area count rate as 1% enriched material with 20 g U/L equivalent 
substituted with the Pb solution. For a rogue diverter, diverting 20 g U/L equivalent 
volume of UN while replacing it further downstream with Pb solution is a potential 





 Peak Area Interpretation 13.3.4
Experimental measurements and simulation have established performance criteria and 
allowed calculation tools to be benchmarked and validated. In particular, the 
experiments may be considered to provide the basis for concentration/density 
calibration. Correlation of the UN solution density, concentration, transmission, 
235
U 
mass, and 185.7 keV peak areas and solution concentrations is given in Figures 13-4 
and 13-5. Each of these relationships is a simple transform. Consequently, we can 
propose a model for which NDA data can determine information about the original 
solution density, concentration, and enrichment to reflect the algorithms presented in 
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Independent verification of these variables is essential in determining safeguards 
compliance and verifying undeclared activities are not occurring.  Individually, 
flowrate, passive, and densitometry measurements are unable to provide fully 
sufficient information to verify compliance and detect misuse. However, the 
combination of operator declarations and traditional IAEA methods/technology (DIV, 
PIV, flowrate, MC&A) with calibrated in-line NDA instrumentation (density, 
enrichment, concentration) provides a more comprehensive, independent means of 
verifying NUCP activities.  These methods are summarized in Table 13-6. 
  

















































X (X)  
(X) = In combination 
 
13.4 Conclusions 
Variation in uranium content – either concentration or enrichment – remains a 
challenge using stand-alone NDA methods. Without verifiable declarations or further 
data – i.e., density/densitometry, mass flowrate data, or 
238
U signatures in secular 
equilibrium – interpretation of the 185.7 keV peak area alone is incomplete, as was 
shown in the example juxtaposing enrichment variations between 0.76%–10% for 75 
and 90 g U/L with the dilution data for concentrations from 10–90g U/L at 0.76%. 
Although an increase in concentration and/or enrichment would yield higher peak area 
count rates, the effect of increased self-shielding due to an increase in density would 
be indicative of an increased uranium concentration. Simple material substitutions 
using Pb(NO3)2 demonstrate that flowrate meters can be easily spoofed. With a slight 
adjustment of enrichment, 185.7 keV emission monitoring can be spoofed to look like 
natural uranium at a declared 90 g U/L, demonstrating that a combination of passive 
and transmission measurements must be employed to ensure such misuse does not 
occur. 
 
Completely independent, stand-alone passive gamma ray techniques cannot 
immediately detect diversion and misuse at the IAEA limit of 10 MTU/yr. without 




configuration. However, in conjunction with IAEA safeguards verification practices 
under INFCIRC 153 and INFCIRC 540 (such as DIV, inspection and MC&A), 
enhanced combined passive and active/transmission gamma-ray techniques can 




CHAPTER 14. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In the context of recent IAEA policy recommendations for monitoring purified 
compounds in uranium conversion facilities, the scope of this project addressed 
instrumentation testing in dilution measurements and at ORNL’s UNCLE facility. The 
objective of this work was to determine the capabilities of passive gamma-ray systems 
for PM in NUCPs and whether it was possible to meet the IAEA safeguards criteria of 
detecting 1 SQ (10 MTU) in a time frame of 1 year with a 50% probability of 
detection. The KMP interpreted as first satisfying INFCIRC/153 Para. 34(C) materials 
occurred following solvent extraction, producing UN during the conversion process. 
Based on in-depth experimental measurements, simulations, and 
uncertainty/sensitivity quantification, the abilities of COTS gamma-ray detectors were 
evaluated to determine their role in an overall safeguards system to determine if IAEA 
safeguards criteria could be met. Based on the capabilities of NDA methods using 
passive gamma-ray methods, further work and recommendations are provided in order 
for the IAEA to meet its safeguards PM goals under PP18. 
 
14.1 Conclusions 
 Experiment Conclusions 14.1.1
Gamma-ray signatures for UN originating from the UNCLE facility were identified 
and detector instrumentation was evaluated as part of a broader study addressing 
safeguards applications. Since secular equilibrium cannot be ensured for the source 




Experimental measurements were conducted using the Canberra 2×2-in. NAIS with 




Probe, and the Canberra Falcon BEGe detectors for dilution concentrations of 10–
90 g U/L of UN (0.76 wt.% enrichment), as well as in an operational environment in 
UNCLE at 90 g U/L at 1070 RPM and 500 RPM pump speeds (7963.4 kg/h and 
3528.9 kg/h, respectively). Both passive and transmission (
137
Cs) measurements were 
conducted to correlate the signature peak areas with the UN solution concentration, 
density, and mass. In the dilution measurements, a pipe segment was fabricated based 
on the UNCLE specifications, where the detector response sensitivity was determined 
for assaying 185.7 keV emissions from 
235
U, as well as the sensitivity of the 
661.7 keV emission from 
137
Cs as a transmission densitometry source. For all 
detectors, the 185.7 keV peak correlated with the UN concentration, whereas the 
661.7 keV transmission source was very insensitive to changes in uranium 
concentration and solution density. Similarly, in the operational measurements in 
UNCLE at 90 g U/L, in varying pump flowrate speed from 1070 RPM to 500 RPM, 
each of the detectors was insensitive to flowrate. At each flowrate, the response was 
essentially unchanged, due to the detector seeing a full pipe of UN in its source-
detector geometry, independent of pump speed.  
 
From the experimental dilution measurements at 90 g U/L, the peak uncertainty for the 
detector measurements spans 0.20%–0.55%. In UNCLE, this uncertainty range 
translates to 11.6–31.4 MTU, which is in excess of the 10 MTU IAEA criterion. In 
addition, the dilution experiments demonstrated that it is statistically indiscernible to 
differentiate a concentration change of ~5 g U/L, especially in the case of low-
resolution measurements, in the presence of high Compton continuum contributions, 
or the use of insensitive transmission sources such as 
137
Cs. As the concentration 





At 90 g U/L, operational measurements in UNCLE were taken for 3600 s, with a 
conservative statistical uncertainty of 0.4% for the Inspector, 0.17% for the Osprey, 
and 0.22% for the Falcon detector, respectively. To measure 1 SQ in UNCLE, the 
overall uncertainty of the measurement must be below 0.17%. Consequently, 
optimized background shielding and increased counting time will enhance statistical 
confidence in gamma-ray spectroscopic data. 
 
 Simulation Conclusions 14.1.2
The relative insensitivity of 
137
Cs to uranium content is supported by the convergence 
of the MAC at higher energies for UN. Lower energy densitometry sources, for 
instance 
57
Co (122 keV) and 
133
Ba (356 keV), were theorized to be better able to 





Monte Carlo models for the Falcon BEGe were constructed to determine the detector 
sensitivity to these transmission sources. Although 
57
Co was most sensitive to uranium 
content at dilution concentrations, it may perhaps be too sensitive because of Compton 
continuum contributions from 
235
U emissions between 140–205 keV, contributing 
higher peak area uncertainty in the 122 keV signature. In addition, from a practical 
standpoint, due to the short half-life of 
57
Co and the low penetrability of 122 keV 
photons, a high intensity 
57
Co source would be required and would need to be replaced 
often in an operational monitoring setting. Transmission densitometry employing 
133
Ba 356 keV emissions were viable for discriminating among UN dilution 





measurements using the 356 keV peak would prove problematic with low-resolution 
detectors, as 
133
Ba has multiple lines that would interfere with the 185.7 keV signal 





Conversion activities occur in outdoor industrial-scale chemical plants with multiple 
transfer pipes and chemical storage tanks. The effect of these adjacent tanks and 
background measurements affects the peak area uncertainty, and hence the confidence 
of the assay peak area signatures. Sufficient shielding helps mitigate these background 
effects and must be considered in the installation of any radiation monitoring system 
in such facilities. In addition, peak area uncertainty due to Compton continuum from 
137
Cs emissions during transmission measurements, as well as from higher-energy 
238
U 
in secular equilibrium, increased the continuum, and consequently, the peak area 
uncertainty for the 
235
U emissions in the 100–200 keV monitoring range.  A dual 
detector option – a thin (planar) detector for the 185.7 keV and a large volume 
(coaxial) detector for the transmission measurement – could be possible, but would 
add to the cost and complexity for a field setting. 
 
 Sensitivity Analysis Conclusions 14.1.3
Efficiency values for each of the three COTS detectors were calculated for the 
185.7 keV peak from a combination of measurement data, ISOCS models, and 
MCNPX simulations, all of which were in good agreement. Efficiency calibration is 
essential in determining the mass throughput of the UN based on gamma-ray 
detection. Characterization of each of the four variables (                          
was conducted via a sensitivity analysis to determine the effect on the overall 
detection efficiency. The sensitivity analysis using ISOCS’s Uncertainty Estimator 
provided an indication of how pipe thickness and source-detector distance and offset 
variables affected the overall efficiency for the modeled Falcon and Osprey detectors. 
The pipe thickness attenuation most affected the 185.7 keV signature peak efficiency 
by up to 8% for ±0.5 mm changes in Schedule 40 304L stainless steel piping 




calibration will provide essential information regarding control of this variable. In 
addition, empty pipe characterization provides one component to the calculation of the 
CF(AT) using Parker’s method, to determine how the         affects the overall 
detection efficiency. Using Parker’s method and a combination of experimental and 
Monte Carlo simulated data using the Falcon BEGe, a CF(AT) of 2.49 (        of 
40.2±0.2%) and κ of ~0.75 was determined for self-attenuation effects. 
 
 Overall Detector Performance 14.1.4
In assessing overall performance, the three COTS detectors employed in this work are 
each potentially viable instruments for monitoring UN in NUCPs. Pending resolution 
and efficiency trade-offs, in addition to Compton continuum sensitivities, the COTs 
detectors are commercially available, economically competitive, and field portable. 
These detectors are also part of standard instrumentation employed by IAEA. 
Although the Falcon BEGe demonstrated best performance due to its superior 
resolution and portability (using a mechanically cooled system), the cost-effectiveness 
becomes prohibitive in the purview of budgetary considerations. Well-characterized 
lower resolution detectors, such as the Osprey and Inspector, may prove suitable. 
Recent advancements in software peak unfolding and attribution codes, such as those 
explored by the Advanced Synthetically Enhanced Detector Resolution Algorithm 
(ASEDRA) [91] and GAmma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) 
[92] codes, show promise in robustly extracting signature information from low-







14.2 Conclusions Regarding IAEA Safeguards Requirements  
In principle, NDA principles using passive gamma-ray detection are viable for process 
monitoring at NUCPs. Passive gamma-ray methods are difficult to spoof, inexpensive 
to employ using COTS instrumentation, and already exist as part of the IAEA standard 
complement of measurement techniques. Unlike precursor work, employing neutron 
detection does not meet performance specifications due to 
3
He shortages in addition to 
the inability to distinguish (α,n) interactions in nitrogen and oxygen in the UN 
solution,  and cosmic-ray induced spallation neutrons in an outdoor operational 
environment. The use of flowrate meters alone are also limited to determining mass 
balance, with little independent verification about the material content (concentration, 
enrichment) of the uranium in the NUCP. In addition, flowrate meters are also high in 
error, which would not meet the 1 SQ requirement for medium-to-large facilities 
> 100 MTU. The use of inline flowrate meters is politically not viable, as these have 
been construed by target nation states as invasive, unnecessary, and interruptive of 
NUCP operations for installation. Use of flowmeters and online uranium concentration 
monitors using gamma-ray detection, in tandem, has been explored where the 
combination of the two have successfully been developed for enrichment monitoring 
[93] [94]. These principles are directly applicable to NUCP monitoring. 
Variation in uranium content – either concentration or enrichment – remains a 
challenge using stand-alone NDA methods. Without verifiable declarations or further 
data – i.e., density/densitometry, mass flowrate data, or 
238
U signatures in secular 
equilibrium – interpretation of the 185.7 keV peak area alone is incomplete. However, 
the introduction of a transmission densitometry source does provide information 
regarding solution concentration, and analysis of the 185.7 keV 
235
U high intensity 
emission provides information regarding uranium enrichment. Together, these two 




alone neutron methods and independent flowrate analysis were unable to meet these 
performance specifications [6, 33, 34, 36-40, 42-45]. 
 
Although the IAEA requirement of 1 SQ (10 MTU) in a period of 1 year cannot be 
detected using stand-alone NDA measurements, consideration must be given to 
estimations of how 5 MTU is all that is required to produce 1 SQ of centrifuge 
material [32]. For NUCPs classified as S (~100 MTU/yr.), 1 SQ represents ~ 10% of 
the plant throughput. At these levels, it is possible to detect misuse. In current real-
world facilities, NDA methods would be applicable to NUCPs such as those in Brazil 
and Argentina. However, considering the implementation of this criterion in such 
facilities as those in Canada – with throughput higher by levels of magnitude – 
diversion of 1 SQ becomes essentially undetectable given the systematic uncertainty. 
Given that the UNCLE facility is capable of circulating UN at the level of a large 
throughput facility, and given its extremely modest size, consideration must be given 






14.3 Future Work 
Based on the technical and instrumentation conclusions of this study, further work is 
required in order for the IAEA to consider implementing the recommendations of 
PP18 and its anticipated successor Policy Paper 21. Employing NDA as part of a 
comprehensive safeguards approach for monitoring 34(C) materials in an NUCP is 
essential. Based on the instrumentation and methods employed in the scope of this 
work, the following approaches – both policy and technical – are proposed for 
continued development of a safeguards system for monitoring 34(C) materials in 
NUCPs. 
 
  Proposed Instrumentation Enhancements for NDA-Based 14.3.1
Safeguards 
The experimental design employed in the scope of this project was developed as a 
proof of principle to test the capabilities of passive gamma-ray detection. Translating 
this instrumentation into a full-scale field setting would benefit from instrumentation 
optimization. 
 
 In-field Efficiency Calibration: Development of an in-field efficiency calibration 
either using ISOCS or calibration standards with an empty transfer pipe would 
provide essential information in translating detected counts to mass throughput of 
UN in NUCP transfer pipes. This can be employed using Parker’s method 
(empirically calibrated), calibration standards, and/or commercially available 






 Transmission Source Collimation: Due to limitations in source availability in the 
scope of this project, as well as limitations geometry optimization due to the 
contamination incident, employing a collimator with the transmission source 
would provide a uniform photon beam, bringing the source-detector geometry 





provide experimental validation of the simulation results regarding source 
sensitivity to uranium concentration. The source strength requires optimization, 
whereas the current experiment was limited by sources on hand.  
 
 Shielding Optimization: Reduction of background – whether from environmental 
or adjacent pipes/tanks – is essential in providing an accurate measurement of UN. 
Although the detector shielding in the scope of this work was limited, and given 
the low-background environment for the dilution experiments, field tests of 
encased shielding would solve the twofold problem of background shielding, in 
addition to maintaining source-detector geometry placement to avoid detector 
displacement vis-à-vis the monitored pipe. 
 
 Flowrate Determination: The use of inline flowmeters has been viewed as 
politically unfavorable, due to the invasiveness of installation in operational 
facilities. In addition, inline flowmeters also lack the ability to accurately 
determine the uranium content in the monitored UN. The use of a combination of 
active and passive gamma-ray methods could alleviate the reliance on external 
flowrate meters and provide information regarding flowrate. Use of two inline 
gamma-ray detectors using time-of-flight techniques could potentially provide 
information regarding flowrate. The first detector could employ a pulsed 




activation. This first detector would both determine the UN concentration using 
transmission densitometry as well as activate nuclei in the UN to emit signature 
photons downstream. The second detector could detect the 185.7 keV signature 
peak, as well as the activated photons via prompt or delayed (n, ) gamma rays. 
Neutron activation in nitric acid solvent or raffinate from nitrogen or oxygen 
signatures is also a potential avenue of activation analysis. 
 
 Future Work – IAEA-Level Strategic Approaches 14.3.2
Gamma-ray monitoring alone cannot provide a full safeguards solution, but is one 
component of a tiered approach. In conjunction with current IAEA practices, such as 
DIV, inspection, CS, and MC&A, the combined passive and active/transmission 
gamma-ray techniques can provide a PM tool for independently verifying operator 
declarations. Installation of such a system also acts as a deterrent, increasing the risk 
for potentially rogue states engaging in undeclared NUCP processing activities. 
Declarations and flowrate data further enhance the ability to draw safeguards 
conclusions regarding NUCP activities, where passive gamma-ray systems ensure 
material substitution or falsification of records is not occurring. 
 
A 3D laser system from Zoller+Frolich (Z+F) Imager 5006i [95] has been 
preliminarily tested at the UNCLE facility to identify physical alterations (valve 
handles, equipment movement – depicted in Appendix C) and shows promise as a 
potential DIV tool for IAEA use in NUCPs as part of a comprehensive safeguards 
system [43]. In addition, environmental sampling and monitoring techniques have 
been proposed by Yoshida et al. for soil sampling outside conversion facilities [96] 





As the IAEA is preparing a policy paper to succeed PP18, entitled Policy Paper 21, 
“Determination of Materials Meeting the Conditions of Paragraph 34(c) of 
INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)” (not published), the following instrumentation and policy 




14.3.2.1 Strategic and Technical Implementation 
Challenges of Advancing Front-End IAEA 
Safeguards under Policy Paper 21   
 
Technical and strategic implementation challenges, case studies, and state responses to 
these changes will be examined. This analysis extends into a comprehensive 
assessment of the motivations, impacts, and effectiveness of such safeguards efforts on 
the overall NPT regime. 
 
Safeguarding nuclear material in the front end of the fuel cycle has only been 
implemented at the stage at which UF6 was declared as feedstock for enrichment 
plants. Recent IAEA circulars and policy papers have sought to implement safeguards 
when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides suitable for isotopic 
enrichment or fuel fabrication exist. Under Policy Paper 21 and its precursor – Policy 
Paper 18 – the IAEA suggests that these purified uranium compounds satisfy the 
criteria for safeguards under INFCIRC/153 Paragraph 34(c), and should be subject to 





Consequently, Policy Paper 21 presents a plurality of strategic challenges in its 
technical, legal, and policy implementation. The proposed work will address how the 
evolution of technology (i.e., laser enrichment) redefines products meeting Paragraph 
34(c) criteria, thus necessitating safeguards implementation prior to enrichment. As 
such, international safeguards agreements remain a highly negotiated political and 
legal dialogue between the IAEA and nation states, where the nuances of the 
implementation of Policy Paper 21 among states with and without the Additional 
Protocol (AP) in effect remain entirely unexplored.  Introduction of new technology, 
such as discussed in this thesis, will likely require a joint development effort to ensure 
full transparency and acceptance. 
 
The core policy questions in Policy Paper 21 must be addressed: With the evolution of 
new nuclear fuel cycle technology, what is the requirement for the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) as a binding legal and policy agreement to evolve with these technology 
changes? How must the technology-policy nexus be bridged in the preview of 
technological progress? Finally, how must NGSI cohesively leverage its resources for 
technology, policy, and human capital development required of Policy Paper 21?  
 
Technical and strategic implementation challenges, case studies, and state responses to 
Policy Paper 21 must be examined. This analysis extends into a comprehensive 
assessment of the motivations, impacts, and effectiveness of such safeguards efforts on 
the overall NPT regime. The recommendations made under Policy Paper 21 must 
further be extrapolated for states with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) 
in effect under INFCIRC/153, versus states with the AP in effect under INFCIRC/540. 
Furthermore, the IAEA Regional Seminar on Good Practices in the Processing and 




the role on export control verification in front-end activities, as no indication was 
given regarding any strategic approach to Policy Paper 21. 
 
This approach to Policy Paper 21 will address technical, policy, and strategic 
implementation challenges associated with all stakeholders – IAEA, national 
authorities, and operators. 
 
Resources have not yet been allocated for addressing the interplaying nexus of 
strategic issues regarding Policy Paper 21 from technical, policy, and legal 
perspectives, as they apply to operators, nation states, and the IAEA. Furthermore, 
despite previous periodic work, DOE must determine how to leverage its resources 
addressing the aforementioned challenges/stakeholders by producing a cohesive policy 
roadmap for these parallel activities. A cohesive strategy regarding the technology-
policy nexus should be proposed as it pertains to all stakeholders under Policy 
Paper 21. 
 
14.3.2.2  Development of a Statistical IAEA 
Safeguards Tool for Correlating Unique 
Front-End Process History Signatures 
Using Chemical Impurity and Isotopic 
Analysis 
 
Process monitoring, verification, and ensuring the continuity of knowledge (CoK) of 
front-end fuel cycle activities for uranium ore concentrates (UOCs) in mining/milling 
and purified uranium compounds at NUCPs are a high priority for the IAEA but 




priorities outlined in the IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan 2012-
2023 [98], front-end technologies, tools, and methods are needed to support such 
safeguards activities as Complementary Access under INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), [16] 
Policy Paper 21, and the Illicit Trafficking Database. Policy 21 suggests implementing 
safeguards when any purified aqueous uranium solution or uranium oxides exist, 
which are suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication. Conversion facilities 
produce purified uranium solutions that should satisfy the criteria for safeguards, but 
are not yet monitored. With the discussion of advancing the starting point of 
safeguards earlier in the fuel cycle, as dictated in INFCIRC/153-34(c) [15], the IAEA 
has expressed a need to develop technologies and tools to address this safeguards 
challenge in Policy Paper 21. 
 
Further investigation via this proposed follow-on project will do the following. 
 1. Determine unique radiological and chemical impurity signatures from 
samples spanning front-end fuel cycle products to statistically correlate 
identified signatures with material history and origin. 
 2. Produce an IAEA end-user tool that statistically correlates signatures 
from laboratory and in-field measurements to draw conclusions regarding 
material origin for verification and process monitoring.  
 
The proposed work is aimed at delivering frontline safeguards relevance by ensuring 
CoK is maintained for verification of purified uranium compounds. To address this 
safeguards challenge, material signatures for uranium compounds must be identified in 
order to determine the unique isotopic and chemical impurity fingerprints that dictate 
the front-end production history (mining, milling, conversion). Isotopic and chemical 




precipitates, uranium oxides, UF4, and UF6) spanning front-end processes will provide 
benchmark data for statistical algorithm development. This follow-on work will 
produce an IAEA software tool based on (principal component) statistical analysis. 
This tool will be validated with samples of known origin and tested. This tool will 
enable the IAEA to populate a database of material signatures and draw decisive 











APPENDIX A. GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVENTORY 
OF CONVERSION FACILITIES 




Fuel Type Facility Status Facility Type Design 
Capacity  























Pilot plant 40 
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Fuel Type Facility Status Facility Type Design 
Capacity  





















USA Gore Conversion to 
UF6 
Decommissioning Commercial 9090 
USA Hanford Conversion to 
UO3 
Shutdown Laboratory 0 










































Data obtained from [3]. 
*
AP signed, but not in force. 
**




APPENDIX B. IAEA STANDING ADVISORY GROUP ON 
SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS OF 34(C) IN 
THE FUEL CYCLE 
 
Figure B-1. SAGSI Assessment of Fuel Cycle Materials Meeting 34(C) Criteria. 
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Figure B-2. SAGSI Assessment of 34(c) Materials in the Conversion Process. 
Reproduced from [21]. 
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APPENDIX C: UNCLE FACILITY AT ORNL 
The Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility was designed to 
provide a state-of-the-art test facility evaluating and testing safeguards instruments for 
application in a NUCP.  
 
UNCLE consists of two 100-gal stainless steel tanks, with thermocouples and pressure 
transducers located at key points throughout the loop (pump inlet, pump outlet, and 
within the calibration area). UNCLE utilizes three computers: (1) standard PC for data 
acquisition of the temperatures and pressures; (2) standard PC for neutron detector 
data; and (3) MIL-SPEC computer running IAEA-standard Multi-Instrument Collect 
(MIC) software for the flowmeter providing mass and volumetric flow rates.  
 
The piping in the main flow loop in the UNCLE facility consists of nominal 3-in. 
schedule 40 stainless steel pipe. One tank currently has approximately 90 gal of 
natural uranyl nitrate solution with a concentration of 90g U/L. The second tank is 






Figure C-1. UNCLE Facility Schematic at ORNL. 
 
 










APPENDIX D: MASS ATTENUATION COEFFICIENT 
GRAPHS 
Table D-1. Infinite Thickness Values for External Transmission Source 
Gamma -Ray Emissions at Dilution Concentrations of UN. 
 Infinite Thickness (cm) 
Energy 
(keV) 
90g U/L 85g U/L 75g U/L 50(g U/L 10g U/L 0g U/L 
122.1 13.20 13.75 14.99 19.25 35.45 44.64 
356.0 48.55 49.16 50.55 54.33 61.51 63.23 




Figure D-1. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 




































Figure D-2. Gamma Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 
85 g U/L at Various Energies. 
 
Figure D-3. Gamma Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 



































































Figure D-4. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 
50 g U/L at Various Energies. 
 
Figure D-5. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 



































































Figure D-6. Gamma-Ray Transmission through Uranyl Nitrate Solution at 





































APPENDIX E: MCNP INPUT FILES 
MCNP Sample Input – Passive at 90g U/L 
 
C NUCP MCNPX Models  (UNCLE system)                                   
c 90g/L  - F8 Tally                                                                           
c              Shaheen Dewji  
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c  Cells                                                                                                                                           
c                                                                                
c  101     3 -0.001293 -101 102    imp:p=1 $ Tally Surface 
102     1  -7.92    -102 103        imp:p=1 $ SS Tube 
103     2  -1.122   -103           imp:p=1 $ U Nitrate 
104     6 -1.03 -107               imp:p=1 $Epoxy Lid 
106     3  -0.001293  -108 104  imp:p=1 $ Air btn col detector 
105     9 -2.7 -104 134          imp:p=1 $ Detector Al Endcap 
107     5  -11.0  104 108 -135 imp:p=1 $ Cu col detector 
108    5  -11.0  135 -125  imp:p=1 $ Tin col detector 
109     5 -11.0  125 -105      imp:p=1 $ W Collimator  
111     0 -134 124   imp:p=1 $ Detector Vacuum 
110    10 -5.3234 -124 imp:p=1 $ Ge Crystal 
112     4 -11.34  -106       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Bottom Brick 
113     4 -11.34  -109       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Top Brick 
114     4 -11.34  -110       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Right Brick 
115     4 -11.34  -111       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Left Brick 
116     4 -11.34  -113       imp:p=1 $ Pb Backshield 
c 900     0  -999 102 105 106 107 109  110 111 113 imp:p=1 $ Environment Shell 
900     3 -0.001293  -999 102 105 107 106 109 110 111 113 imp:p=1 $ Environment Shell 
999     0             999          imp:p=0 $ Void 
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
 
c                                                                                
c   Surface                                                                      
c 101  1 rcc 0    0   -0.635    0   0   63.6524    4.51325 $ Tally Box 
102   1 rcc  0    0   -0.635    0   0   63.6524    4.44 $ SS Tube 
103   1 rcc  0    0    0        0   0   60.2742    3.92   $ UN 
124   1 rcc -8.275 0    31.8262 -2.0 0   0          2.985 $ Ge crystal 
134   1 rcc -6.905 0    31.8262 -4.1 0   0          3.95 $ vacuum  
104   1 rcc -6.785 0    31.8262 -4.3 0   0   4.1 $ Detector Endcap .12cm thick 
108   1 rcc -5.235 0    31.8262 -5.85 0  0   5.7     $ Air around detector 
105   1 rcc -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0   0   6.5    $ W Collimator  
125   1 rcc  -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0  0  6.0    $ Sn Collimator  
135   1 rcc  -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0  0  5.9    $ Cu Collimator  
107   1 rcc -5.075 0    31.8262 -0.16  0 0 6.5    $ Epoxy Front Lid  
106   1 rpp -15.075 -5.075 -10.15 10.15 16.6762 21.6762    $ Pb Shield Bottom Brick 
109   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 -10.15 10.15 41.9762 51.9762 $ Pb Shield Top Brick 
110   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 6.51 16.51 21.6763 41.9761 $ Pb Shield Right Brick 
111   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 -16.51 -6.51 21.6763 41.9761 $ Pb Shield Left Brick 
113   1 rpp 4.7002 9.7002 -10.15 10.15  26.8262 36.8262 $Backshield 
999   1 rcc  0    0   -75       0   0   200        50      $ Void Cylinder 
c                                                                                
 
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  MATERIAL CARDS  ***                                                     




c                                                                                
c     Material 1, Stainless Steel 304L      (-7.92)                              
m1    26000.          0.05936  $MAT4 
      24000.          0.01743 28000.          0.00772 25055.          0.00174  
c                                                                                
c     Material 2,  Uranium nitrate solution.  Mostly water.                      
c     From UNCLE description                                                     
c     90 grams Uranium / 1000 mL H2O  (-1.122)                                   
m2    92238. -0.0796   $MAT8 
      92235. -0.00061 
      92234. -0.000005 
      8000. -0.815185         
      1000. -0.097521 
      7000. -0.007080 
c                                                                                
c     Material 3, Air                                                            
m3    8016.           -0.2314   
     7014.           -0.7558 18000.          -0.0128  
c 
c     Material 4, Pb 
m4 82000. -1 
c     Material 5, Collimator (density 11g/cc) 
m5 74000. -0.98 6000 -0.0171 1000 -0.0029 
c 
c     Material 6, Epoxy (density 1.07g/cc) 
m6 1000 -0.06 6000 -0.721 8000 -0.219 
c     Material 7, Copper 
m7 29000 -1 
c     Material 8, Tin 
m8 50000 -1 
c     Material 9, Al 
m9 13000 -1 
c     Material 10, HPGe 
m10   32000.04p 1 $HPGe 
c 
c Data Cards                                                                     
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  TRANSFORMATION  ***                                                     
c   ------------------------                                                     
tr1  0 0 0  
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  SOURCE DEF  ***                                                         
c   --------------------                                                         
c     Cell source of Uranium dissolved in water,                                 
c     spontaneous fission spectrum, U-238                                          
c     cylindrical source centered in solution pipe                               
sdef PAR=2  POS=0 0 0   AXS=0 0 1  RAD=d1   EXT=d2  ERG=d3 CEL=103          
si1    3.92                                                                     
sp1  -21  1                         $Radial sampling                             
si2   60.2742                                                                     
sp2  -21  0                         $Vertical cylinder sampling                
C RadSource Run: Tue May 15 13:33:13 2012 
C  
C Input Isotopes 
C U-234  0.01% 
C U-235  0.76% 
C U-238  99.23% 
C  





C Age: 0 s, 0 yrs  
C ======================================================== 
C  1    DISCRETE GAMMA LINE energies (MeV)  
SI3 L 0.0316 0.0347 0.0414 0.04195 0.05122 0.0541 0.05425 0.06437 0.0727 & 
0.07372 0.0748 0.09609 0.10916 0.11545 0.12035 0.13655 0.14076 0.1424 & 
0.143764 0.15093 0.163358 0.1733 0.18252 0.185712 0.19494 0.198928 & 
0.1996 0.202111 0.205309 0.21528 0.221399 0.228785 0.233469 0.240875 & 
0.24684 0.2515 0.26645 0.275129 0.275428 0.2795 0.281441 0.28292 0.28956 & 
0.29165 0.2943 0.301741 0.31069 0.317062 0.3258 0.3435 0.3454 0.3459 & 
0.35603 0.3685 0.3718 0.38782 0.3903 0.41029 0.433 0.4484 0.4551 & 
0.5172 0.7425 0.7947 
C  
C  1    ASSOCIATED photon intensities : 
SP3 D 0.00016 0.00037 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 & 
0.0011 0.0001 0.0006 0.00086 0.0154 0.0007 0.00026 0.00012 0.0022 & 
0.00005 0.1096 0.00076 0.0508 0.0001 0.0034 0.572 0.0063 0.00042 & 
0.001 0.0108 0.0501 0.00027 0.0012 0.00008 0.00029 0.00075 0.00053 & 
0.0004 0.00006 0.00042 0.00007 0.0027 0.00006 0.00005 0.00007 0.00038 & 
0.00033 0.00005 0.00004 0.00001 0.000004 0.00003 0.0007 0.00038 0.00005 & 
0.0007 0.0007 0.00038 0.0004 0.00003 0.00004 0.00001 0.00008 0.000004 & 
0.000004 0.000006 
c   ---------------------       
c   ***  TALLY CARDS  *** 
c   ---------------------           
C Summed Tally 
C 
F8:P 110 




FC18 Tally With GEB 
FT18 GEB 0.000594701 0.000763331 0.85487 
C 
C Energy Bins 
C 
E0 0 1e-8 .0000194 8190i 1.5925365 $8192 bins 
PHYS:P 4J 1 
MODE P    







MCNP Sample Input – 137Cs Transmission at 85g U/L 
Note: 57Co and 133Ba SDEF are provided as comments  
 
C NUCP MCNPX Models  (UNCLE system)                                   
c 85g/L 137Cs Transmission                                                                             
c              Shaheen Dewji, MARCH 2013                                         
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c  Cells                                                                                                                                           
c                                                                                
c  101     3 -0.001293 -101 102    imp:p=1 $ Tally Surface 
102     1  -7.92    -102 103        imp:p=1 $ SS Tube 
103     2 -1.115    -103           imp:p=1 $ U Nitrate 
104     6 -1.03 -107               imp:p=1 $Epoxy Lid 
106     3  -0.001293  -108 104  imp:p=1 $ Air btn col detector 
105     9 -2.7 -104 134          imp:p=1 $ Detector Al Endcap 
107     5  -11.0  104 108 -135 imp:p=1 $ Cu col detector 
108    5  -11.0  135 -125  imp:p=1 $ Tin col detector 
109     5 -11.0  125 -105      imp:p=1 $ W Collimator  
111     0 -134 124   imp:p=1 $ Detector Vacuum 
110    10 -5.3234 -124 imp:p=1 $ Ge Crystal 
112     4 -11.34  -106       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Bottom Brick 
113     4 -11.34  -109       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Top Brick 
114     4 -11.34  -110       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Right Brick 
115     4 -11.34  -111       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Left Brick 
116     4 -11.34  -113       imp:p=1 $ Pb Backshield 
122     7 -1.00 -152 imp:p=1 $ Source 
c 900     0  -999 102 105 106 107 109  110 111 113 152 imp:p=1 $ Environment Shell 
900     3 -0.001293  -999 102 105 107 106 109 110 111 113 152 imp:p=1 $ Environment Shell 
999     0             999          imp:p=0 $ Void 
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
 
c                                                                                
c   Surface                                                                      
c 101  1 rcc 0    0   -0.635    0   0   63.6524    4.51325 $ Tally Box 
102   1 rcc  0    0   -0.635    0   0   63.6524    4.44 $ SS Tube 
103   1 rcc  0    0    0        0   0   60.2742    3.92   $ UN 
124   1 rcc -8.275 0    31.8262 -2.0 0   0          2.985 $ Ge crystal 
134   1 rcc -6.905 0    31.8262 -4.1 0   0          3.95 $ vacuum  
104   1 rcc -6.785 0    31.8262 -4.3 0   0   4.1 $ Detector Endcap .12cm thick 
108   1 rcc -5.235 0    31.8262 -5.85 0  0   5.7     $ Air around detector 
105   1 rcc -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0   0   6.5    $ W Collimator  
125   1 rcc  -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0  0  6.0    $ Sn Collimator  
135   1 rcc  -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0  0  5.9    $ Cu Collimator  
107   1 rcc -5.075 0    31.8262 -0.16  0 0 6.5    $ Epoxy Front Lid  
106   1 rpp -15.075 -5.075 -10.15 10.15 16.6762 21.6762    $ Pb Shield Bottom Brick 
109   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 -10.15 10.15 41.9762 51.9762 $ Pb Shield Top Brick 
110   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 6.51 16.51 21.6763 41.9761 $ Pb Shield Right Brick 
111   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 -16.51 -6.51 21.6763 41.9761 $ Pb Shield Left Brick 
113   1 rpp 4.7002 9.7002 -10.15 10.15  26.8262 36.8262 $Backshield 
152   1 rcc 4.5001 0 31.8262 0.2 0 0 1 $Source 
999   1 rcc  0    0   -75       0   0   200        50      $ Void Cylinder 
c                                                                                
 
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  MATERIAL CARDS  ***                                                     
c   ------------------------                                                     




c     Material 1, Stainless Steel 304L      (-7.92)                              
m1    26000.          0.05936  $MAT4 
      24000.          0.01743 28000.          0.00772 25055.          0.00174  
c                                                                                
c     Material 2,  Uranium nitrate solution 85gU/L.  Mostly water.                      
c     From UNCLE description                                                     
c     85 grams Uranium / 1000 mL H2O  (-1.115)                                   
m2    92238. -0.0795649   $MAT8 
      92235. -0.000579 
      92234. -0.000004 
      8000. -0.818842        
      1000. -0.098196 
      7000. -0.006729 
c                                                                                
c     Material 3, Air                                                            
m3    8016.           -0.2314   
     7014.           -0.7558 18000.          -0.0128  
c 
c     Material 4, Pb 
m4 82000. -1 
c     Material 5, Collimator (density 11g/cc) 
m5 74000. -0.98 6000 -0.0171 1000 -0.0029 
c 
c     Material 6, Epoxy (density 1.07g/cc) 
m6 1000 -0.06 6000 -0.721 8000 -0.219 
c 
c     Material 7, Polyester for Source (density 1.0g/cc) 
m7 6000 0.333 1000 0.533 8000 0.133 
c     Material 8, Tin 
m8 50000 -1 
c     Material 9, Al 
m9 13000 -1 
c     Material 10, HPGe 
m10   32000.04p 1 $HPGe 
c 
c Data Cards                                                                     
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  TRANSFORMATION  ***                                                     
c   ------------------------                                                     
tr1  0 0 0  
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  SOURCE DEF  ***                                                         
c   --------------------                                                         
c     Cell source of Uranium dissolved in water,                                 
c     spontaneous fission spectrum, U-238                                          
c     cylindrical source centered in solution pipe                               
sdef PAR=2 CEL=d1 POS=FCEL d2 RAD=FCEL d5 AXS=FCEL d8 EXT=FCEL d11 ERG=FCEL d20  
c 
SI1 L 103 122 $ Cells to sample from S1 - UN and S2 
SP1 D 1 1 $ 50% from each 
c  
c set POS for each source 
c 
DS2 L 0 0 0  4.5001 0 31.8262 
C SP3 1 
C SP4 1 
c  





DS5 S 6 7 
SI6 3.92 
SP6 -21 1 
SI7 1.0 
SP7 -21 0  
c  
c set AXS for each source 
c 
DS8 L 0 0 1  1 0 0 
c 
c set EXT for each source 
c 
DS11 s 12 13 
SI12  0 60.2742                                                                     
SP12  -21  0                         $Vertical cylinder sampling                
SI13 0 0.2 
SP13 -21 0 
c  
c set ERG for each source 
c 
DS20 S 21 22 
SI21    L 0.0316 0.0347 0.0414 0.04195 0.05122 0.0541 0.05425 0.06437 0.0727 & 
0.07372 0.0748 0.09609 0.10916 0.11545 0.12035 0.13655 0.14076 0.1424 & 
0.143764 0.15093 0.163358 0.1733 0.18252 0.185712 0.19494 0.198928 & 
0.1996 0.202111 0.205309 0.21528 0.221399 0.228785 0.233469 0.240875 & 
0.24684 0.2515 0.26645 0.275129 0.275428 0.2795 0.281441 0.28292 0.28956 & 
0.29165 0.2943 0.301741 0.31069 0.317062 0.3258 0.3435 0.3454 0.3459 & 
0.35603 0.3685 0.3718 0.38782 0.3903 0.41029 0.433 0.4484 0.4551 & 
0.5172 0.7425 0.7947 
C  
C  1    ASSOCIATED photon intensities  
SP21    D 0.00016 0.00037 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 & 
0.0011 0.0001 0.0006 0.00086 0.0154 0.0007 0.00026 0.00012 0.0022 & 
0.00005 0.1096 0.00076 0.0508 0.0001 0.0034 0.572 0.0063 0.00042 & 
0.001 0.0108 0.0501 0.00027 0.0012 0.00008 0.00029 0.00075 0.00053 & 
0.0004 0.00006 0.00042 0.00007 0.0027 0.00006 0.00005 0.00007 0.00038 & 
0.00033 0.00005 0.00004 0.00001 0.000004 0.00003 0.0007 0.00038 0.00005 & 
0.0007 0.0007 0.00038 0.0004 0.00003 0.00004 0.00001 0.00008 0.000004 & 
0.000004 0.000006 
C Cs137 Source 
SI22 L 0.6617 
SP22 D 0.851 
C Co57 Source 
C SI22 L 0.0144 0.122 0.1364743 
C SP22 D 0.0916 0.856 0.1068 
C Ba133 Source 
C SI22 L 0.0306252 0.0309727 0.034987 0.0809969 0.276397 0.302851 & 
C       0.356005 0.383851 
C SP22 D  0.341219 0.63072 0.121729 0.337528 0.070851 0.183964 &  
C      0.6215 0.0891231 
c   ---------------------       
c   ***  TALLY CARDS  *** 
c   ---------------------           
C Summed Tally 
C 
F8:P 110 








FT18 SCD GEB 0.000594701 0.000763331 0.85487 
FU18 21 22  
C 
C Energy Bins 
C 
E0 0 1e-8 .0000194 8190i 1.5925365 $8192 bins 
PHYS:P 4J 1 
MODE P    










MCNP Sample Input – Enrichment at 90g U/L / 5% 235U Enrichment 
 
C NUCP MCNPX Models  (UNCLE system)                                   
c 90g/L  - F8 Tally      5% Enrichment                                                                     
c              Shaheen Dewji, MARCH 2012                                         
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c  Cells                                                                                                                                           
c                                                                                
c  101     3 -0.001293 -101 102    imp:p=1 $ Tally Surface 
102     1  -7.92    -102 103        imp:p=1 $ SS Tube 
103     2  -1.122   -103           imp:p=1 $ U Nitrate 
104     6 -1.03 -107               imp:p=1 $Epoxy Lid 
106     3  -0.001293  -108 104  imp:p=1 $ Air btn col detector 
105     9 -2.7 -104 134          imp:p=1 $ Detector Al Endcap 
107     5  -11.0  104 108 -135 imp:p=1 $ Cu col detector 
108    5  -11.0  135 -125  imp:p=1 $ Tin col detector 
109     5 -11.0  125 -105      imp:p=1 $ W Collimator  
111     0 -134 124   imp:p=1 $ Detector Vacuum 
110    10 -5.3234 -124 imp:p=1 $ Ge Crystal 
112     4 -11.34  -106       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Bottom Brick 
113     4 -11.34  -109       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Top Brick 
114     4 -11.34  -110       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Right Brick 
115     4 -11.34  -111       imp:p=1 $ Pb Shield Left Brick 
116     4 -11.34  -113       imp:p=1 $ Pb Backshield 
c 900     0  -999 102 105 106 107 109  110 111 113 imp:p=1 $ Environment Shell 
900     3 -0.001293  -999 102 105 107 106 109 110 111 113 imp:p=1 $ Environment Shell 
999     0             999          imp:p=0 $ Void 
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
 
c                                                                                
c   Surface                                                                      
c 101  1 rcc 0    0   -0.635    0   0   63.6524    4.51325 $ Tally Box 
102   1 rcc  0    0   -0.635    0   0   63.6524    4.44 $ SS Tube 
103   1 rcc  0    0    0        0   0   60.2742    3.92   $ UN 
124   1 rcc -8.275 0    31.8262 -2.0 0   0          2.985 $ Ge crystal 
134   1 rcc -6.905 0    31.8262 -4.1 0   0          3.95 $ vacuum  
104   1 rcc -6.785 0    31.8262 -4.3 0   0   4.1 $ Detector Endcap .12cm thick 
108   1 rcc -5.235 0    31.8262 -5.85 0  0   5.7     $ Air around detector 
105   1 rcc -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0   0   6.5    $ W Collimator  
125   1 rcc  -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0  0  6.0    $ Sn Collimator  
135   1 rcc  -5.235 0    31.8262 -15  0  0  5.9    $ Cu Collimator  
107   1 rcc -5.075 0    31.8262 -0.16  0 0 6.5    $ Epoxy Front Lid  
106   1 rpp -15.075 -5.075 -10.15 10.15 16.6762 21.6762    $ Pb Shield Bottom Brick 
109   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 -10.15 10.15 41.9762 51.9762 $ Pb Shield Top Brick 
110   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 6.51 16.51 21.6763 41.9761 $ Pb Shield Right Brick 
111   1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 -16.51 -6.51 21.6763 41.9761 $ Pb Shield Left Brick 
113   1 rpp 4.7002 9.7002 -10.15 10.15  26.8262 36.8262 $Backshield 
999   1 rcc  0    0   -75       0   0   200        50      $ Void Cylinder 
c                                                                                
 
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  MATERIAL CARDS  ***                                                     
c   ------------------------                                                     
c                                                                                
c     Material 1, Stainless Steel 304L      (-7.92)                              
m1    26000.          0.05936  $MAT4 




c                                                                                
c     Material 2,  Uranium nitrate solution.  Mostly water.                      
c     From UNCLE description        5% Enriched                                             
c     90 grams Uranium / 1000 mL H2O  (-1.122)                                   
m2    92238. -0.076199   $MAT8 
      92235. -0.004011 
      92234. -0.000005 
      8000. -0.815185         
      1000. -0.097521 
      7000. -0.007080 
c                                                                                
c     Material 3, Air                                                            
m3    8016.           -0.2314   
     7014.           -0.7558 18000.          -0.0128  
c 
c     Material 4, Pb 
m4 82000. -1 
c     Material 5, Collimator (density 11g/cc) 
m5 74000. -0.98 6000 -0.0171 1000 -0.0029 
c 
c     Material 6, Epoxy (density 1.07g/cc) 
m6 1000 -0.06 6000 -0.721 8000 -0.219 
c     Material 7, Copper 
m7 29000 -1 
c     Material 8, Tin 
m8 50000 -1 
c     Material 9, Al 
m9 13000 -1 
c     Material 10, HPGe 
m10   32000.04p 1 $HPGe 
c 
c Data Cards                                                                     
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  TRANSFORMATION  ***                                                     
c   ------------------------                                                     
tr1  0 0 0  
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  SOURCE DEF  ***                                                         
c   --------------------                                                         
c     Cell source of Uranium dissolved in water,                                 
c     spontaneous fission spectrum, U-238                                          
c     cylindrical source centered in solution pipe                               
sdef PAR=2  POS=0 0 0   AXS=0 0 1  RAD=d1   EXT=d2  ERG=d3 CEL=103          
si1    3.92                                                                     
sp1  -21  1                         $Radial sampling                             
si2   60.2742                                                                     
sp2  -21  0                         $Vertical cylinder sampling                
C ======================================================== 
C  1    DISCRETE GAMMA LINE energies (MeV)  
SI3 L 0.0316 0.0347 0.0414 0.04195 0.05122 0.0541 0.05425 0.06437 0.0727 & 
0.07372 0.0748 0.09609 0.10916 0.11545 0.12035 0.13655 0.14076 0.1424 & 
0.143764 0.15093 0.163358 0.1733 0.18252 0.185712 0.19494 0.198928 & 
0.1996 0.202111 0.205309 0.21528 0.221399 0.228785 0.233469 0.240875 & 
0.24684 0.2515 0.26645 0.275129 0.275428 0.2795 0.281441 0.28292 0.28956 & 
0.29165 0.2943 0.301741 0.31069 0.317062 0.3258 0.3435 0.3454 0.3459 & 
0.35603 0.3685 0.3718 0.38782 0.3903 0.41029 0.433 0.4484 0.4551 & 
0.5172 0.7425 0.7947 
C  




SP3 D 0.00016 0.00037 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 & 
0.0011 0.0001 0.0006 0.00086 0.0154 0.0007 0.00026 0.00012 0.0022 & 
0.00005 0.1096 0.00076 0.0508 0.0001 0.0034 0.572 0.0063 0.00042 & 
0.001 0.0108 0.0501 0.00027 0.0012 0.00008 0.00029 0.00075 0.00053 & 
0.0004 0.00006 0.00042 0.00007 0.0027 0.00006 0.00005 0.00007 0.00038 & 
0.00033 0.00005 0.00004 0.00001 0.000004 0.00003 0.0007 0.00038 0.00005 & 
0.0007 0.0007 0.00038 0.0004 0.00003 0.00004 0.00001 0.00008 0.000004 & 
0.000004 0.000006 
c   ---------------------       
c   ***  TALLY CARDS  *** 
c   ---------------------           
C Summed Tally 
C 
F8:P 110 




FC18 Tally With GEB 
FT18 GEB 0.000594701 0.000763331 0.85487 
C 
C Energy Bins 
C 
E0 0 1e-8 .0000194 8190i 1.5925365 $8192 bins 
PHYS:P 4J 1 
MODE P    
print          




APPENDIX F: SIMULATION OUTPUT 
F.1 Source Definition Comparison of Simulations  
 
Figure F-1. Comparison of MCNPX Simulation for 
235
U Source Definition with 
and without 
238
U Source Definition. 
 
Table F-1. Peak Area and Continuum Comparison of MCNPX 185.7 keV 
Emission with and without 
238
U Source Definition. 










[% of Integral] 
235U  
(without 238U) 









































F.2 Simulation Output for Passive and Transmission Simulations 
 
Figure F-2. 85 g U/L Comparison of 
137




































Figure F-3. 75 g U/L Comparison of 
137




































Figure F-4. 50 g U/L Comparison of 
137




































Figure F-5. 10 g U/L Comparison of 
137











































































































APPENDIX G: DILUTION MEASUREMENT FULL SPECTRA 
 


























Detector Comparison - 90g U/L - Backshield





























Detector Comparison - 85g U/L - Backshield





























Detector Comparison - 75g U/L - Backshield





























Detector Comparison - 50g U/L - Backshield




























Detector Comparison - 10g U/L - Backshield





Figure G-6. Peak Area Ratios of 
137
Cs Emissions of 661.7 keV to 185.7 keV for 
Transmission Measurement Data as a Function of Solution Concentration. 





















Figure G-7. Peak Area Values as a Function of Solution Concentration for 
137
Cs 
Transmission Measurements for Falcon BEGe. 





































APPENDIX H: DILUTION MEASUREMENT FULL SPECTRA 
 
Figure H-1. Full Spectrum Detector Comparison of UNCLE Flowrate 























Falcon HPGe UNCLE Setup1-1070RPM Inspector 1000 LaBr3 UNCLE Setup1-1070RPM





Figure H-2. Full Spectrum Detector Comparison of Backshield at 500 RPM 























Falcon HPGe UNCLE Setup2-500RPM Inspector 1000 LaBr3 UNCLE Setup2-500RPM








































3547.40 3556.97 - - 
 






















APPENDIX I: BACKGROUND MEASUREMENTS  
 



























APPENDIX J: MCNPX EFFICIENCY MODELS 
C NUCP MCNPX Models  (UNCLE system)                                   
c 90g/L  - F1 Tally                                                                                                                                             
c                                                                                
c  Cells                                                                         
c                                                                                
c  101     3 -0.001293 -101 102    imp:p=1 $ Tally Surface                       
  102     1   -7.92 -102 103  $ SS Tube 
  103     2  -1.122 -103  $ U Nitrate 
  104     6   -1.03 -107  $Epoxy Lid 
  106     3 -0.001293 -108 104  $ Air btn col detector 
  105     9    -2.7 -104 134  $ Detector Al Endcap 
  107     5     -11 104 108 -135  $ Cu col detector 
  108     5     -11 135 -125  $ Tin col detector 
  109     5     -11 125 -105  $ W Collimator 
  111     0         -134 124  $ Detector Vacuum 
  110    10 -5.3234 -124  $ Ge Crystal 
  112     4  -11.34 -106  $ Pb Shield Bottom Brick 
  113     4  -11.34 -109  $ Pb Shield Top Brick 
  114     4  -11.34 -110  $ Pb Shield Right Brick 
  115     4  -11.34 -111  $ Pb Shield Left Brick 
  116     4  -11.34 -113  $ Pb Backshield 
c 900     0  -999 102 105 106 107 109  110 111 113 imp:p=1 $ Environment Shell    
  900     3 -0.001293 -999 102 105 107 106 109 110 111 113  $ Environment S 
  999     0         999  $ Void 
 
c                                                                                
c   Surface                                                                      
c 101  1 rcc 0    0   -0.635    0   0   63.6524    4.51325 $ Tally Box           
  102     1 rcc 0 0 -0.635 0 0 63.6524 4.44  $ SS Tube 
  103     1 rcc 0 0 0 0 0 60.2742 3.92  $ UN 
  124     1 rcc -8.275 0 31.8262 -2 0 0 2.985  $ Ge crystal 
  134     1 rcc -6.905 0 31.8262 -4.1 0 0 3.95  $ vacuum 
  104     1 rcc -6.785 0 31.8262 -4.3 0 0 4.1  $ Detector Endcap .12cm thick 
  108     1 rcc -5.235 0 31.8262 -5.85 0 0 5.7  $ Air around detector 
  105     1 rcc -5.235 0 31.8262 -15 0 0 6.5  $ W Collimator 
  125     1 rcc -5.235 0 31.8262 -15 0 0 6  $ Sn Collimator 
  135     1 rcc -5.235 0 31.8262 -15 0 0 5.9  $ Cu Collimator 
  107     1 rcc -5.075 0 31.8262 -0.16 0 0 6.5  $ Epoxy Front Lid 
  106     1 rpp -15.075 -5.075 -10.15 10.15 16.6762 $ Pb Shield Bottom Br 
                 21.6762 
  109     1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 -10.15 10.15 41.9762 $ Pb Shield Top Brick 
                 51.9762 
  110     1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 6.51 16.51 21.6763 $ Pb Shield Right Brick 
                 41.9761 
  111     1 rpp -10.075 -5.075 -16.51 -6.51 21.6763 $ Pb Shield Left Brick 
                 41.9761 
  113     1 rpp 4.7002 9.7002 -10.15 10.15 26.8262 36.8262  $Backshield 
  999     1 rcc 0 0 -75 0 0 200 50  $ Void Cylinder 
c                                                                                
 
c                                                                                
c Data Cards                                                                     
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  TRANSFORMATION  ***                                                     
c   ------------------------                                                     




mode  p 
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  MATERIAL CARDS  ***                                                     
c   ------------------------                                                     
c                                                                                
c     Material 1, Stainless Steel 304L      (-7.92)                              
m1    26000.          0.05936  $MAT4 
      24000.          0.01743 28000.          0.00772 25055.          0.00174  
c                                                                                
c     Material 2,  Uranium nitrate solution.  Mostly water.                      
c     From UNCLE description                                                     
c     90 grams Uranium / 1000 mL H2O  (-1.122)                                   
m2    92238.          -0.0796  $MAT8 
      92235.         -0.00061 92234.          -5e-006 8000.         -0.815185  
      1000.         -0.097521 7000.          -0.00708  
c                                                                                
c     Material 3, Air                                                            
m3    8016.           -0.2314  $MAT 
      7014.           -0.7558 18000.          -0.0128  
c                                                                                
c     Material 4, Pb                                                             
m4    82000.               -1  $MAT 
c     Material 5, Collimator (density 11g/cc)                                    
m5    74000.            -0.98  $MAT 
      6000.           -0.0171 1000.           -0.0029  
c                                                                                
c     Material 6, Epoxy (density 1.07g/cc)                                       
m6    1000.             -0.06  $MAT 
      6000.            -0.721 8000.            -0.219  
c     Material 7, Copper                                                         
m7    29000.               -1  $MAT 
c     Material 8, Tin                                                            
m8    50000.               -1  $MAT 
c     Material 9, Al                                                             
m9    13000.               -1  $MAT 
c     Material 10, HPGe                                                          
m10   32000.04p             1  $HPGe 
imp:p             1 15r                     0  $ 102, 999 
c                                                                                
c                                                                                
c   ***  SOURCE DEF  ***                                                         
c   --------------------                                                         
c     Cell source of Uranium dissolved in water,                                 
c     spontaneous fission spectrum, U-238                                          
c     cylindrical source centered in solution pipe                               
sdef PAR=2  POS=0 0 0   AXS=0 0 1  RAD=d1   EXT=d2  ERG=d3 CEL=103               
si1    3.92                                                                      
sp1  -21  1                         $Radial sampling                             
si2   60.2742                                                                    
sp2  -21  0                         $Vertical cylinder sampling                  
c RadSource Run: Tue May 15 13:33:13 2012                                        
c                                                                                
c Input Isotopes                                                                 
c U-234  0.01%                                                                   
c U-235  0.76%                                                                   
c U-238  99.23%                                                                  
c                                                                                
c Total: 100%                                                                    
c                                                                                




c ========================================================                       
c  1    DISCRETE GAMMA LINE energies (MeV)                                       
si3 L 0.0316 0.0347 0.0414 0.04195 0.05122 0.0541 0.05425 0.06437 0.0727 &       
0.07372 0.0748 0.09609 0.10916 0.11545 0.12035 0.13655 0.14076 0.1424 &          
0.143764 0.15093 0.163358 0.1733 0.18252 0.185712 0.19494 0.198928 &             
0.1996 0.202111 0.205309 0.21528 0.221399 0.228785 0.233469 0.240875 &           
0.24684 0.2515 0.26645 0.275129 0.275428 0.2795 0.281441 0.28292 0.28956 &       
0.29165 0.2943 0.301741 0.31069 0.317062 0.3258 0.3435 0.3454 0.3459 &           
0.35603 0.3685 0.3718 0.38782 0.3903 0.41029 0.433 0.4484 0.4551 &               
0.5172 0.7425 0.7947                                                             
c                                                                                
c  1    ASSOCIATED photon intensities :                                          
sp3 D 0.00016 0.00037 0.0003 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 &                
0.0011 0.0001 0.0006 0.00086 0.0154 0.0007 0.00026 0.00012 0.0022 &              
0.00005 0.1096 0.00076 0.0508 0.0001 0.0034 0.572 0.0063 0.00042 &               
0.001 0.0108 0.0501 0.00027 0.0012 0.00008 0.00029 0.00075 0.00053 &             
0.0004 0.00006 0.00042 0.00007 0.0027 0.00006 0.00005 0.00007 0.00038 &          
0.00033 0.00005 0.00004 0.00001 0.000004 0.00003 0.0007 0.00038 0.00005 &        
0.0007 0.0007 0.00038 0.0004 0.00003 0.00004 0.00001 0.00008 0.000004 &          
0.000004 0.000006                                                                
c   ---------------------                                                        
c   ***  TALLY CARDS  ***                                                        
c   ---------------------                                                        
c F1 Tally Over Axial length of UN for CF                                        
f1:p 103.1 103.2 103.3 T                                                         
fc1 UN Energy Bin F1 Tally                                                                                                                                   
c                                                                                
c F1 Tally Over Axial length of Pipe for CF                                      
f11:p 102.1 102.2 102.3 T                                                        
fc11 Pipe Energy Bin F1 Tally                                                    
c                                                                                
c F1 Tally Over Axial length of Coll Front for CF                                
f21:p 105.1 108.3 T                                                              
fc21 Collimator Energy Bin F1 Tally                                              
c                                                                                
c F1 Tally Over Detector Housing                                                 
f31:p 104.1 104.2 104.3 T                                                        
fc31 Housing Energy Bin F1 Tally                                                 
c                                                                                
c F1 Tally Over Crystal for CF                                                   
f41:p 124.1 124.2 124.3 T                                                        
fc41 Crystal Energy Bin F1 Tally                                                 
c                                                                                
c Energy Bins                                                                    
e0 0 1e-8 .0000194 8190i 1.5925365 $8192 bins                                    
phys:p 4J 1                                                                      
print                                                                            





APPENDIX K: ISOCS SIMULATIONS 





Figure K-1. ISOCS Software Interface and Input Parameters for (A) Falcon 
BEGE Detector and (B) Tungsten Collimator. 
 
(A) UN-Filled Pipe Parameters: 
1.1 = Pipe thickness 
1.2 = Pipe inner diameter 
1.3 = Pipe height (+ axis) 
1.4 = Pipe height (- axis) 
3.1= UN inner diameter 
3.2 = UN height (+ axis) 
3.3 = UN height (- axis) 
4.1 = Epoxy face on Falcon tungsten detector 
 
(B) Falcon Tungsten Parameters: 
1.1 = Distance in front of detector face 
1.5 = Outer diameter 
1.6 = Collimator thickness 












Figure K-2. ISOCS Software Interface and Input Parameters for (A) Osprey 2x2-





K.2 ISOCS Efficiency Values at for Collimated/Shielded Detectors 
without Pipe Wall at Dilution Concentrations  
 
 




































































K.3 ISOCS Efficiency Values at for Uncollimated/Unshielded 
Detectors without Pipe Wall at Dilution Concentrations  
 
 
Figure K-5. ISOCS Efficiency Calculations of UN for Uncollimated Falcon 
















































































K.4 ISOCS Efficiency Comparison for Falcon and Osprey without 
Pipe Wall 
At 90 g U/L (without pipe wall), Figure K-7 shows a comparison of the efficiency of 
the Pb-shielded Osprey with the W collimated Falcon. At 90 g U/L, Figure K-8 shows 




Figure K-7. Comparison of ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for 





























Falcon 90g U/L (Collimated without Pipe Wall)






Figure K-8. Comparison of ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for 






























Falcon 90g U/L (Uncollimated without Pipe Wall)





Figure K-9. Comparison of ISOCS Calculated Efficiencies for 
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K.5 ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Results 
K.5.1 Source-Detector Distance Variation 
 
Figure K-10. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations 
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Gnuplot Fit for 185.7 keV Efficiency Effect on Source-Detector Distance 
 
     
 
      
      [K-1] 
 
After 132 iterations the fit converged. 
final sum of squares of residuals : 5.03138e-010 
rel. change during last iteration : -1.89784e-012 
 
degrees of freedom    (FIT_NDF)                        : 28 
rms of residuals      (FIT_STDFIT) = sqrt(WSSR/ndf)    : 4.23901e-006 
variance of residuals (reduced chisquare) = WSSR/ndf   : 1.79692e-011 
 
Final set of parameters            Asymptotic Standard Error 
=======================            ========================== 
 
a               = 0.473218         +/- 0.007003     (1.48%) 
b               = 22.8315          +/- 0.242        (1.06%) 
 
 
correlation matrix of the fit parameters: 
 
               a      b 
a               1.000 




K.5.2 Pipe Thickness Variation 
 
 
Figure K-11. ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator Simulations: Efficiency Calculations 
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APPENDIX L: MATERIAL SUBSTITUTION ANALYSIS 
USING MCNPX 




U (g U/L) 
Equivalent Mass UN 





Table L-2. Mass Fraction of UN-Pb(NO3)2 Solution Employed in MCNPX 
Simulations for Various Enrichments. 
 
L-2 (A). 5g U/L Substitution 
Enrichment 0.76% 1.00% 5.00% 10.00% 
238U 7.57% 7.57% 7.57% 7.57% 
235U 0.00058% 0.00076% 0.00379% 0.00757% 
N  0.69% 0.69% 0.69% 0.69% 
H  9.80% 9.80% 9.80% 9.80% 
O  81.81% 81.81% 81.81% 81.81% 
Pb 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 
 
L-2 (B). 10g U/L Substitution 
Enrichment 0.76% 1.00% 5.00% 10.00% 
238U 7.07% 7.06% 6.77% 6.42% 
235U 0.05% 0.07% 0.36% 0.71% 
N  0.66% 0.66% 0.66% 0.66% 
H  9.86% 9.86% 9.86% 9.86% 
O  82.11% 82.11% 82.11% 82.11% 






L-2 (C). 20g U/L Substitution. 
Enrichment 0.76% 1.00% 5.00% 10.00% 
238U 6.19% 6.18% 5.93% 5.61% 
235U 0.05% 0.06% 0.31% 0.62% 
N  0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 0.62% 
H  9.97% 9.97% 9.97% 9.97% 
O  82.70% 82.70% 82.70% 82.70% 






Figure L-1. Peak Area (cpm) in 185.7 keV ROI for 
235
U as a Function of 
235
U 
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